UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

5-5-2015

Smith v. Smith Clerk's Record v. 1 Dckt. 42621

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"Smith v. Smith Clerk's Record v. 1 Dckt. 42621" (2015). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 5643.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/5643

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

HORTO
Pia ntiff aod Counterclaim
V

ff/Appellant

bird- e y fl

I-

ff/Appel nt

odetJt

4 ppu/l' I

' L

i •

t o/tltt.

t..ltc D.

"· • t£-:tlfi r

- - - - - - _ _ _ J11Jidal.

oonf' JI ___ _

_ ___ _ _

, i ni

,.,,{)'

for Appdl.tmt

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STAFFORD L. SMITH,
Plaintiff and Counterclaim
Defendant/Respondent
v.
WOODRUFF D. SMITH,
Defendant and Counterclaim
Plaintiff/Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2014-1434
Docket No. 42621

WOODRUFF D. SMITH,
)
Defendant/Appellant.
)
Third-Party Plaintiff/Appellant, )
)
V.
)
)
)
SMITH CHEVROLET CO. INC. and
STAFFWOOD ~ARTNERSHIP,
)
)
Third-Party Defendants
)
Respondent.
)

**************
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL

**************
Appeal from the District Court of the
Seventh Judicial District of the State of Idaho,
in and for the County of Bonneville

HONORABLE Jon J. Shindurling, District Judge.

************ * *

D. Mayfield
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36 South State Street, Suite 1400
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
iv_u,..,11a1.,

Kara L. Pettit
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Stanley J. Preston
PRESTON & SCOTT
Five Gateway Office Center
178 S. Rio Grande Street, Suite 250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Attorney for Appellant

Attorney for Respondent
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Stafford L Smith vs. Woodruff Smith, etal.

Woodruff

Stafford

Smith Chevrolet Co.

, Staffwood

Date

Code

User

3/7/2014

NGOC

CARTER

New Case Filed-Other Claims

Jon J. Shindurling

NOAP

CARTER

Plaintiff: Smith, Stafford L Notice Of Appearance
Kara L Pettit

Jon J. Shindurling

CARTER

Filing: A -All initial civil case filings of any type not Jon J. Shindurling
listed in categories B-H, or the other A listings
below Paid by: Pettit, Kara L (attorney for Smith,
Stafford L) Receipt number: 0010878 Dated:
3/7/2014 Amount: $96.00 (Cash) For: Smith,
Stafford L {plaintiff)

CARTER

Complaint (Filed Under Seal)

Jon J. Shindurling

MOTN

CARTER

Document sealed
Plaintiff- Ex Parte Motion To Seal Complaint

Jon J. Shindurling

3/10/2014

ORDR

LYKE

Order Granting Ex Parte Motion to Seal
Complaint

Jon J. Shindurling

3/12/2014

SMIS

CARTER

Summons Issued

Jon J. Shindurling

3/14/2014

MOTN

HUMPHREY

Plaintiffs Ex Parte Motion To Seal Amended
Complaint

Jon J. Shindurling

3/17/2014

ORDR

LYKE

Order Granting Ex Parte Motion to Seal
Complaint

Jon J. Shindurling

COMP

LYKE

Amended Complaint Filed

Jon J. Shindurling

CARTER

Document sealed
Acceptance Of Service
03/14/2014
Michael W. Spence and Greggory J Savage
(attorneys) For Woodruff D. Smith

Jon J. Shindurling

COMP

3/21/2014

3/24/2014

Judge

MOTN

HUMPHREY

Motion For Limited Admission Pro Hae Vice Michael R. Carlston

Jon J. Shindurling

MOTN

HUMPHREY

Motion For Limited Admission Pro Hae Vice Stanley J. Preston

Jon J. Shindurling

3/27/2014

MOTN

CARTER

Plaintiff - (2) Motion For Pro Hae Vice Admission

Jon J. Shindurling

3/28/2014

ORDR

LYKE

Order Granting Limited Admission Pro Hae Vice - Jon J. Shindurling
Stanley J. Preston

NOAP

LYKE

Plaintiff: Smith, Stafford L Notice Of Appearance
Stanley J. Preston

ORDR

LYKE

Order Granting Limited Admission Pro Hae Vice - Jon J. Shindurling
Michael R. Carlston

NOAP

LYKE

Plaintiff: Smith, Stafford L Notice Of Appearance
Michael R Carlston

ORDR

LYKE

Order Granting Limited Admission Pro Hae Vice - Jon J. Shindurling
Michael W. Spence

ORDR

LYKE

Order Granting Limited Admission Pro Hae Vice - Jon J. Shindurling
Greggory J. Savage

NOAP

LYKE

Plaintiff: Smith, Stafford L Notice Of Appearance
Michael W. Spence

Jon J. Shindurling

NOAP

LYKE

Plaintiff: Smith, Stafford L Notice Of
J.

Jon

4/2/2014

4/8/2014

Jon J. Shindurling

Jon J. Shindurling

1
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Stafford

vs. Woodruff

Smith Chevrolet Co.

Date

Code

User

4/14/2014

NOAP

CEARLY

Defendant: Smith, Woodruff Notice Of
Appearance Michael D Mayfield

CEARLY

Filing: Technology Cost - CC Paid by: Mayfield, Jon J. Shindurling
Michael D (attorney for Smith, Woodruff) Receipt
number: 0017064 Dated: 4/15/2014 Amount:
$3.00 (Credit card) For: Smith, Woodruff
(defendant)

CEARLY

Jon J. Shindurling
Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other
than the plaintiff or petitioner Paid by: Mayfield,
Michael D (attorney for Smith, Woodruff) Receipt
number: 0017064 Dated: 4/15/2014 Amount:
$66.00 (Credit card) For: Smith, Woodruff
(defendant)

CEARLY

Filing: K3 - Third party complaint - This fee is in
addition to any fee filed as a plaintiff initiating the
case or as a defendant appearing in the case.
Paid by: Mayfield, Michael D (attorney for Smith,
Woodruff) Receipt number: 0017068 Dated:
4/15/2014 Amount: $14.00 (Check) For: Smith,
Woodruff (defendant)

CEARLY

Filing: K4 - Cross Claim (defendant v defendant Jon J. Shindurling
or plaintiff v. plaintiff) This fee is in addition to any
fee filed as a plaintiff to initiate the case or as a
defendant appearing in the case Paid by:
Mayfield, Michael D (attorney for Smith,
Woodruff) Receipt number: 0017068 Dated:
4/15/2014 Amount: $14.00 (Check) For: Smith,
Woodruff (defendant)

MOTN

CEARLY

Third-Party Plaintiff - Motion To Dismiss Or In The Jon J. Shindurling
Alternative Motion For Summary Judgment

MEMO

CEARLY

Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Dismiss
Or In The Alternative Motion For Summary
Judgment

ANSW

CEARLY

Answer, Counterclaim And Third Party Complaint Jon J. Shindurling
(With Jury Demand)

4/21/2014

HRSC

LYKE

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 06/02/2014 11 :00
AM) Motion to Stay/Motion for Judgment

Jon J. Shindurling

4/28/2014

NOTH

HUMPHREY

Notice Of Hearing - 06/02/2014@ 9:30AM
DefendanUCounterclaimant and Third-Party
Plaintiff's Motion To Dismiss Or In The
Alternative, Motion For Summary Judgment

Jon J. Shindurling

5/16/2014

ANSW

CEARLY

Stafford Smith Reply To Counterclaim And Smith Jon J. Shindur!ing
Chevrolet Answer To Third-Party Complaint

NOAP

CEARLY

Defendant: Smith Chevrolet Co. Inc. Notice Of
Appearance Michael R Carlston

Judge
Jon J. Shindurling

Jon J. Shindurling

Jon J. Shindurling

Jon J. Shindurling
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Stafford L Smith vs. Woodruff Smith, etal.

Stafford
Date

Smith vs. Woodruff
Code

5/27/2014

Staffwood

User

Judge

CEARLY

Jon J. Shindurling
Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other
than the plaintiff or petitioner Paid by: Carlston,
Michael R (attorney for Smith Chevrolet Co. Inc.)
Receipt number: 0022976 Dated: 5/20/2014
Amount: $66.00 (Credit card) For: Smith
Chevrolet Co. Inc. (defendant)

CEARLY

Filing: Technology Cost - CC Paid by: Carlston, Jon J. Shindurling
Michael R (attorney for Smith Chevrolet Co. Inc.)
Receipt number: 0022976 Dated: 5/20/2014
Amount: $3.00 (Credit card) For: Smith Chevrolet
Co. Inc. (defendant)

MOTN

CEARLY

Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant/Third-Party
Defendant - Motion For Judgment On The
Pleadings Filed By Stafford Smith And Smith
Chevrolet

MEMO

CEARLY

Memorandum In Support Of Motion For Judgment Jon J. Shindurling
On The Pleadings Filed By Stafford Smith And
Smith Chevrolet

NOTH

CEARLY

Notice Of Hearing RE: Motion For Judgment On Jon J. Shindurling
The Pleadings Filed By Stafford Smith And Smith
Chevrolet
06-02-14 @ 9:30 AM

MEMO

CARTER

Plaintiffs Memorandum In Opposition To
Defendants Motion To Dismiss Or In The
Alternative Motion For Summary Judgment

Jon J. Shindurling

CARTER

Defendant - Opposition TO Stafford Smith And
Smith Chevrolets Motion For Judgment On The
Pleadings

Jon J. Shindurling

5/16/2014

5/21/2014

Smith Chevrolet Co.

Jon J. Shindurling

5/30/2014

MEMO

QUINTANA

Jon J. Shindurling
Defendant - Reply Memorandum in Support of
Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative Motion For
Summary Judgment

6/2/2014

MEMO

LYKE

Jon J. Shindurling
Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Judgment o the Pleadings Filed by Stafford Smith
and Smith Chevrolet

MINE

LYKE

Minute Entry
Jon J. Shindurling
Hearing type: Motion
Hearing date: 6/2/2014
Time: 10:49 am
Courtroom:
Court reporter: Mary Fox
Minutes Clerk: Amanda Lyke
Tape Number:
Party: Smith Chevrolet Co. Inc., Attorney: Michael
Carlston
Party: Stafford Smith, Attorney: Kara Pettit
Party: Staffwood Partnership
Party: Woodruff Smith, Attorney: Michael Mayfield
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Stafford

Smith

Woodruff

Smith Chevrolet Co.

Staffwood

Date

Code

User

6/2/2014

DCHH

LYKE

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
Jon J. Shindurling
06/02/2014 11 :00 AM: District Court Hearing Hele
Court Reporter: Mary Fox
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Pit's Motion for Judgment on
Pleadings; Def. Motion to Dismiss Under 150

MEMO

HUMPHREY

Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant And Third-Party Jon J. Shindurling
Defendant's Reply Memorandum In Support Of
Motion For Judgment On The Pleadings Filed By
Stafford Smith And Smith Chevrolet

6/23/2014

MRUD

HUMPHREY

Mail Returned Unable to Deliver - Stanley J.
Preston Resent

Jon J. Shindurling

7/28/2014

ORDR

LYKE

Opinion and Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings and Denying
Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings or in the Alternative Motion for
Summary Judgment

Jon J. Shindurling

8/20/2014

JDMT

LYKE

Judgment

Jon J. Shindurling

STATUS

LYKE

Case Status Changed: Closed

Jon J. Shindurling

CDIS

LYKE

Civil Disposition entered for: Smith Chevrolet Co. Jon J. Shindurling
Inc., Defendant; Smith, Woodruff, Defendant;
Staffwood Partnership, Defendant; Smith,
Stafford L, Plaintiff. Filing date: 8/20/2014

QUINTANA

Objections to Proposed Judgment

Jon J. Shindurling

HRSC

LYKE

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 10/20/2014 10:00
AM) Mtn for Attorney Fees

Jon J. Shindurling

STATUS

LYKE

Case Status Changed: Closed pending clerk
action

Jon J. Shindurling

MOTN

BIRCH

Plaintiff's Motion For Attorneys' Fees And Costs
(fax)

Jon J. Shindurling

MEMO

BIRCH

Memorandum In Support Of Plaintiffs Motion for
Attorneys' Fees And Costs (fax)

Jon J. Shindurling

AFFD

BIRCH

Affidavit Of Stanley J. Preston In Support Of
Plaintiffs Motion for Attorneys' Fees And Costs
(fax)

Jon J. Shindurling

NOTH

BIRCH

Notice Of Hearing - October 20, 2014@ 10AM
(fax)

Jon J. Shindurling

AFFD

BIRCH

Affidavit Of Michael R. Carlston In Support Of
Plaintiffs Motion For Attorneys' Fees And Costs
(fax)

Jon J. Shindurling

CARTER

Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Jon J. Shinduiling
Supreme Court Paid by: Mayfield, Michael D
(attorney for Smith, Woodruff) Receipt number:
0044696 Dated: 10/2/2014 Amount: $129.00
(Check) For: Smith, Woodruff (defendant)

CARTER

Defendant (Woofruff D. Smith) - Notice Of Appeal Jon J.

8/21/2014
8/28/2014

9/3/2014

10/1/2014

NOTC

Judge

Date: 3/31/2015
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Stafford

Smith vs. Woodruff

Smith Chevrolet Co.
Judge

Date

Code

User

10/1/2014

APSC

CARTER

Appealed To The Supreme Court

Jon J. Shindurling

10/10/2014

NOTC

BIRCH

Notice Of Change Of Address - Stanley J.
Preston, counsel for Plaintiff/Counterclaim

Jon J. Shindurling

CONT

LYKE

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
10/20/2014 10:00 AM: Continued Mtn for
Attorney Fees

Jon J. Shindurling

HRSC

LYKE

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 10/27/2014 10:30
AM) Mtn for Attorney

Jon J. Shindurling

LYKE

Notice of Hearing

Jon J. Shindurling

10/14/2014

BIRCH

Opposition To Plaintiff's Motion For Attorneys'
Fees And Costs

Jon J. Shindurling

10/15/2014

CARTER

Plaintiff - Request For Additional Transcript

Jon J. Shindurling

BNDC

PADILLA

Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 47005 Dated
10/16/2014 for 200.00)

Jon J. Shindurling

BNDC

PADILLA

Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 47007 Dated
10/16/2014 for 100.00)

Jon J. Shindurling

CERTAP

PADILLA

Clerk's Certificate of Appeal

Jon J. Shindurling

APSC

PADILLA

Appealed To The Supreme Court

Jon J. Shindurling

MOTN

LYKE

Motion to Appear Telephonically at Hearing
scheduled for October 27, 2014

Jon J. Shindurling

MOTN

CARTER

Plaintiffs Motion To Appear Telephonically At
Hearing Scheduled For October 27, 2014

Jon J. Shindurling

10/23/2014

MEMO

HUMPHREY

Reply Memorandum In Support Of Plaintiff's
Motion For Attorneys' Fees And Costs

Jon J. Shindurling

10/27/2014

MINE

LYKE

Jon J. Shindurling
Minute Entry
Hearing type: Motion
Hearing date: 10/27/2014
Time: 10:30 am
Courtroom:
Court reporter: Mary Fox
Minutes Clerk: Amanda Lyke
Tape Number:
Party: Stafford Smith, Attorney: Kara Pettit
Party: Woodruff Smith, Attorney: Michael Mayfield

DCHH

LYKE

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
Jon J. Shindurling
10/27/2014 10:30 AM: District Court Hearing Hele
Court Reporter: Mary Fox
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Mtn for Attorney Fees
Stan Preston #801-869-1623 Under 50

12/1/2014

DEOP

ANDERSEN

Opinion and Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for
Attorney's Fees

Jon J. Shindurling

12/10/2014

NOTC

HUMPHREY

Amended Notice Of Appeal

Jon J. Shindurling

12/18/2014

CARTER

Plaintiff - Request For Additional Transcript

Jon J. Shindurling

12/23/2014

CARTER

Receipt For Payment Of

Jon J.

10/16/2014

10/17/2014

Time:
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Stafford
Date

vs. Woodruff
Code

Smith Chevrolet Co. Inc.,
Judge

User

1/23/2015

CARTER

***WRIT AND $2 CASH RETURNED, PER
JUDGES CLERK, JUDGMENT PAPERWORK
NEEDS SUBMITTED SO THAT A JUDGMENT
CAN BE ENTERED BEFORE ISSUING A
WRIT***

1/27/2015

CARTER

Miscellaneous Payment: For Certifying The Same Jon J. Shindurling
Additional Fee For Certificate And Seal Paid by:
Justin Seamons Receipt number: 0003884
Dated: 1/28/2015 Amount: $1.00 (Cash)

JDMT

LYKE

Judgment $79,262.18

CDIS

LYKE

Civil Disposition entered for: Smith Chevrolet Co. Jon J. Shindurling
Inc., Defendant; Smith, Woodruff, Defendant;
Staffwood Partnership, Defendant; Smith,
Stafford L, Plaintiff. Filing date: 1/29/2015

AFFD

JNICHOLS

Affidavit Of Amount Due Under Judgment

Jon J. Shindurling

WRIT

JNICHOLS

Writ OF Execution Issued Bonneville County
$79,963.37

Jon J. Shindurling

JNICHOLS

Miscellaneous Payment: Writs Of Execution Paid Jon J. Shindurling
by: Justin R. Seamons Receipt number: 0004884
Dated: 2/3/2015 Amount $2.00 (Cash)

1/29/2015

2/2/2015

Jon J. Shindurling

Jon J. Shindurling

3/23/2015

BNDC

QUINTANA

Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 12910 Dated
3/23/2015 for 71383.52)

Jon J. Shindurling

3/24/2015

MOTN

JNICHOLS

Motion To Stary Enforcement Of Judgment

Jon J. Shindurling

3/25/2015

MOTN

QUINTANA

Defendant/Counterclaim-Plaintiff and Third-Party Jon J. Shindurling
Plaintiffs Motion to Stay Enforcement of
Judgment

3/31/2015

BNDC

PADILLA

Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 14013 Dated
3/31/2015 for 509.73)

Jon J. Shindurling

Kara L. Pettit (Idaho State Bar No. 5276)
Michael R. Carlston (Utah State Bar No. 0577, Pro Hae Vice Admission To Be Submitted)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE, ST ATE OF IDAHO
STAFFORD L. SMITH,

COMPLAINT
(Filed Under Seal)

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No.:
WOODRUFF D. SMITH,

Judge:

Defendant.

Plaintiff Stafford L. Smith ("Plaintiff') hereby complains against Defendant WoodruffD.
Smith ("Defendant") as follows:

PARTIES AND JURISDICTION
1.

Plaintiff is an individual residing in the State of Idaho.

2.

Defendant is an individual residing in the State of Idaho.

3.

Plaintiff, through an Idaho limited liability partnership known as The SLS l, LLP

(formerly known as The SLS Limited Partnership, an Idaho limited partnership), is a fifty
percent (50%) owner of Staff\vood Partnership, an Idaho general partnership ("Staff\vood").
4.

Defendant, through an Idaho limited partnership known as The WDS Limited

Partnership is a fifty percent (50%) owner of Staffwood.
5.

Staff\vood is the owner of various properties that are the subject of this case, and

all of these properties are located in Bonneville County, Idaho, with the exception of one
property which is located in Bingham County, Idaho.
6.

Plaintiff and Defendant are brothers.

7.

Many of the acts and omissions at issue in this Complaint took place in

Bonneville County, Idaho. Plaintiff resides in Bonneville County, Idaho. Staff\vood's principal
place of business is located in Bonneville County, Idaho. In addition, this case involves real
estate and other property located in Bonneville and Bingham Counties, Idaho. Jurisdiction and
venue are therefore proper in this Court.
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

8.

Over the years, Plaintiff and Defendant have had various business relationships.

In approximately 2010, disputes arose between Plaintiff and Defendant regarding the respective
ownership interest each party had in certain businesses, and the manner in which the businesses
have been managed. Based on these disputes, Plaintiff and Defendant asserted and alleged
various legal claims against each other.
9.

In an effort to resolve their disputes and differences with each other, and to

separate ownership of the car dealerships and other businesses they had jointly owned, Plaintiff
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and Defendant entered into a Settlement Agreement, effective November 10, 2010 (the "2010
Settlement Agreement"), whereby ownership of the various car dealerships and certain other
businesses in which Plaintiff and Defendant had joint ownership were divided between Plaintiff
and Defendant.
l 0.

As part of the 20 IO Settlement Agreement, Plaintiff and Defendant, on behalf of

themselves and their various business entities entered into mutual releases of all claims.
11.

The closing of the 2010 Settlement Agreement took place on or about

February l 0, 2011.
12.

Subsequent to the closing of the 2010 Settlement Agreement, a lawsuit was

filed in the Seventh Judicial District Court of Bonneville County, State of Idaho, entitled
Woodrujf D. Smith, et al. v. Stafford L. Smith, et al., Case No. CV-11-1772 (the

"Lawsuit"), wherein Plaintiff and Defendant asserted various claims and counterclaims
against each other arising under the 2010 Settlement Agreement and otherwise.
13.

During the course of discovery related to the Lawsuit, the parties detennined

that there were additional disputes between them that were not addressed in the Lawsuit.
14.

Ultimately, Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a second Settlement Agreement,

effective July 5, 2012 (the "2012 Settlement Agreement"), whereby Plaintiff and Defendant
settled all additional claims and disputes between themselves and their various business entities
that were asserted in the Lawsuit, and that they had otherwise discovered.
15.

As part of the 2012 Settlement Agreement, Plaintiff and Defendant, on behalf of

themselves and their various business entities entered into mutual releases of all claims, and the
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Lawsuit was dismissed with prejudice.
16.

At all relevant times hereto, Michael Spence and Greggory Savage of the law firm

of Ray, Quinney & Nebeker, P.C. (collectively "RQN") have served as Defendant's attorneys.
Among other things, RQN represented Defendant and his business entities in the disputes that
led up to the 2010 Settlement Agreement, in the negotiation and finalization of the 2010
Settlement Agreement, in the Lawsuit and related disputes thereto, and in the negotiation and
finalization of the 2012 Settlement Agreement.
17.

At all times relevant hereto, RQN have held themselves out as the attorneys for

Defendant, with full authority to negotiate and enter into agreements on behalf of Defendant and
his business entities. In fact, RQN has routinely and repeatedly asserted that it represents
Defendant in the disputes between Plaintiff and Defendant over the past several years, as well as
in the disputes, negotiations, written communications and agreements that give 1ise to this case.
18.

Under the tern1s of the 2010 Settlement Agreement, Plaintiff and Defendant

agreed on terms regarding the management of Staffwood, in which they each continued to have a
fifty percent (50%) ownership interest. These terms included a provision whereby Plaintiff and
Defendant agreed to appoint a mutually acceptable third member to the Board of Staffwood for
the purpose of breaking any deadlock between Plaintiff and Defendant as the other two members
of Staffwood' s Board. In accordance with the terms of the 2010 Settlement Agreement, Plaintiff
and Defendant jointly agreed to appoint this third Board member.
19.

Under the terms of the 2010 Settlement Agreement, as amended by the 2012

Settlement Agreement, Plaintiff and Defendant also agreed to a procedure whereby the parties
4

1

had the right to initiate a bid process for the purpose of purchasing real property owned by
Staffwood.
20.

In early 2013, Plaintiff initiated this bid process by making a bid to purchase three

properties owned by Staffwood: (1) the building and related real property (the "Smith Chevrolet
Property") leased and occupied by the Smith Chevrolet dealership ("Smith Chevrolet") owned by
Plaintiff; (2) the building and related real property (the "RV Property") leased by Smith
Chevrolet, and occupied by an RV dealership owned by Plaintiff; and (3) a certain building and
related real property (the "Outlet Property") leased by Smith Chevrolet. The Smith Chevrolet
Property, the RV Property and the Outlet Property are collectively referred to herein as the "Bid
Properties."
21.

Staffwood had previously obtained a loan from Wells Fargo Bank (the "WFB

Loan"), which was secured by the Bid Properties. Smith Chevrolet advanced funds on behalf of
Staffwood substantially in excess of Smith Chevrolet's obligations for leasing the Bid Properties,
for the purpose of ensuring that Staffwood had adequate funds to pay its ongoing obligations,
which included, but are not limited to, accounting costs, taxes, insurance, maintenance, repairs
and servicing the WFB Loan.
22.

Under the 2012 Settlement Agreement, Staffwood agreed to reimburse Smith

Chevrolet for amounts it paid on behalf of Staffwood to make the payments on the WFB Loan,
and to meet the other obligations identified in the previous paragraph, to the extent these funds
exceeded the amount Smith Chevrolet was obligated to pay Staffwood for Smith Chevrolet's
iease of the Bid Properties.
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By the end of 2013, Defendant's share of the amounts owed to Smith Chevrolet
for the funds it had advanced on behalf of Staffwood exceeded $350,000. Defendant has never
paid his share of this obligation.
24.

By the end of 2013, the outstanding principal balance owed by Staffwood on the

WFB Loan exceeded $850,000.00.
25.

In response to Plaintiff's bid to purchase the Bid Properties, Defendant submitted

his own bid for the Bid Properties, and the parties traded bids for the Bid Prope1iies for several
months.
26.

After Defendant made the final bid for the Bid Properties, he then improperly

asserted that he was unwilling to purchase the Bid Properties unless Plaintiff and Staffwood
agreed to satisfy and meet certain unjustified and unreasonable demands and conditions related
to the Bid Properties, which Plaintiff was unwilling to do. This resulted in a new dispute
between Plaintiff and Defendant.
27.

During the back and forth between Plaintiff and Defendant, the third board

member of Staffwood resigned in response to frivolous and unsupported threats and accusations
made by Defendant and/or Defendant's agents. As a result, Staffwood was paralyzed to take
any action where Plaintiff and Defendant were not both in agreement.
28.

In an effort to negotiate a resolution of this dispute, a series of meetings and

communications took place between RQN as Defendant's attorneys and Plaintiff's attorneys.
29.

Plaintiff's attorneys subsequently sent a letter dated December 20, 2013 to

Defendant's attorneys, RQN, (the "December 20 Letter"), a copy of which is attached hereto as
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whereby Plaintiff offered to purchase the Bid Properties based on the following
material terms:
a.

Plaintiff would purchase the Bid Properties for $2,800,000.00; and

b.

The net proceeds from the sale of the Bid Properties would be divided

between Staffwood's partners after satisfying the WFB Loan and the amounts Staffwood
owed Smith Chevrolet for the funds it had advanced on behalf of Staffwood in excess of
Smith Chevrolet's lease obligations, as alleged above. See Exhibit A.
30.

In response, RQN sent Plaintiff's attorneys a letter dated January 13, 2014 (the

"January 13 Letter"), a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit B, wherein RQN, as
Defendant's attorneys, expressly stated, "Woody hereby accepts [Plaintiff's J offer as set forth in
your letter of December 20, 2013." Exhibit B. Significantly, Defendant and his accountant, Hal
Bennett were copied on the January 13 Letter.
31.

In the January 13 Letter, Defendant also expressly stated the following regarding

his understanding of the two material tern1s offered by Plaintiff in the December 20 Letter
regarding the purchase of the Bid Properties:
a.

"[Plaintiff] closes on the [Bid Properties] at $2.8 million." Exhibit B; and

b.

"All funds from the Closing shall go to the account of Staffwood, and

shall be disbursed as follows: (a) payoff of [the WFB Loan] (assumed to be about
$875,000 at closing); and (b) refund ofrent overpayment by Smith Chevrolet and other
expenses mentioned in your letter, will be set at $350,000. Balance of funds shall be
distributed equally to the partners." Exhibit B.
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32.

In the January 13 Letter, Defendant proposed,

" .. that the parties attempt to agree on a way that this transaction may be done
on a tax free basis. [Defendant's] accountants believe that by treating the entire
transaction as a distribution in dissolution of the parties' interest in Staffwood, the
parties can come out the same as agreed without incurring negative tax
consequences. This would seem to be beneficial to both parties, but since this
provision is outside of the terms of [Plaintiff's] offer, we make clear that we do
not require [Plaintiff's] agreement to [this proposal].
Exhibit B (emphasis added).
33.

In fact, in a subsequent email dated February 6, 2014 (the "February 6 Email"), a

copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit C, RQN again urged Plaintiff to acquire the Bid
Properties as "a dissolution," but RQN expressly acknowledged that this was not the deal that the
parties had agreed to, and stated, "[w ]e realize that [Plaintiff] has the right to treat this as a sale
and exchange of the [Bid Properties] .... " Exhibit C.
34.

While there was some additional back and forth on some other non-material

terms, regarding which the parties ultimately reached agreement, the written exchanges between
the attorneys for Plaintiff and Defendant establish that there was a clear offer and acceptance
regarding the material terms for Plaintiffs purchase of the Bid Properties.
35.

Therefore, Plaintiff and Defendant entered into an enforceable contract for

Plaintiffs purchase of the Bid Properties, which agreement is hereafter referred to as the "Bid
Properties Purchase Agreement."
36.

In addition to accepting Plaintiffs offer to purchase the Bid Properties in the

January 13 Letter, Defendant also made an offer regarding the division of the remaining real
property owned by Staffwood. See Exhibit B. Specifically, the January 13 Letter states that
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"[t]he balance of the [Staffwood] properties shall be divided into two sets of property/cash ...
[and Plaintiff] shall have the choice to choose Property Set A or Property Set B, and [Defendant]
shall receive the Property Set not elected by [Plaintiff]." Id.
37.

Pursuant to the January 13 Letter, Property Set A consisted of the Snake River

Landing Property, less $400,000 Cash to be paid to the Property Set B Recipient, and Property
Set B consisted of the Bellin Road Property, the Blackfoot Property, the proceeds from the recent
sale of the Pocatello property, and $400,000 Cash to be paid by the Property A Recipient. See id.
38.

In response to Defendant's offer to divide the remaining Staffwood properties on

the terms set forth in the January 13 Letter, Plaintiffs attorneys sent a letter to RQN dated
January 30, 2014 (the "January 30 Letter"), a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit D,
which stated, "[Plaintiff] is pleased that [Defendant] has accepted [Plaintiffs] settlement offer
based on the tenns communicated ... [in the December 20 Letter]. Please be advised that
[Plaintiff] is willing to divide the remaining Staffwood property consistent with the terms
outlined in [the January 13 Letter], and [Plaintiff] has decided to choose Property Set B."
39.

Again, while there was some back and forth on other non-material terms,

regarding which the parties ultimately reached agreement, the written exchanges between the
attorneys for Plaintiff and Defendant establish that there was a clear offer and acceptance
regarding the material terms for the division of Staffwood's remaining real property between
Plaintiff and Defendant.
40.

Therefore, Plaintiff and Defendant entered into an enforceable contract for

dividing between themselves the remaining reai property owned by Staffwood, which contract is
9
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hereafter referred to as the "Division of Staffwood Properties Agreement."
41.

In reliance on Defendant's representations and promises, Plaintiff communicated

to Defendant that he ready, willing, able and fully prepared to close on the transactions agreed to
under both the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement and the Division of Staffwood Properties
Agreement (coilectively, the "Agreements"), and convey the properties in accordance with the
terms of the Agreements. See February 20, 2014 Email from Stanley J. Preston to RQN and
attached documents, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit E.
42.

In response, Defendant has tried to insert new and unrelated demands that were

never part of the Agreements. Finally, Plaintiff sent a fom1al demand to Defendant to comply
with the Agreements and to close the transactions agreed to under the Agreements. See March 3,
2014 Letter from Stanley J. Preston to RQN, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit F.
43.

At all relevant times, Plaintiff has been ready, willing, able and fully prepared to

close on the Agreements and satisfy his contractual obligations under the Agreements.
44.

Defendant has failed and refused to proceed with the required closing of the

Agreements, in accordance with the tem1s of the Agreements.
45.

Defendant has now taken the position that the parties never entered into any

enforceable contracts with respect to the Agreements, contrary to the express written offers and
acceptances between the parties as set forth above.
46.

Specifically, Defendant is now asserting that the reason the Agreements are not

binding and enforceable is because a material condition to any agreement was Defendant's
insistence that the entire transaction be treated as a tax-free distribution of the Staffwood
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properties. Defendant's position, however, is directly rebutted by the express written statements
made by RQN in the January 13 Letter and the February 6 Email.
47.

The written communications between the parties establish that, while the division

of the remaining Staffwood properties other than the Bid Properties would be a distribution,
Defendant expressly agreed that Plaintiff had the right to purchase the Bid Properties.
48.

In the meantime, Plaintiff has now been required to pay-off the WFB Loan on

Staffwood's behalf with Plaintiff's own funds. The amount required to pay-off the WFB Loan
totaled $858,066, half of which amount Defendant is required to pay.
49.

Plaintiff has made demand on Defendant, as a 50% owner of Staffwood, to pay

Defendant's share of funds required to pay-off the WFB Loan, which amounts to $429,033.
Defendant has to date failed and refused to pay this sum to Plaintiff.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Breach of Contract Regarding the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement)

50.

Plaintiff incorporates herein by this reference the allegations set forth in the

preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.
51.

The Bid Properties Purchase Agreement constitutes a valid and enforceable

contract between Plaintiff and Defendant.
52.

Plaintiff and Defendant reached an agreement as to the material and essential

tenns of the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement, which tenns are sufficiently clear and certain to
enable the parties to specifically perfonn the tenns of the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement.
53.

The terms of the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement are reasonable and based on

adequate consideration.
11

1

54.

Plaintiff has performed all duties, promises and material obligations required of

Plaintiff under the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement, and all conditions precedent that Plaintiff
agreed to perform pursuant to the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement have been satisfied.
55.

Among other things, Plaintiff has offered, and is fully prepared, to pay the full

consideration called for in the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement, and continues to be ready,
willing and able both to pay the required consideration, and to close the real estate transactions,
required by the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement.
56.

Defendant has failed and refused, and continues to fail and refuse, to perform the

required closing pursuant to the terms of the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement, or to convey
the Bid Properties to Plaintiff.
57.

Defendant has breached the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement by engaging in

the conduct set forth above, including, without limitation, refusing to perform his obligations
under, or to close the real estate transactions required by, the Bid Properties Purchase
Agreement.
58.

The real property that Plaintiff agreed to purchase under the Bid Properties

Purchase Agreement is rare and has unique and special value to Plaintiff, and Plaintiff has no
adequate remedy at law to enforce the provisions of the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement,
other than specific performance of the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement.
59.

Plaintiff is entitled to specific perfonnance of the terms, conditions and provisions

of the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement by court decree ordering Defendant, among other
things, to complete conveyance of the Bid Properties and perform his other obligations under the
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Bid Properties Purchase Agreement.
60.

As a direct result of Defendant's various breaches of the Bid Properties Purchase

Agreement, Plaintiff has been damaged and is entitled to recover his actual, consequential,
incidental and expectancy damages, which Plaintiff has suffered as a result of Defendant's
breaches of the Bid Properties Agreement, ali in an amount to be determined at trial, which
amount exceeds $500,000.00.
61.

Plaintiff is also entitled to recover his reasonable attorneys' fees and costs

incurred in this matter, as well as appropriate pre- and post-judgment interest at the maximum
rate permitted by law, all in an amount to be determined at trial.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(Breach of Contract Regarding the Division of Staffwood Properties Agreement)

62.

Plaintiff incorporates herein by this reference the allegations set forth in the

preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.
63.

The Division of Staffwood Properties Agreement constitutes a valid and

enforceable contract between Plaintiff and Defendant.
64.

Plaintiff and Defendant reached an agreement as to the material and essential

tenns of the Division of Staffwood Properties Agreement, which terms are sufficiently clear and
certain to enable the parties to specifically perfonn the tenns of the Division of Staffwood
Properties Agreement.
65.

The terms of the Division of Staffwood Properties Agreement are reasonable and

based on adequate consideration.
66.

Plaintiff has performed all

promises and material obligations required of
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Plaintiff under the Division of Staffwood Properties Agreement, and all conditions precedent that
Plaintiff agreed to perform pursuant to the Division of Staffwood Properties Agreement have
been satisfied.
67.

Among other things, Plaintiff has offered, and is willing, able, ready and fully

prepared to dose the reai estate transactions, required by the Division of Staffwood Properties
Agreement.
68.

Defendant has failed and refused, and continues to fail and refuse, to perform the

required closing pursuant to the terms of the Division of Staffwood Properties Agreement, or to
divide the subject properties and convey them in accordance with the terms of the Division of
Staffwood Properties Agreement.
69.

Defendant has breached the Division of Staffwood Properties Agreement by

engaging in the conduct set forth above, including, without limitation, refusing to perform his
obligations under, or to close the real estate transactions required by, the Division of Staffwood
Properties Agreement.
70.

The real property that Plaintiff is entitled to receive under the Division of

Staffwood Properties Agreement is rare and has unique and special value to Plaintiff, and
Plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law to enforce the provisions of the Division of Staffwood
Properties Agreement, other than specific performance of the Division of Staffwood Properties
Agreement.
71.

Plaintiff is entitled to specific performance of the terms, conditions and provisions

of the Division of Staffwood Properties Agreement by court decree ordering Defendant, among
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other things, to complete conveyance of the required properties in accordance with the terms of,
and perform his other obligations under, the Division of Staffwood Properties Agreement.
72.

As a direct result of Defendant's various breaches of the Division of Staffwood

Properties Agreement, Plaintiff has been damaged and is entitled to recover his actual,
consequential, incidental and expectancy damages, which Plaintiff has suffered as a result of
Defendant's breaches of the Division of Staffwood Properties Agreement, all in an amount to be
determined at trial, which amount exceeds $500,000.00.
73.

Plaintiff is also entitled to recover his reasonable attorneys' fees and costs

incurred in this matter, as well as appropriate pre- and post-judgment interest at the maximum
rate permitted by law, all in an amount to be detem1ined at trial.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
(Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Regarding the Agreements)
74.

Plaintiff incorporates herein by this reference the allegations set forth in the

preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.
75.

Under Idaho law, and inherent in both of the Agreements, are implied covenants

of good faith and fair dealing. These covenants of good faith and fair dealing apply to every
aspect of these contractual relationships between Plaintiff and Defendant. These covenants of
good faith and fair dealing prohibit Defendant from intentionally or purposefully doing anything
which would impair, destroy or injure Plaintiff's right to receive the fruits of the A,greements and
the ordinary and reasonably anticipated benefits and consideration of the Agreements.
76.

To comply with these covenants, Defendant had an obligation to act consistently
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with the Agreements' agreed common purposes and Plaintiff's justified and reasonable
expectations.
77.

Defendant has breached his covenants of good faith and fair dealing to Plaintiff

by engaging in the conduct set forth above.
78.

As a direct result of Defendant's various breaches of his covenants of good faith

and fair dealing, Plaintiff has been damaged and is entitled to recover his actual, consequential,
incidental and expectancy damages, which Plaintiff suffered as a result of Defendant's breaches
of his covenants of good faith and fair dealing, all in an amount to be determined at trial, which
amount exceeds $500,000.00.
79.

Plaintiff is also entitled to recover his reasonable attorneys' fees and costs

incurred in this matter, as well as appropriate pre- and post-judgment interest at the maximum
rate pennitted by law, all in an amount to be detennined at trial.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Promissory Estoppel)
80.

Plaintiff incorporates herein by this reference the allegations set forth in the

preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.
81.

RQN, with the full authorization of Defendant and on behalf of Defendant,

delivered the January 13 Letter to Plaintiff's attorneys, wherein Defendant made certain
commitments and promises to Plaintiff, including the following: ( 1) Plaintiff had the right to
purchase the Bid Properties for $2.8 million; (2) Defendant would close on the sale of the Bid
Properties to Plaintiff, regardless of whether Plaintiff was willing to treat this transaction as a
tax-free distribution of property; (3) Defendant would pay $350,000 to Plaintiff to reimburse him
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for the amounts Smith Chevrolet advanced on behalf of Staffwood, as alleged above; and (4)
Defendant would agree to a conveyance to Plaintiff of one of the Staffwood Property Sets, at
Plaintiff's election.
82.

Defendant knew and expected, or reasonably should have known and expected,

that the promises set forth in the January 13 Letter would induce reliance by Plaintiff.
83.

Plaintiff has reasonably and detrimentally relied on the above-referenced

promises and commitments in the January 13 Letter.
84.

Defendant has repudiated the commitments and promises he made in the January

13 Letter, and now refuses to honor the commitments and promises set forth therein.
85.

Defendant must be estopped from repudiating and reneging on his commitments

and promises as set forth in the January 13 Letter.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for relief against Defendant as follows:
I.

Under his First Claim for Relief,
a.

For specific perfom1ance of the terms, conditions and provisions of the

Bid Properties Purchase Agreement by means of a court decree ordering Defendant to
complete conveyance of the Bid Properties and perfom1 his other obligations under the
Bid Properties Purchase Agreement;
b.

For compensation incidental to the decree of specific perfo1mancc as set

forth above, according to proof; and
c.

For Plaintiff's actual, consequential, incidental and expectancy damages,
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which Plaintiff has suffered as a result of Defendant's breaches of the Bid Properties
Purchase Agreement, all in an amount to be established at trial, which amount exceeds
$500,000.00;
2.

Under his Second Claim for Relief
a.

Plaintiff is entitled to specific performance of the tenns, conditions and

provisions of the Division of Staffwood Properties Agreement by court decree ordering
Defendant, among other things, to complete conveyance of the required properties in
accordance with the terms thereof, and perform his other obligations under, the Division
of Staffwood Properties Agreement;
b.

For compensation incidental to the decree of specific performance as set

forth above, according to proof; and
c.

For Plaintiffs actual, consequential, incidental and expectancy damages,

which Plaintiff has suffered as a result of Defendant's breaches of the Division of
Staffwood Properties Agreement, all in an amount to be determined at trial, which
amount exceeds $500,000.00;
3.

Under his Third Claim for Relief, for Plaintiffs actual, consequential, incidental

and expectancy damages, which Plaintiff has suffered as a result of Defendant's breaches of his
implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing, all in an amount to be determined at triai, which
amount exceeds $500,000.00;
4.

Under his Fourth Claim for Relief, for an order estopping Defendant from

repudiating his commitments and promises in the January 13 Letter as alleged above, and an
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order declaring that Defendant is obligated to comply with said commitments and promises;
5.

For an award of Plaintiffs reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in

this matter;

6.

For pre- and post-judgment interest at the maximum rate pem1itted by law;

7.

For such other and further relief to which Plaintiff may be entitled as a

and

matter of Jaw or equity, or which the Court determines to be just and proper.
DATED this

ih day of March, 2014.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Kara L Pettit

Attorneys for Plaintiff Stafford L Smith
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EXHIBIT A

II

PRESTON

& Scon

ATTOR.NEYS AT LAW

Direct Dial: 801-869-1623

Stanley J. Preston

December 20, 2013

VIA ELECTRONIC AND REGULAR MAIL

l\1ichael\V.Spence
Greggory J. Savage
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
36 South State Street, Suite 1400
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Re:

Stafford Smith and Woodruff Smith

Dear Mike and Gregg:
Thank you for your letter yesterday and settlement proposal. Stafford is willing to
purchase the subject properties from Staffwood, including the Outlet Center property, on the
following terms and conditions:
Stafford will pay the of sum $2,800,000 for the properties that
were the subject of the bid process, which amount is $50,000 more than his last
bid;
1.

2.
The funds \V oody has escrowed under the bid process will be
returned to him at closing;

In light of the holidays, the closing on Stafford's purchase will take
place thirty (30) days from the date the parties sign an agreement as to the terms
of Stafford's purchase of the subject properties;
3.

4.
The net proceeds from the sale of the subject properties will be
divided between Staffwood's partners after satisfying the following obligations:
a. Payment in full of Staffwood's loan from \\Tells Fargo Bank;

Five Gateway Office Center
178 S. Rio Grande Street. Suite 250 • Salt Lake City, UT 84101 • Telephone: 801-869-1620 • Fax: 801-869-1621

27

Michael
GreggoryJ.Savage
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b. Payment to Smith Chevrolet of the funds it has advanced above
its lease obligation on behalf of Staffwood to ensure adequate
funds for Staffvvood to pay its ongoing obligations, which
payment is pursuant to the parties' agreement as set forth in
Section 10.4 of the July 5, 2012 Settlement Agreement. These
obligations include, but are not limited to, accounting costs, taxes,
insurance, maintenance, repairs and servicing the Wells Fargo
Bank. loan. Exact amounts to be repaid to Smith Chevrolet shall
be determined by means of an audit conducted by Staffwood's
accountant, Kevin Oakey, but said amounts are anticipated to be
in excess of $350,000; and
c. Staffwood' s retention of a mutually agreed amount as a reserve to
enable Staffwood to pay its ongoing obligations on its remaining
properties. Stafford recommends that the retained sum should be
$50,000 but in no event should the retained amount be less than
$20,000.
In addition, as you are aware, the sale of Staffwood' s Pocatello property will take place
in the near future. Woody has agreed to the terms of the sale, but requested that the proceeds
from the sale not be distributed until the parties reach a settlement agreement. Stafford estimates
that the net proceeds from this sale will be approximately $230,000. Assuming the sale takes
place as planned, it is proposed that the net proceeds from this sale be distributed to the partners
once an agreement is signed in writing regarding Stafford's purchase of the subject bid properties
or, alternatively, that these funds be distributed simultaneously with the closing of Stafford's
purchase of the bid properties.
Of course, once we reach an agreement on Staffwood's purchase of the bid properties, we
will expect to promptly receive your proposal for dividing Staffwood' s remaining properties
between the partners. Please let me lmow as soon as possible whether the foregoing is
acceptable to your client.

Michael

Spence

Greggory J. Savage
December 20, 2013
Page3

Sincerely,

cc:

Damian C. Smith (via electronic mail)
Michael R Carlston (via electronic mail)
Stafford Smith (via electronic mail)
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Narrvel E. Hall
Douglas W. Morrison
Herbert C. Livsey
D. Jay Curtis
Jonathan A. Dibble
Scott Hancock Clark
Loren E. Weiss
James S. Jardine
Janet Hugle Smith

Douglas Matsumori

CONFIDENTIAL SETTLEMENT COMMUNICATION
PURSUANT TO UTAH RULE OF EVIDENCE 408
Via E-mail and U.S. Mail

SALT LAKE CITY OFFlCE

36 South State Street
Suite 1400
Salt Lake City, Utah

84111
801 532-1500m
801 532-7543 FAX

John R. Madsen
Michael W. Spence

Scott A. Hagen
Marl< M. Bettllyon
Rick L. Rose
Rick B. Hoggard
Lisa A. Yerkovich
Bt•nl D. Wrid•
Michael E. Bluo

Steven W. C.al!

Re:

Smith v. Smith

Dear Stan:
Woody hereby accepts Stafford's offer as set forth in your letter of December
20, 2013.
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Bruce L Olson
John A. Adams
Douglas M. Monson
Craig Carillo
Jeffrey W. Appel
David J. Castleton
Ellen J. D. Toscano
Kevin G. Glade
Lester K. Essig
Ira B. Rublnfeld

Stephen C. llngey

Stanley J. Preston
Preston & Scott
178 South Rio Grande Street, Suite 250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

PO Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah
84145-0385

Larry G. Moore

For purposes of certainty and clarification, we set forth below further detail
about our understanding of the terms of settlement. In paragraph no. 8 below, we
propose that the parties attempt to agree on a way that this transaction may be done
· W oody ' s accountants be I'1eve th at b y treating
· the entire
·
on a tax free bas1s.
transaction as a distribution in dissolution of the parties' interests in Sta:ffwood, the
parties can come out the same as agreed without incurring negative tax consequences.
This would seem to be beneficial to both parties, but since this provision is outside of
the terms of Stafford's offer, we make clear that we do not require Stafford's
agreement to paragraph no. 8.
Also, as requested, we propose a division of the balance of the Sta:ffwood
property, which we have set forth below. It does not matter to Woody which
election Stafford makes of these two Property Sets. We do not see how the property
can be divided any other way without resulting in joint or adjacent ownership of any
properties, which may cause conflict or irritation in the future.
Accordingly, the points of understanding are as follows:

1. Stafford closes on the 3 bid properties at $2.8 million ("Closing"), which
Closing is to be held within 30 days 1 of the date hereof.
2. Funds escrowed by Woody in the bid process shall be returned upon
finalizing this Agreement.
1

You indicated that Stafford needed 30 days because of the holidays. Now that the holidays have
passed, Woody is willing to close this in a much shorter time frame if Stafford is able to do so.
Earlier closing will also save the parties additional interest.
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3. All funds from the Closing shall go to the account of Staffwood, and shall
disbursed as follows: (a) payoff of Wells Fargo loan (assumed to be about
$875,000 at closing); and (b) refund ofrent overpayment by Smith Chevrolet
and other expenses mentioned in your letter, will be set at $350,000.2
Balance of funds from Closing shall be distributed equally to the partners.
4. The balance of the properties shall be divided into two sets of property/cash
as set forth below. Stafford shall have the choice to choose Property Set A or
Property Set B, and Woody shall receive the Property Set not elected by
Stafford.

Pro e

SetA

*Snake River Landing Pro erty
Less: $400,000 Cash to Property B
Reci ient

Pro e

SetB

Bellon Road Property
Blackfoot property

*Recipient A assumes and pays, and holds Recipient B harmless from, the
$1.9 million note and deed of trust pertaining to this property.
**Recipient B shall receive all proceeds from the recent sale of this property.
5. Staf:fwnod's approximately 7 acre plot west of the Snake River shall not be
divided, but shall be conveyed by Staffwood to the City of Idaho Falls in
connection with the Closing in order that each of the parties in their capacity
of partners of Staffwood may receive equal benefit of the write off.
6. Conveyance of property in Property Sets A and B to the respective party shall
occur contemporaneously with the Closing. No such conveyance or transfer
of funds shall occur prior to Closing. 3
7. TI1e parties agree that upon Closing, all debts, claims or obligations (a) owing
to Staffwood from themselves or their respective entities, (b) owing to them
from Staffwood, and (c) owing to each other (except for (i) continuing
obligations of Stafford pursuant to Section 3.3 of the November 10, 2010
Settlement Agreement, and (ii) continuing obligations of the parties
pertaining to the windup of SV Idaho pursuant to Section 4 of the July 5,

2

An audit ofthis amount would delay the Closing. Woody proposes to set this at $350,000 and be
done with it

3

This avoids piecemeal settlement and motivates the parties to close. As mentioned in footnote I
above, Woody is ready to close as soon as Stafford is able.

Stanley l Preston
January
2014
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Settlement Agreement), if any, shall
Agreement.

8.

released

settled by

In order to reduce taxes to the maximum extent possible, the parties agree to
discuss and attempt to agree prior to Closing concerning ways by which
Stafford's receipt of the 3 bid properties along with other divisions of cash
and property to the parties hereunder may be treated overall as an equal
distribution of Staffwood assets in liquidation of their ownership interests in
Staffwood. If the parties cannot. agree prior to Closing, Closing of the bid
properties and the subsequent divisions shall take place exactly as set forth
above.

9. Staffwood shall remain in existence after the Closing until the end of
calendar year 2014 in order that Staffwood may be used to complete a 1031
like-kind exchange if desired, provided that nothing shall require any action
which increases the tax burden of the other party.
10. Staffwood shall then be dissolved prior to the end of calendar year 2014,
unless it is being utilized for a 1031 like-kind exchange as described in
paragraph no. 9 above; in which case, Staffwood will be dissolved upon
completion of the 1031 transaction.
We look forward to hearing how Stafford would like to proceed.
Sincerely,

;;e.,UfNNEY &

_,Jha/
, .

pence
Greggory J. Savage

cc:

1266871

Michael R. Carlston
Woodruff Smith
Hal Bennett
Damian Smith

BEKER,P.C .

. 1__

EXHIBITC

Stanley Preston
from:
Sent:

Greggory Savage <gsavage@rqn.com>
Thursday, February 06, 2014 1:26 PM

To:

Stanley Preston; "mcarlston@scmlaw.com' (mcarlston@scmlaw.com)'

Cc:

Michael Spence
RE: Financial Analysis of Proposed Closing

Subject:

We understand that Woody and the folks advising him generally agree with the computations in the Exhibit A you
provided and it seems we are very close to agreement, subject to some clarifications or decisions on the following list of
issues that has been provided to us:
1. Woody's return of his $292,500 deposit is irrelevant to this closing, because he is just receiving his own money
back. Given the limited nature of the matters remaining for resolution, there seems to be no reason why he
shouldn't get the deposit back immediately. We note that Stafford received a return of his earnest money the
day after he elected to cease bidding. At this point, Woody's deposit is unnecessary because he is not obligated
to provide funds to complete this deal. Therefore, we would like the deposit refunded immediately and Exhibit
A amended to remove all reference to the deposit, because to an outsider (such as the IRS) looking at these
documents, it appears that Woody is getting the full $688,867 out of this transaction, which he is not.
2.

We see that the computation presumes that Stafford will bring $2.8 million to the closing. Woody's tax
professionals have advised both parties, in order to treat this as a sale Stafford will need to bring in the $2.8M
and let it flow through the transaction. We realize that Stafford has the right to treat this as a sale and exchange
of the 3 bid properties under our Settlement Agreements, but we ask Stafford to consider a dissolution wherein
he makes a contribution sufficient to get the 3 bid properties plus the Property B properties, and Woody gets
Property A plus $395,967 (as adjusted for closing costs)? This would allow Stafford to bring less than the $2.8
million to the closing and would result in less taxes for both parties. Please advise whether Stafford is willing to
consider this.

3. Since the parties will be paying property taxes, utilities, etc., on a prospective basis, we don't see any need to
keep money in Staffwood. Does this distribution provide for any money to remain in Staffwood? How much
remains in the Staffwood account(s}?
4.

Woody is fine with Stafford managing the process relative to the gift of property to the City of Idaho Falls, but
the agreement needs to provide that Woody receives th,: exact same attribution of the gift as Stafford, and that
Woody's agreement is obtained prior to implementation.

5.

As we understand it, upon completion of this closing, the only matters remaining between the parties (other
than Stafford's note to Woody as you have documented) are the following:
a. Future dealings relating to SV Idaho and its eventual liquidation. Does Stafford claim Woody owes any
money to SV Idaho or to Stafford relative to SV Idaho? If there is any disagreement on this, we would
like to resolve it now. Also, there is the $500,000 to be written off. How does Stafford propose to deal
with this between the partners?
b. First right of refusal to buy the other's business. This hurts the marketability of both brothers'
businesses, and is another potential matter for conflict in the future. Is Stafford willing to terminate this
provision.
c. Woody also requests that the one year non-hiring provision be terminated. We would like to have
employees at either partner's business free to bEi empioyed where they choose.

6. Subject to the foregoing items and receipt of the following documents, Woody is prepared to close:

a. Draft of an acceptable Settlement Agreement;
b. Revised Exhibit A as requested above;
Title
on the Snake River Landing
d.
Settlement Statement from the title company

crm,wir,cr

how disbursements are to

be
Thanks.
Gregg Savage

From: Stanley Preston [mailto:sjp@prestonandscott.com]

Sent: Wednesday, February 05, 2014 9:52 AM

To: Michael Spence; Greggory Savage
Cc: Mike carlston (mcarlston@scmlaw.com); Bryan M. Scott; Damian Smith

Subject: Financial Analysis of Proposed Closing
Mike and Gregg,
Attached is a spreadsheet showing the financial breakdown for the closing we have proposed. Obviously we don't yet
know the title fees and closing costs that will need to added to this spreadsheet, but this is essentially what we propose
will be Exhibit A to the Addendum to Escrow Instructions I sent you last week, and the reference to Exhibit Bin the
Addendum will also be changed to reference this document as well. When do you anticipate getting back to us on our
proposal. We would like to close this matter this week. Regards, Stan
Stanley J. Preston
PRESTON & SCOTT
Five Gateway Office Center
178 S. Rio Grande St., Suite 250
SLC, UT 84101
Tel.: 801-869-1620
Fax: 801-869-1621
DD: 801-869-1623
sjp@prestonandscott.com
www.prestonandscott.com
The Information contained In this e-mail and any attachments is confidential and solely for the use of the intended recipient. If the intended
recipient ls our client, then this Information ls also a prlvlleged attorney-client communication. Unauthorized use or disclosure of this Information
is prohibited. If you have received this communication In error, do not read It. Please delete It from your system without copying it, and notify the
sender by e-mail or by calling 801-869-1620, so that our address record can be corrected. Thank you.
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AITORNEYS AT LAW
Stanley J. Preston

Direct Dial: 801-869-1623

January 30, 2014

CONFIDENTIAL AND PROTECTED SETTLEMENT COMMUNICATION
VL4 ELECTRONIC MAIL
lvlichaelW. Spence
Greggory J. Savage
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
36 South State Street, Suite 1400
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Re:

Stafford Smith and WoodruffSmith

Dear lvlike and Gregg:
Stafford is pleased that Woody has accepted Stafford's settlement offer based on the
terms communicated in my letter to you dated December 20, 2013. Please be advised that
Stafford is willing to divide the remaining Staffwood property consistent with the terms outlined
in your letter dated January 13, 2014, and Stafford has decided to choose Property Set B.
Enclosed is a draft Addendum to the TitleOne Escrow Instructions to effect a Closing
regarding Stafford's purchase of the properties subject to the bid process, as well as the transfer
of Property Set A to Woody and Property Set B to Stafford, as well as drafts of the Special
Warranty Deeds to be attached as Exhibits to the Addendum. We have noted one change in the
Special Warranty Deed to Woody where it states that it is further subject to a development lien,
we are going to change this deed so that it specifically references the encumbrance in question.
Also, Stafford is in the process of preparing Exhibit A to the Addendum, and we will forward
these two exhibits to you as soon as they are available. In recognition of the parties' desire to
accomplish this as soon as possible, Stafford proposes that this Closing take place tomorrow,
Friday, January 31, at 2:00 p.m.
The accountants are still in the process of advising our clients regarding whether to
structure the transfer of the Staffwood properties as a sale or liquidation. Stafford anticipates
that he will be provide a description of these two options in the near future and then let Woody
choose which way be wants to proceed.
In the meantime, the parties will still need to prepare and sign a third Settlement
Agreement regarding this matter inasmuch as a number of the terms are not covered by the

Five Gateway Office Center
178 S. Rio Grande Street, Suite 250 • Salt Lake City, UT 84101 • Telephone: 801-869-1620 • Fax: 801-869-1621
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enclosed Addendum. This settlement agreement will need to address at least the following
issues:
1. A mutual release of all claims between the parties.
2. Woody's agreement to indemnify Stafford and hold Stafford harmless with
respect to the deed of encumbering the Snalrn River Landing Property for which
Sunnyview, LLC, is the beneficiary.
3. The parties' agreement that, upon the Closing pursuant to the Addendum, all
debts, claims or obligations: (a) owing to Staffwood from Stafford and Woody
and their respective entities; (b) owing to them from Staffwood; and (c) owing to
each other (except for (i) continuing obligations of Stafford pursuant to Section
3.3 of the November 10, 2010 Settlement Agreement, and (ii) continuing
obligations of the parties pertaining to the windup of SV Idaho pursuant to
Section 4 of the July 5, 2012 Settlement Agreement), if any, shall be released and
settled as part of this Settlement.
4. The conveyance to the City ofldaho Falls of the seven acre plot west of the Snake
River, with each partner receiving equal benefit of the tax write off. The gift of
this property, however, must be made contingent upon the City building an
appropriate park by a specified date. Stafford has worked on these arrangements
and should see this through. Without this condition, the park may not be built in
the parties' lifetimes. Stafford has been negotiating and working with the City
and other parties in the planning of the park, and he has been working to bring in
other major donor groups to ensure the park will be worthy of Staffwood's land
donation and will be a true legacy. The parties will need to agree that Stafford
should continue to take the lead in the planning a.nd negotiations with the City.
For these reasons, the timing of the donation should not be stipulated in the
parties' settlement agreement
5. The structure of the transaction as either a sale or a liquidation, with the resulting
impact on the continuing existence of Staff\;vood, as set fori-.h in paragraphs 9 and

Michael

Spence

Greggory J. Savage
January 30, 2014
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10 of your January 13, 2014 letter, provided that Woody will make a decision on
this issue within sixty days of Stafford presenting the options to Woody.

6. A provision that the terms and condi1ions of the November 10, 2010 Settlement
Agreement and the July 5, 2012 Settlement Agreement shall remain in full force
and effect except as amended by the terms of the third settlement agreement.
7. Inasmuch as Sta:ffwood will not be liquidated at the Closing, and it will have
some continuing obligations, the parties will agree to leave a nominal amoi.mt in
the Staffwood account.
Please let me know as soon as possible if you have any suggested changes to the enclosed
Addendum, and whether you agree that the parties should prepare and sign a third settlement
agreement along the lines proposed herein. Once we are in agreement on these two points, I will
begin preparing the settlement agreement.
Sincerely,

Encls.
cc:

Damian C. Smith (via electronic mail w/encls.)
Michael R. Carlston (via electronic mail w/encls.)
Stafford Smith (via electronic mail wlencls.)

EXHIBITE

Stanley Preston
From:

Sent:
To:
Cc:

Subject:
Attachments:

Stanley Preston
Thursday, February
'Michael Spence'

2014 1:05 AM

Greggory Savage <gsavage@rqn.com>; Mike Carlston (rncarlston@scmlaw.com); Bryan
M. Scott; 'Damian Smith'
Closing on Staffwood Properties
Addendum to Escrow Instructions 02-20-14.docx; Analysis of Staffwood Sale and
Distribution 02-20-14.xls; Release of Escrow Funds 02-20-14.docx

Mike,
In my email dated February 13, 2014,. I quoted from our prior written communications wherein our respective clients
reached an agreement as to the terms for Stafford's purchase of the bid properties and the distribution of other real
property owned by Staffwood Partnership, as well as Woody eJ<press, written representation that he was willing to go
forward with a Closing to effect the conveyance of the subject real property.
It is, therefore, extremely disappointing that Woody would fail to follow through with his contractual obligation to
complete this Closing in a timely manner and, instead, leave the country for an extended period of time, and thereby
leave this important matter unconcluded. It is particularly troubling that Woody would do this without the courtesy of
notifying us beforehand, and without making any provision that would allow you as his counsel to contact him.
Please be advised that my client1s patience has reached its limit, both as to Woody's unjustified delays and failure to
complete the required Closing, as well as his repeated attempts to renegotiate the terms of the parties' prior
agreements. Accordingly, we expect Woody to proceed with the Closing immediately upon his return from his trip,
which we understand from your representation will be this coming Sunday. To accomplish this, we have scheduled the
Closing for Tuesday, February 25, 2014, at 2:00 p.m., as outlined in the attached Addendum to Escrow Instructions, the
Exhibit A to the Addendum, and the Release of Escrow Funds, which have been revised and prepared to accommodate
Woody's request that the Closing make no reference to the return of his escrow funds.
We believe these attached documents reflect the terms of the parties' agreement. If, however, you have any suggested
changes to these documents please advise me immediately, provided that any such suggested changes are consistent
with the terms of the parties' agreement. Also, to the extent Woody desires to order title insurance on any of the
properties that are being conveyed to him, please notify the Escrow Agent as soon as possible. Finally, please send me
copies of the attached agreements with the required signatures from Woody, Woody's wife, and the WDS Limited
Partnership, by Monday, February 24, 2014.
Stanley J. Preston
PRESTON & scon
Five Gateway Office Center
178 S. Rio Grande St., Suite 250
SLC, UT 84101
Tel.: 801-869-1620
Fax: 801-869-1621
DD: 801-869-1623
sip@prestonandscott.com
www.prestonandscott.com
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The information contained in this e-mail and any attachments is confidential and so ly for the use of the intended
recipient. if the intended recipient is our client, then this information is also a privileged attorney-client
communication. Unauthorized use or disclosure of this information is prohibited. If you have received this
communication in error, do not read it. Please delete it from your system without copying it, and notify the sender byemail or
801-869-1620, so that our address record can be corrected. Thank you.

From: Michael Spence [mailto:mspence@RQN.COM]

Sent: Tuesday, February 18{ 2014 4:10 PM
To: Stanley Preston
Subject: "Alias Smith & Jones"
Stan, I have "heard" back from Woody's in house folks. Woody is out of the country and they/we don't expect to "hear
or see" back from him until this coming Sunday, notwithstanding our efforts to contact him beforehand. If he is at the
Olympics (which I seriously doubt), I hope he enjoys the 70 degree weather over there! Sorry. Mike

Michael Spence I Ray Quinney & Nebeker P.C. I 36 South State Street, Suite 1400 I Salt lake City, Utah 84111
Direct: 801-323-33811 Facsimile: 801-532-75431 www.rqn.com
IRS Rules of Practice require us to inform you that advice, if any, in this email (including any attachments) concerning federal tax matters is not
intended to be used, and cannot be used or relied upon for the purpose of avoiding penalties under the Internal Revenue Code, nor for promoting,
marketing or recommending any transaction or matter addressed herein. This e-mail is sent by a law firm and contains information that may be
privileged and confidential. If you are not the intended recipient, please delete the e-mail and notify us immediately.
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ADDENDUM

AND

Addendum to
and
(" Addendum") is
by
individually and his capacity as a general partner of SLS 1 LLLP, successor to
SLS Limited Partnership and as a managing partner of Staffwood Partnership, an Idaho general
partnership ("Stafford") and Woodruff D. Smith, individually and as a general partner of The
WDS Limited Partnership and as a managing partner of Staffwood Partnership, an Idaho general
partnership ("Woody"). This Addendum is given by Stafford and Woody to TitleOne Title and
Escrow Company ("Escrow Agent") to augment those certain instructions given to Escrow
Agent dated February 5, 2013 relating to Staffwood Partnership and those certain Settlement
Agreements referred to therein as S.A. 2010 and S.A. 2012 ("Initial Escrow Instruction") and
additional property referred to herein ("Deeded Property").
In consideration of mutual covenants and agreements and the fulfillment of the instructions
contained in this Addendum, the parties agree and instruct the Escrow Agent, as follows:
1. Closing: The Closing shall be on Tuesday, February 25, 2014 at 2:00 o'clock p.m. Mountain
Time at the office of the Escrow Agent located at 400 Memorial Drive, Idaho Falls, Idaho
83402, or such other time and place as Stafford and Woody may agree, in writing delivered to
Escrow Agent. At Closing, the following shall occur:
A. Stafford shall deposit certified funds in the amounts required herein.
B. The Escrow Agent shall cause to be recorded the deeds referenced in
paragraph 3 hereof.
C. The Escrow Agent shall obtain from Wells Fargo Bank, National Association
and file or record terminations, releases, and deeds of re-conveyance sufficient
and necessary to remove the liens and encumbrances listed on "Schedule 1,"
attached hereto, which Schedule shall be prepared by Escrow Agent.
D. Escrow Agent shall disburse to Woody the sums described in paragraph 2.C.
hereof.
E. Real property truces and assessments shall not be apportioned between Woody
and Stafford. Rather each parcel is being conveyed subject to accrued and
accruing real property truces and assessments.
F. The Closing costs shall be paid by Staffwood Partnership. Each party has the
option of ordering and obtaining standard owner's policies ohitle insurance on
any of the Deeded Property that is conveyed to such party pursuant to Closing, the
premium for which shall be paid by Staffwood Partnership; provided, however,
that each party shall immediately notify Escrow Agent of its decision to order any
such title insurance so as not to delay Closing. Escrow Agent accepts
responsibility for the condition of title only to the extent as established by and in
accordance with the policies of title insurance purchased as a pa.rt of the Closing.

2. Collection of Funds and Disbursements:.
following funds:

Agent shall accept and/or disburse to

~A,JU""""' accept additional funds
in the amount set forth
Exhibit A, attached hereto, together with a sum equal to one half (1h) of the fees and
costs charged by the Escrow Agent for Closing services. In addition Escrow Agent
shall disburse to Wells Fargo Bank, National Association all sums necessary to
satisfy the obligations and obtain the release of those liens and encumbrances listed
on "Schedule l ", attached hereto, with a payout date of the amounts due to Wells
Fargo Bank, National Association as of January 14, 2014, with Stafford responsible
for paying any interest that has accrued since that date.

B. At Closing, collect from Staffwood Partnership, or at its direction, all sums
necessary to pay the premium cost of title insurance ordered by the parties
relating to the Deeded Property.
C. At Closing, disburse to WDS Limited Partnership the sum set forth in Exhibit
A, attached hereto, less a sum equal to one half (Yz) of the fees and costs of
Escrow Agent incurred in the Closing.
3. Recording of Deeds: At Closing the Escrow Agent shall cause to be recorded
the following Special Warranty Deeds:

A A Special Warranty Deed in the form of "Exhibit B", attached hereto, conveying to
Woody the property commonly known as the Snake River Landing Property, subject to
accrued and accruing real property taxes and assessments and to liens and encumbrances
ofrecord, including but not limited to that deed of trust recorded as instrument number
1176756 recorded February 2, 2005 with Staffwood Partnership as Grantor,
AMERTITLE, INC, as Trustee and SUNNYVIEW LLC as beneficiary, which obligation
Woody agrees to assume and pay and to indemnify Stafford and hold Stafford harmless
therefrom.

B. A Special Warranty Deed in the form of "Exhibit C", attached hereto,
conveying to Stafford the properties located in Bonneville County, State of Idaho
and commonly known as the RV Property, the Smith Chevrolet Property, the Bellin
Road Property and the Pioneer Road Property, subject to accrued and accruing
taxes and assessments and easements of use or record but free of the lien of Wells
Fargo Bank, National Association as described in paragraph 2. A hereof.
C. A Special Warranty Deed in the form of "Exhibit D", attached hereto,
conveying to Stafford the property located in Bingham County, State ofidaho and
commonly known as the "Blackfoot Property," subject to accrued and accruing
taxes and assessments and easements of use or record.
4. The Parties' Prior Settlement Agreements: The terms and conditions of the November
10, 2010 Settlement Agreement and the July 5, 2012 Settlement Agreement shall remain in full
force and effect except as amended by the terms of this Addendum.
2

this

of February,

WoodruffD. Smith, general partner

Dawn Smith, general partner

WoodruffD. Smith, individually

3

this_ day

February, 20

Stafford L. Smith, general partner

Shelly Smith, general partner

Stafford L. Smith, individually

4
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Staffwood Property Division
Sale of Property to Stafford

property Sale Analysis
Cash paid to Staffwood
Wells Note Balance Jan 14
Adjustments to payoff + Payment to Smith Chevrolet
Title Insurance and Closing Costs
Remaining amount to distribute

RV Building
Smith Chevrolet
_
Woody's Automotive Building
RV Building Land
Vet Clinic Land
Woody's Automotive Land
Smith Chevrolet Land

2,800,000.00
(858,066.00)
Note plus adjustments to equal $858,066 at date of closing. Stafford's responsibility
(350,000.00)
Amount determined prior to closing
1,591,934.00
Adjusted Basis
371,040.40
354,230.10
232,596.78
195,500.00
134,421.31
20,000.00
20,000.00

Total Basis

1,327,788.59

Sales Price

2,800,000.00

Gain on sale of assets in Staffwood

1,472,211.41

!Cash Analysis
Sale Proceeds
ash distribution (will be reduced by TitleOne costs)
Cash to Stafford from Woody to equalize A/B
Proceeds from Pocatello
Payment to Smith Chevrolet
Net Cash

In

at Closing

:rax Basis of Property to Distribute at closing
Team Automotive Pocatello Building
Team Automotive Pocatello Land

less closing costs and insurance

Stafford
(2,800,000)
795,967
400,000
239,843

Woody

Staffwood Smith Chev

795,967
(400,000)
-239843
350,000

(1,364.190)

Tax Basis
152,782
20,000

395,967

Team Automotive Blackfoot Building
Team Automotive Blackfoot Land
Bellin Road land (Milligan)

147,086
10,000

296,751
Tax Basis

Land Snake River Parkway

488,559

RELEASE OF ESCROW FUNDS

WDS LIMITED

individually and in
capacity as a general partner of
successor to The
Limited Partnership and as a managing partner of Staffwood Partnership,
an Idaho general partnership ("Stafford") and Woodruff D. Smith, individually and as a general
partner of The WDS Limited Partnership and as a managing partner of Staffwood Partnership, an
Idaho general partnership ("Woody") hereby instruct TitleOne Title and Escrow Company
("Escrow Agent") as follows:
Immediately upon completion of the Closing pursuant to the Addendum to
Escrow and Closing Instructions ("Addendum") previously signed by Stafford
and Woody, Escrow Agent shall disburse to Woody the sum of $292,500
previously deposited by Woody pursuant to those certain instructions given to
Escrow Agent dated February 5, 2013 relating to Staffwood Partnership and those
certain Settlement Agreements referred to therein as S.A. 2010 and S.A. 2012
("Initial Escrow Instruction"), less only the administrative costs of the Escrow
Agent.
The parties further acknowledge that said disbursement of funds to Woody constitutes a return
to Woody of his own funds that he had previously deposited with Escrow Agent pursuant to
Initial Escrow Instruction, and that these are not new or additional funds that he is receiving
pursuant to the Closing under the Addendum.

DATED this_day of February, 2014
THE WDS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP

WoodruffD. Smith, general partner

Dawn Smith, general partner

WoodruffD. Smith, individually

Stafford L. Smith, general partner

Shelly Smith, general partner

Stafford L. Smith, individually
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PRESTON

•

& Scorr

ATTORNEYS AT LAW
Stanley J. Preston

Direct Dial: 801-869-1623

March 3, 2014
CONFIDENTIAL AND PROTECTED SETTLEMENT COMMUNICATION
VIA ELECTRONIC AND REGULAR MAIL

Michael W. Spence
Greggory J. Savage
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
36 South State Street, Suite 1400
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Re:

Stafford Smith and Woodruff Smith

Dear Mike and Gregg:
As previously explained in prior correspondence and electronic communications between
us, it is the position of my client, Stafford Smith, that the parties have entered into an enforceable
settlement agreement regarding: (1) Stafford's purchase of the bid properties for the sum of
$2,800,000; and (2) the division of certain remaining Staffwood properties, whereby Woody will
receive what has been designated as the Property Set A, and Stafford will receive Property Set B.
We have reviewed applicable Idaho law on this issue and concluded it supports Stafford's
position.
Stafford has relied to his detriment on the fact that the parties have reached an agreement
on these two primary issues and Stafford is, and has been since January 30, 2014, fully prepared
to close on this settlement and meet all of his obligations related thereto. Stafford is suffering
damage as a result of Woody's refusal to timely close on the agreed terms. At this point, unless
this matter closes in the next few days, Stafford will be forced to use his own funds to pay off the
liens and obligations owed by Staffwood to Wells Fargo Bank.
Accordingly, Stafford hereby demands that the parties perform the required Closing on
Thursday, March 6, 2014, at 2:00 p.m. pursuant to the terms set forth in my email to you dated
February 20, 2014, and the documents attached thereto. If the Closing does not take place by
March 6, then Stafford will have no other choice but to sue Woody to enforce the parties'
settlement agreement and recover the damages Stafford has suffered.

Five Gateway Office Center
178 S. Rio Grande Street, Suite 250 • Salt Lake City, UT 84101 • Telephone: 801 -869-1620 • Fax: 801-869-1621
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Greggory J. Savage
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Of course, if you have any suggested changes to the proposed Addendum to Escrow
Instructions, the Analysis of Staffwood Sale and Distribution, or the Release of Escrow Funds,
that I emailed to you on February 20, 2014, we wiH certainly consider them, so long as they do
not materially change the terms of the parties' agreement.
Finally, this letter once again confirms Stafford's willingness post-Closing to endeavor to
work with Woody to obtain the most mutually beneficial tax treatment reasonably possible.
According to Staffwood's accountant, completing the transactions in accordance with the agreed
terms provides the most favorable opportunity that will be available to minimize the tax
obligations of the parties. Hopefully, your client will see the wisdom in getting this resolved at
this time based on the terms to which the parties have agreed.
Sincerely,

cc:

Michael R. Carlston (via electronic mail.)
Stafford Smith (via electronic mail)

Kara L. Pettit (Idaho State Bar No. 5276)
Michael R. Carlston (Utah State Bar No. 0577, Pro Hae Vice Admission Pending)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
Stanley J. Preston (Utah State Bar No. 4119, Pro Hae Vice Admission Pending)
PRESTON & SCOTT
Five Gateway Office Center
178 S. Rio Grande Street, Suite 250
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: (801) 869-1620
Attorneys for Plaintiff Stafford L. Smith

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE, STATE OF IDAHO
STAFFORD L. SMITH,
Plaintiff,

EX PARTE MOTION TO SEAL
AMENDED COMPLAINT

vs.
WOODRUFF D. SMITH,
Defendant.

Civil No. CV-2014-1434
Judge Jon Shindurling

Pursuant to Rule 32(i) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff Stafford L. Smith
("Plaintiff') respectfully submits this Ex Parte Motion to Seal Amended Complaint.
The Amended Complaint and its Exhibits contain confidential settlement
communications between the parties' attorneys, protected by Rule 408 of the Idaho Rules
of Evidence. Accordingly, Plaintiff moves to seal the Amended Complaint filed
concurrently with this motion.
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DATED this

ti'1

1

of March~ 2014.

SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

1 ~---:;;;;;-------

By 1
Kara L. Pettit
Attorneysfor PlaintlJtStafford L; Smith
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Kara L. Pettit (Idaho State Bar No. 5276)
Michael R. Carlston (Utah State Bar No. 0577, Pro Hae Vice Admission To Be Submitted)
SNOW, CHRJSTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
Stanley J. Preston (Utah State Bar No. 4119, Pro Hae Vice Admission To Be Submitted)
PRESTON & SCOTT
Five Gateway Office Center
178 S. Rio Grande Street, Suite 250
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: (801) 869-1620

Attorneys for Plaintiff Stafford L. Smith

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE, STATE OF IDAHO
STAFFORD L. SMITH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

AMENDED COMPLAINT
(Filed Under Seal)
Civil No. CV-2014-1434

WOODRUFF D. SMITH,
Defendant.

Judge Jon Shindurling

Kara Pettit (Idaho State Bar No. 5276)
Michael R. Carlston (Utah State Bar No. 05
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000

Pro Hae Vice Admission To Be Submitted)

Stanley J. Preston (Utah State Bar No. 4119, Pro Hae Vice Admission To Be Submitted)
PRESTON & SCOTT
Five Gateway Office Center
178 S. Rio Grande Street, Suite 250
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: (801) 869-1620

Attorneysfor Plaintiff Stafford L. Smith

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE, STATE OF IDAHO
STAFFORD L. SMITH,

AMENDED COMPLAINT
(Filed Under Seal)

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. CV-2014-1434
WOODRUFF D. SMITH,

Judge Jon Shindurling

Defendant.

Plaintiff Stafford L. Smith ("Plaintiff') hereby complains against Defendant WoodruffD.
Smith ("Defendant") as follows:

PARTIES AND JUIUSDICTION
1.

Plaintiff is an individual residing in the State of Idaho.

2.

Defendant is an individual residing

the State of Idaho.

3.

Plaintiff, through an Idaho limited liability partnership known as The SLS 1, LLP

(formerly known as The SLS Limited Partnership, an Idaho limited partnership), is a fifty
percent (50%) owner of Staffwood Partnership, an Idaho general partnership ("Staffwood").

4.

Defendant, through an Idaho limited partnership known as The WDS Limited

Partnership is a fifty percent (50%) owner of Staffwood.
5.

Staffwood is the owner of various properties that are the subject of this case, and

all of these properties are located in Bonneville County, Idaho, with the exception of one
property which is located in Bingham County, Idaho.
6.

Plaintiff and Defendant are brothers.

7.

Many of the acts and omissions at issue in this Complaint took place in

Bonneville County, Idaho. Plaintiff resides in Bonneville County, Idaho. Staffwood's principal
place of business is located in Bonneville County, Idaho. In addition, this case involves real
estate and other property located in Bonneville and Bingham Counties, Idaho. Jurisdiction and
venue are therefore proper in this Court.

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
8.

Over the years, Plaintiff and Defendant have had various business relationships.

In approximately 20 l 0, disputes arose between Plaintiff and Defendant regarding the respective
ownership interest each party had in certain businesses, and the manner in which the businesses
have been managed. Based on these disputes, Plaintiff and Defendant asserted and alleged
various legal claims against each other.

9.

an

to resolve their disputes and differences with each other, and to
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separate ownership of the car dealerships and other businesses they had jointly owned, Plaintiff
and Defendant entered into a Settlement Agreement, effective November l 0, 2010 (the "20 l 0
Settlement Agreement"), whereby ownership of the various car dealerships and certain other
businesses in which Plaintiff and Defendant had joint ownership were divided between Plaintiff
and Defendant.
10.

As part of the 2010 Settlement Agreement, Plaintiff and Defendant, on behalf of

themselves and their various business entities, entered into mutual releases of all claims.
11.

The closing of the 20 l O Settlement Agreement took place on or about

February 10, 2011.
12.

Subsequent to the closing of the 2010 Settlement Agreement, a lawsuit was

filed in the Seventh Judicial District Court of Bonneville County, State of Idaho, entitled

Woodruff D. Smith, et al. v. Stafford L. Smith, et al., Case No. CV-11-1772 (the
"Lawsuit"), wherein Plaintiff and Defendant asserted various claims and counterclaims
against each other arising under the 2010 Settlement Agreement and otherwise.
13.

During the course of discovery related to the Lawsuit, the parties determined

that there were additional disputes between them that were not addressed in the Lawsuit.
14.

Ultimately, Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a second Settlement Agreement,

effective July 5, 2012 (the "2012 Settlement Agreement"), whereby Plaintiff and Defendant
settled all additional claims and disputes between themselves and their various business entities
that were asserted in the Lawsuit, and that they had otherwise discovered.
15.

Plaintiff and Defendant, on behalf of

part of the 2012 Settlement
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themselves and their various business entities, entered into mutual releases of all claims, and the
Lawsuit was dismissed with prejudice.
16.

At all relevant times hereto, Michael Spence and Greggory Savage of the law firm

of Ray, Quinney & Nebeker, P.C. (collectively "RQN") have served as Defendant's attorneys.
Among other things, RQN represented Defendant and his business entities in the disputes that
led up to the 2010 Settlement Agreement, in the negotiation and finalization of the 2010
Settlement Agreement, in the Lawsuit and related disputes thereto, and in the negotiation and
finalization of the 2012 Settlement Agreement.
17.

At all times relevant hereto, RQN have held themselves out as the attorneys for

Defendant, with full authority to negotiate and enter into agreements on behalf of Defendant and
his business entities. In fact, RQN has routinely and repeatedly asserted that it represents
Defendant in the disputes between Plaintiff and Defendant over the past several years, as well as
in the disputes, negotiations, written communications and agreements that give rise to this case.
18.

Under the terms of the 2010 Settlement Agreement, Plaintiff and Defendant

agreed on terms regarding the management of Staffwood, in which they each continued to have a
fifty percent (50%) ownership interest. These terms included a provision whereby Plaintiff and
Defendant agreed to appoint a mutually acceptable third member to the Board of Staffwood for
the purpose of breaking any deadlock between Plaintiff and Defendant as the other two members
of Staffwood's Board. In accordance with the terms of the 2010 Settlement Agreement, Plaintiff
and Defendant jointly agreed to the appointment of a third Board member.
19.

Under

terms of the 2010 Settlement Agreement, as amended by the 2012
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Settlement Agreement, Plaintiff and Defendant also agreed to a procedure whereby the parties
had the right to initiate a bid process for the purpose of purchasing real property owned by
Staffwood.
20.

In early 2013, Plaintiff initiated this bid process by making a bid to purchase three

properties leased by Smith Chevrolet Co. ("Smith Chevrolet"), which is owned by Plaintiff: (1)
the building and related real property occupied by Smith Chevrolet (the "Smith Chevrolet
Property"); (2) the building and related real property occupied by an RV dealership owned by
Plaintiff (the "RV Property"); and (3) a certain building and related real property known as the
Outlet Property (the "Outlet Property"). The Smith Chevrolet Property, the RV Property and the
Outlet Property are collectively referred to herein as the "Bid Properties."
21.

Staffwood had previously obtained a loan from Wells Fargo Bank (the "WFB

Loan"), which loan was secured by the RV Property and a guarantee of Staffwood' s assets.
Smith Chevrolet advanced funds on behalf of Staffwood substantially in excess of Smith
Chevrolet's obligations for leasing the Bid Properties, for the purpose of ensuring that Staffwood
had adequate funds to pay its ongoing obligations, which included, but are not limited to,
accounting costs, taxes, insurance, maintenance, repairs and servicing the WFB Loan.
22.

Under the 2012 Settlement Agreement, Staffwood agreed to reimburse Smith

Chevrolet for amounts it paid on behalf of Staffwood to make the payments on the WFB Loan,
and to meet the other obligations identified in the previous paragraph, to the extent these funds
exceeded the amount Smith Chevrolet was obligated to pay Staffwood for Smith Chevrolet's
lease of the Bid Properties.
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23.

By the end of 2013, the amount Staffwood owed to Smith Chevrolet for the funds

Smith Chevrolet had advanced on behalf of Staffwood in excess of Smith Chevrolet's lease
obligation exceeded $350,000. Defendant has never paid Stafford his 50% share of this
obligation.
24.

By the end of 2013, the outstanding principal balance owed by Staffwood on the

WFB Loan exceeded $850,000.00.
25.

In response to Plaintiffs bid to purchase the Bid Properties, Defendant submitted

his own bid for the Bid Properties, and the parties traded bids for the Bid Properties for several
months.
26.

After Defendant made the final bid for the Bid Properties, he then improperly

asserted that he was unwilling to purchase the Bid Properties unless Plaintiff and Staffwood
agreed to satisfy and meet certain unjustified and unreasonable demands and conditions related
to the Bid Properties, which Plaintiff was unwilling to do. This resulted in a new dispute
between Plaintiff and Defendant.
27.

In addition, the title company that reviewed the ownership of the Bid Properties

discovered that Smith Chevrolet is the record title owner of the Outlet Property, which created an
issue as to whether Staffwood or Smith Chevrolet was the owner of the Outlet Property.
28.

As the parties worked to resolve their disputes regarding the Bid Properties and

the conditions and demands that Defendant claimed had to be satisfied before he would purchase
the Bid Properties pursuant to the bid process, the third member of Staffwood's Board resigned
in response to

unsupported threats and accusations made by Defendant and/or
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Defendant's agents. As a result, Staffwood was paralyzed and unable to take any action where
Plaintiff and Defendant were not both in agreement.
29.

In an effort to negotiate a resolution of this dispute regarding the purchase of the

Bid Properties, a series of meetings and communications took place between RQN as
Defendant's attorneys and Plaintiffs attorneys.
30.

Plaintiff's attorneys subsequently sent a letter dated December 20, 2013 to

Defendant's attorneys, RQN, (the "December 20 Letter"), a copy of which is attached as Exhibit
A, whereby Plaintiff made a settlement offer to resolve the parties' dispute regarding the Bid
Properties, wherein Plaintiff offered to purchase the Bid Properties based on the following
material terms:
a.

Plaintiff would purchase the Bid Properties for $2,800,000.00; and

b.

The net proceeds from the sale of the Bid Properties would be divided

between Staffwood's partners after satisfying the WFB Loan and the amounts Staffwood
owed Smith Chevrolet for the funds Smith Chevrolet had advanced on behalf of
Staffwood in excess of Smith Chevrolet's lease obligations, as alleged above. See
Exhibit A.
31.

In response, RQN sent Plaintiff's attorneys a letter dated January 13, 2014 (the

"January 13 Letter"), a copy of which is attached as Exhibit B, wherein RQN, as Defendant's
attorneys, expressly stated, "Woody hereby accepts [Plaintiff's] offer as set forth in your letter of
December 20, 2013 ." Exhibit B. Significantly, Defendant and his accountant, Hal Bennett were
copied on the January 13 Letter.
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32.

In the January 13 Letter, Defendant also expressly stated the following regarding

his understanding of the two material terms offered by Plaintiff in the December 20 Letter
regarding Plaintiffs offer to purchase the Bid Properties:
a.

"[Plaintiff] closes on the [Bid Properties] at $2.8 million." Exhibit B; and

b.

"All funds from the Closing shall go to the account of Staffwood, and

shall be disbursed as follows: (a) payoff of [the WFB Loan] (assumed to be about
$875,000 at closing); and (b) refund ofrent overpayment by Smith Chevrolet and other
expenses mentioned in your letter, will be set at $350,000. Balance of funds shall be
distributed equally to the partners." Exhibit B.
33.

In the January 13 Letter, Defendant stated,

In paragraph no. 8, below, we propose that the parties attempt to agree on a way
that this transaction may be done on a tax free basis. [Defendant's] accountants
believe that by treating the entire transaction as a distribution in dissolution of the
parties' interest in Staffwood, the parties can come out the same as agreed
without incurring negative tax consequences. This would seem to be beneficial to
both parties, but since this provision is outside of the terms of [Plaintiff's] offer,
we make clear that we do not require [Plaint{ff's] agreement to [this proposal].
Id. (emphasis added).

34.

Specifically, paragraph no. 8 of the January 13 Letter, stated as follows:

In order to reduce taxes to the maximum extent possible, the parties agree to
discuss and attempt to agree prior to Closing concerning ways by which
Stafford's receipt of the 3 bid properties along with other divisions of cash and
property hereunder may be treated overall as an equal distribution of Staffwood
assets in liquidation of their ownership interests in Staffwood. Jf the parties
cannot agree prior to Closing, Closing of the bid properties and the subsequent
divisions shall take place exactly as set forth above.
(emphasis added).
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35.

In fact, in a subsequent email dated February 6, 2014 (the "February 6 Email"), a

copy of which is attached as Exhibit C, RQN again urged Plaintiff to acquire the Bid Properties
as "a dissolution," but RQN expressly acknowledged that this was not the deal that the parties
had agreed to, and stated, "[ w ]e realize that [Plaintiff] has the right to treat this as a sale and
exchange of the [Bid Properties] .... " Exhibit C.
36.

While there was some additional back and forth on some other non-material

terms, regarding which the parties ultimately reached agreement, the written exchanges between
the attorneys for Plaintiff and Defendant establish that there was a clear offer and acceptance
regarding the material terms for Plaintiff's purchase of the Bid Properties.
37.

Therefore, Plaintiff and Defendant entered into an enforceable contract for

Plaintiffs purchase of the Bid Properties, which agreement is hereafter referred to as the "Bid
Properties Purchase Agreement."
38.

In addition to accepting Plaintiff's offer to purchase the Bid Properties in the

January 13 Letter, Defendant also made an offer regarding the division of the remaining real
property owned by Staffwood. See Exhibit B. Specifically, the January 13 Letter states that
"[t]he balance of the [Staffwood] properties shall be divided into two sets of property/cash ...
[and Plaintiff] shall have the choice to choose Property Set A or Property Set B, and [Defendant]
shall receive the Property Set not elected by [Plaintiff]." Id.
39.

Pursuant to the January 13 Letter, Property Set A consisted of the Snake River

Landing Property, less $400,000 Cash to be paid to the Property Set B Recipient, and Prope1iy
Set B consisted of the Bellin Road Property, the Blackfoot Property, the proceeds from the recent
9

sale of the Pocatello property, and $400,000 Cash to be paid by the Property A Recipient. See id.
40.

In response to Defendant's offer to divide the remaining Staffwood properties on

the terms set forth in the January 13 Letter, Plaintiff's attorneys sent a letter to RQN dated
January 30, 2014 (the "January 30 Letter"), a copy of which is attached as Exhibit D, which
stated, "[Plaintiff] is pleased that [Defendant] has accepted [Plaintiffs] settlement offer based on
the terms communicated ... [in the December 20 Letter]. Please be advised that [Plaintiff] is
willing to divide the remaining Staffwood property consistent with the terms outlined in [the
January 13 Letter], and [Plaintiff] has decided to choose Property Set B." Exhibit D.
41.

Again, while there was some back and forth on other non-material terms,

regarding which the parties ultimately reached agreement, the written exchanges between the
attorneys for Plaintiff and Defendant establish that there was a clear offer and acceptance
regarding the material terms for the division of Staffwood' s remaining real property between
Plaintiff and Defendant.
42.

Therefore, Plaintiff and Defendant entered into an enforceable contract for

dividing between themselves the remaining real property owned by Staffwood, which contract is
hereafter referred to as the "Division of Staffwood Properties Agreement."
43.

In reliance on Defendant's representations and promises, Plaintiff communicated

to Defendant that he was ready, willing, able and fully prepared to close on the transactions
agreed to under both the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement and the Division of Staffwood
Properties Agreement (collectively, the "Agreements"), and convey the properties in accordance
with the terms of the Agreements. See February 20, 2014 Emaii from Stanley J. Preston to RQN
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and documents attached thereto, copies of which are attached as Exhibit E.
44.

In response, Defendant has tried to get Plaintiff to agree to new and/or unrelated

terms that were never part of the Agreements. Finally, Plaintiff sent a formal demand to
Defendant to comply with the Agreements and to close the transactions agreed to under the
Agreements. See March 3, 2014 Letter from Stanley J. Preston to RQN, a copy of which is
attached as Exhibit F.
45.

At all relevant times, Plaintiff has been ready, willing, able and fully prepared to

close on the Agreements and satisfy his contractual obligations under the Agreements.
46.

Defendant has failed and refused to proceed with the required closing of the

Agreements, in accordance with the terms of the Agreements.
47.

Defendant has now taken the position that the parties never entered into any

enforceable contracts with respect to the Agreements, contrary to the express written offers and
acceptances between the parties as set forth above.
48.

Specifically, Defendant is now asserting that the reason the Agreements are not

binding and enforceable is because a material condition to any agreement was Defendant's
insistence that the entire transaction be treated as a tax-free distribution of the Staffwood
properties. Defendant's position, however, is directly rebutted by the express written statements
made by RQN in the January 13 Letter and the February 6 Email.
49.

The written communications between the parties establish that, while the division

of the remaining Staffwood properties other than the Bid Prope1iies would be a distribution,
Defendant expressly agreed that Plaintiff had the right to purchase the Bid Properties.
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50.

In the meantime, Plaintiff has now been required to pay-off the WFB Loan on

Staffwood's behalf with Plaintiffs own funds. The amount required to pay-off the WFB Loan
. totaled $858,066, half of which amount Defendant is required to pay to Plaintiff as a 50% owner
of Staffwood.
51.

Plaintiff has made demand on Defendant, as a 50% owner of Staffwood, to pay

Defendant's share of funds required to pay-off the WFB Loan, which amounts to $429,033, as
well as Defendant's 50% share of the amount Staft\vood owes Plaintiff for the funds Smith
Chevrolet had advanced on behalf of Staffwood in excess of Smith Chevrolet's lease obligation,
which amounts to an additional $175,000. Defendant has to date failed to pay these sums to
Plaintiff.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Breach of Contract Regarding the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement)
52.

Plaintiff incorporates herein by this reference the allegations set forth in the

preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.
53.

The Bid Properties Purchase Agreement constitutes a valid and enforceable

contract between Plaintiff and Defendant.
54.

Plaintiff and Defendant reached an agreement as to the material and essential

terms of the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement, which terms are sufficiently clear and certain to
enable the parties to specifically perform the terms of the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement.
55.

The terms of the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement are reasonable and based on

adequate consideration.
56.

Plaintiff has performed all duties, promises and material obligations required of
12

Plaintiff under the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement, and all conditions precedent that Plaintiff
agreed to perform pursuant to the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement have been satisfied.
57.

Among other things, Plaintiff has offered, and is fully prepared, to pay the full

consideration called for in the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement, and continues to be ready,
willing and able both to pay the required consideration, and to close the real estate transactions,
required by the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement.
58.

Defendant has failed and refused, and continues to fail and refuse, to perform the

required closing pursuant to the terms of the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement, or to convey
the Bid Properties to Plaintiff.
59.

Defendant has breached the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement by engaging in

the conduct set forth above, including, without limitation, refusing to perform his obligations
under, or to close the real estate transactions required by, the Bid Properties Purchase
Agreement.
60.

The real property that Plaintiff agreed to purchase under the Bid Properties

Purchase Agreement is rare and has unique and special value to Plaintiff, and Plaintiff has no
adequate remedy at law to enforce the provisions of the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement,
other than specific performance of the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement.
61.

Plaintiff is entitled to specific performance of the terms, conditions and provisions

of the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement by court decree ordering Defendant, among other
things, to complete conveyance of the Bid Properties and perform his other obligations under the
Bid Properties Purchase Agreement.
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62.

As a direct result of Defendant's various breaches of the Bid Properties Purchase

Agreement, Plaintiff has been damaged and is entitled to recover his actual, consequential,
incidental and expectancy damages, which Plaintiff has suffered as a result of Defendant's
breaches of the Bid Properties Agreement, all in an amount to be determined at trial, which
amount exceeds $500,000.00.
63.

Plaintiff is also entitled to recover his reasonable attorneys' fees and costs

incurred in this matter, as well as appropriate pre- and post-judgment interest at the maximum
rate permitted by law, all in an amount to be determined at trial.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(Breach of Contract Regarding the Division of Staffwood Properties Agreement)
64.

Plaintiff incorporates herein by this reference the allegations set forth in the

preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.
65.

The Division of Staffwood Properties Agreement constitutes a valid and

enforceable contract between Plaintiff and Defendant.
66.

Plaintiff and Defendant reached an agreement as to the material and essential

terms of the Division of Staffwood Properties Agreement, which terms are sufficiently clear and
certain to enable the parties to specifically perform the terms of the Division of Staffwood
Properties Agreement.
67.

The terms of the Division of Staffwood Properties Agreement are reasonable and

based on adequate consideration.
68.

Plaintiff has performed all duties, promises and material obligations required of

Plaintiff under the Division of Staffwood Properties Agreement, and all conditions precedent that
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Plaintiff agreed to perform pursuant to the Division of Staffwood Properties Agreement have
been satisfied.
69.

Among other things, Plaintiff has offered, and is willing, able, ready and fully

prepared to close the real estate transactions, required by the Division of Staffwood Prope11ies
Agreement.
70.

Defendant has failed and refused, and continues to fail and refuse, to perform the

required closing pursuant to the terms of the Division of Staffwood Properties Agreement, or to
divide the subject properties and convey them in accordance with the terms of the Division of
Staffwood Properties Agreement.
71.

Defendant has breached the Division of Staffwood Properties Agreement by

engaging in the conduct set forth above, including, without limitation, refusing to perform his
obligations under, or to close the real estate transactions required by, the Division of Staffwood
Properties Agreement.
72.

The real prope11y that Plaintiff is entitled to receive under the Division of

Staffwood Properties Agreement is rare and has unique and special value to Plaintiff, and
Plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law to enforce the provisions of the Division of Staffwood
Properties Agreement, other than specific performance of the Division of Staffwood Properties
Agreement.
73.

Plaintiff is entitled to specific performance of the terms, conditions and provisions

of the Division of Staffwood Properties Agreement by court decree ordering Defendant, among
other things, to complete conveyance of the required properties in accordance with

terms

15

2

and perform his other obligations under, the Division of Staffwood Properties Agreement.
74.

As a direct result of Defendant's various breaches of the Di vision of Staffwood

Properties Agreement, Plaintiff has been damaged and is entitled to recover his actual,
consequential, incidental and expectancy damages, which Plaintiff has suffered as a result of
Defendant's breaches of the Division of Staffwood Properties Agreement, all in an amount to be
determined at trial, which amount exceeds $500,000.00.
75.

Plaintiff is also entitled to recover his reasonable attorneys' fees and costs

incurred in this matter, as well as appropriate pre- and post-judgment interest at the maximum
rate permitted by law, all in an amount to be determined at trial.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
(Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Regarding the Agreements)
76.

Plaintiff incorporates herein by this reference the allegations set forth in the

preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.
77.

Under Idaho law, and inherent in both of the Agreements, are implied covenants

of good faith and fair dealing. These covenants of good faith and fair dealing apply to every
aspect of these contractual relationships between Plaintiff and Defendant. These covenants of
good faith and fair dealing prohibit Defendant from intentionally or purposefully doing anything
which would impair, destroy or injure Plaintiffs right to receive the fruits of the Agreements and
the ordinary and reasonably anticipated benefits and consideration of the Agreements.
78.

To comply with these covenants, Defendant had an obligation to act consistently

with the Agreements' agreed common purposes and Plaintiffs justified and reasonable
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expectations.
79.

Defendant has breached his covenants of good faith and fair dealing to Plaintiff

by engaging in the conduct set forth above.
80.

As a direct result of Defendant's various breaches of his covenants of good faith

and fair dealing, Plaintiff has been damaged and is entitled to recover his actual, consequential,
incidental and expectancy damages, which Plaintiff suffered as a result of Defendant's breaches
of his covenants of good faith and fair dealing, all in an amount to be determined at trial, which
amount exceeds $500,000.00.
81.

Plaintiff is also entitled to recover his reasonable attorneys' fees and costs

incurred in this matter, as well as appropriate pre- and post-judgment interest at the maximum
rate permitted by law, all in an amount to be determined at trial.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Promissory Estoppel)
82.

Plaintiff incorporates herein by this reference the allegations set forth in the

preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.
83.

RQN, with the full authorization of Defendant and on behalf of Defendant,

delivered the January 13 Letter to Plaintiffs attorneys, wherein Defendant made certain
commitments and promises to Plaintiff, including the following: (1) Plaintiff had the right to
purchase the Bid Properties for $2.8 million; (2) Defendant would close on the sale of the Bid
Properties to Plaintiff, regardless of whether Plaintiff was willing to treat this transaction as a
tax-fi:ee distribution of property; (3) Staffwood would pay $350,000 to Plaintiff to reimburse him
for the amounts Smith Chevrolet advanced on behalf of Staffwood, as alleged above, which
17

requires Defendant to pay Plaintiff the sum of $175,000, which is Defendant's 50% share of this
obligation; and ( 4) Defendant would agree to a conveyance to Plaintiff of one of the Staffwood
Property Sets, at Plaintiff's election.
84.

Defendant knew and expected, or reasonably should have known and expected,

that the promises set forth in the January 13 Letter would induce reliance by Plaintiff.
85.

Plaintiff has reasonably and detrimentally relied on the above-referenced

promises and commitments in the January 13 Letter.
86.

Defendant has repudiated the commitments and promises he made in the January

13 Letter, and now refuses to honor the commitments and promises set forth therein.
87.

Defendant must be estopped from repudiating and reneging on his commitments

and promises as set forth in the January 13 Letter.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for relief against Defendant as follows:
1.

Under his First Claim for Relief,
a.

For specific performance of the terms, conditions and provisions of the

Bid Properties Purchase Agreement by means of a court decree ordering Defendant to
complete conveyance of the Bid Properties and perform his other obligations under the
Bid Properties Purchase Agreement;
b.

For compensation incidental to the decree of specific performance as set

forth above, according to proof; and
c.

Plaintiffs actual, consequential, incidental and expectancy damages,
18

which Plaintiff has suffered as a result of Defendant's breaches of the Bid Properties
Purchase Agreement, all in an amount to be established at trial, which amount exceeds
$500,000.00;
2.

Under his Second Claim for Relief
a.

Plaintiff is entitled to specific performance of the terms, conditions and

provisions of the Division of Staffwood Properties Agreement by court decree ordering
Defendant, among other things, to complete conveyance of the required properties in
accordance with the terms thereof, and perform his other obligations under, the Division
of Staffwood Properties Agreement;
b.

For compensation incidental to the decree of specific performance as set

forth above, according to proof; and
c.

For Plaintiff's actual, consequential, incidental and expectancy damages,

which Plaintiff has suffered as a result of Defendant's breaches of the Division of
Staffwood Properties Agreement, all in an amount to be determined at trial, which
amount exceeds $500,000.00;
3.

Under his Third Claim for Relief, for Plaintiff's actual, consequential, incidental

and expectancy damages, which Plaintiff has suffered as a result of Defendant's breaches of his
implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing, all in an amount to be determined at trial, which
amount exceeds $500,000.00;
4.

Under his Fourth Claim for Relief, for an order estopping Defendant from

19

repudiating his commitments and promises in the January 13 Letter as alleged above, and an
order declaring that Defendant is obligated to comply with said commitments and promises;
5.

For an award of Plaintiff's reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in

this matter;
6.

For pre- andpost-judgrnent inforestat the maximum rate permitted by law;

7.

For such other and further relief to which Plaintiff may be entitled as a

and

matter of law or equity, or which the Court determines to be just and proper.
DATED this

Ii11 day of March, 2014.

~---------

SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Kara L. Pettit
Attorneys.for Plaintiff Stafford L. Smith

EXHIBIT A

II

PRESTON

&

SCOTT

ATTORNEYS AT LAW
Stanley J. Preston

Direct Dial: 801-869-1623

December 20, 2013

VL4 ELECTRONIC AND REGULAR MAIL
Michael W. Spence
Greggory J. Savage
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
36 South State Street, Suite 1400
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Re:

Stafford Smith and Woodrzif.!Smith

Dear Mike and Gregg:
Thank you for your letter yesterday and settlement proposal. Stafford is ·willing to
purchase the subject properties from Staffwood, including the Outlet Center property, on the
following terms and conditions:
1.
Stafford will pay the of sum $2,800,000 for the properties that
were the subject of the bid process, which amount is $50,000 more than his last
bid;
2.
The funds Woody has escrowed under the bid process will be
returned to him at closing;
3.
In light of the holidays, the closing on Stafford's purchase will tal<e
place thirty (30) days from the date the parties sign an agreement as to the terms
of Stafford's purchase of the subject properties;
The net proceeds from the sale of the subject properties will be
4.
divided between Staffwood's partners after satisfying the following obligations:
a. Payment in full of Staffwood's loan from Wells Fargo Bank;

Five Gateway Office Center
178 S. Rio Grande Street, Suite 250 , Salt Lake City, UT 84101 • Telephone: 801-869-1620 • Fax: 801-869-1621
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Michael , Spence
Greggory J. Savage
December 20, 2013
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b. Payment to Smith Chevrolet of the funds it has advanced above
its lease obligation on behalf of Staffwood to ensure adequate
funds for Staffwood to pay its ongoing obligations, which
payment is pursuant to the parties' agreement as set forth in
Section 10.4 of the July 5, 2012 Settlement Agreement. These
obligations include, but are not limited to, accounting costs, taxes,
insurance, maintenance, repairs and servicing the Wells Fargo
Bank loan. Exact amounts to be repaid to Smith Chevrolet shall
be determined by means of an audit conducted by Staffwood's
accolmtant, Kevin Oakey, but said amounts are anticipated to be
in excess of $350,000; and
c. Staffwood's retention of a mutually agreed amount as a reserve to
enable Staffwood to pay its ongoing obligations on its remaining
properties. Stafford recommends that the retained sum should be
$50,000 but in no event should the retained amount be less than
$20,000.
In addition, as you are aware, the sale of Staffwood' s Pocatello property \\~11 take place
in the near future. Woody has agreed to the terms of the sale, but requested that the proceeds
from the sale not be distributed until the parties reach a settlement agreement. Stafford estimates
that the net proceeds from this sale will be approximately $230,000. Assuming the sale takes
place as planned, it is proposed that the net proceeds from this sale be distributed to the partners
once an agreement is signed in writing regarding Stafford's purchase of the subject bid properties
or, alternatively, that these funds be distributed simultaneously with the closing of Stafford's
purchase of t.11e bid properties.
Of course, once we reach an agreement on Staffwood's purchase of the bid properties, we
will expect to promptly receive your proposal for dividing Staffwood's remaining properties
between the partners. Please let me know as soon as possible whether the foregoing is
acceptable to your client.

Michael W. Spence
Greggory J. Savage
December 20, 2013
Page3

Sincerely,

cc:

Damian C. Smith (via electronic mail)
Michael R. Carlston (via electronic mail)
Stafford Smith (via electronic mail)

EXHIBITB

ATIOR,~EYS AT LAW

Narrvel E. Hall

Douglas W. Morrison
Herbert C. Livsey
D. Jay Curtis

January 13, 2014

Joratnan A. Dibble
Scott Hancock Clark

Loren E. Weiss

James S. Jardine
Janel Hugle Srr:ith
Douglas Matsumarl
Larry G. Moore

CONFIDENTIAL SETTLEMENT COMMUNICATION
PURSUANT TO UTAH RULE OF EVIDENCE 408
Via E-mail and U.S. Mail

SALT LAKE CITY OFFICE

lester I\. Essig
Ira B, Rub!nfeld

Stephen C. Tlngey

Stanley J. Preston
Preston & Scott
178 South Rio Grande Street, Suite 250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

PO Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah
84145-0385

Re:

Bruce L Olson
John A. Adams
Douglas M. Menson
Craig Carlile
Jeffrey W. Appel
David J. Castleton
Ellen J. D. Toscano
K1:win G. Glade

John R. Madsen
Michael W. Spence
Scott A. Hagen
Mark M, Betti!yon
Rick L Rose

Rick 8, Hoggard
Lisa A. Yer!mv!ch
Brent D. Wride
Michael E. Blue

Steven W. Cal!
Elaine A. Monson

Smith v. Smith

Mark A. Cotter
Greggory J. Savage:

Kally J. Applegate

36 South State Street
Suite 1400
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
801 532-1500,EL
801 532-7543 FAX
www.rqn.com

Justin T. Toth

Dear Stan:

Uesel B. Stevens

Robert O. Rice
Arthur B. Berger

Woody hereby accepts Stafford's offer as set forth in your letter of December
20, 2013.

Frederick R. Thaler, Jr.
John W. Macl~ay
McKay M. Pearson
Maril W. Pugsley
Matthew N. Evans

Gary L Longmore

John P. Wundarli

For purposes ?f certainty and clarification, we set forth below further detail
86 North University Ave about OUT understandmg of the terms Of Settlement. Jn paragraph llO. 8 below, We
suite 430
propose that the parties attempt to agree on a way that this transaction may be done
Provo, Utah
84601-4420
on a tax free basis. Woody's accountants believe that by treating the entire
_
oom
transaction
as a distribution in dissolution of the parties' interests in Sta:ffvvood, the
801 342 24
301 375-8379 FAx
parties can come out the same as agreed without incurring negative tax consequences.
This would seem to be beneficial to both parties, but since this provision is outside of
the terms of Stafford's offer, we make clear that we do not require Stafford's
agreement to paragraph no. 8.
PRovo orncE

Also, as requested, we propose a division of the balance of the Sta:ffvvood
property, which we have set forth below. It does not matter to Woody which
election Stafford makes of these two Property Sets. We do not see how the property
can be divided any other way without resulting in joint or adjacent ownership of any
properties, which may cause conflict or irritation in the future.

Michael R. Johnson
E. Blaine Rawson
Samuel C. Straight
Matthew R. Lewis

Paul C. Burl~e
Elaina M. Maragakls

D. Zachary Wiseman
Michael D, Mayfield

Scott 8. Finlinson
Brett L. Tolman
Bryan K. Bassett

Kamie F. Brown
Mark B. Durrant
Janelle Eurick Bauer
Gregg D. Stephenson

Kristine M. Larsen
Gregory S. Roberts

J!~~s~~~~e~~fi:g~~in
Angela E. Aikin
Samuel A. Lambert
David H. Leigh
Gavin M. Reese

Richard H. Madsen, II
Ryan 13. 13e!!
s. Brandon Owen

Charles H. Livsey
Oavld B. D!hble
Emily S. Loeffler
Bryant J. McConkie

Marla E. Heckel
Bfllke R. Bauman
Michael K. Erickson
Erle G. Benson

R. Troy Mcllerup

Accordingly, the points of understanding are as follows:
1. Stafford closes on the 3 bid properties at $2.8 million ("Closing"), which
1
Closing is to be held within 30 days of the date hereof.
2. Funds escrowed by Woody in the bid process shall be returned upon
finalizing this Agreement.
1

You indicated that Stafford needed 30 days because of the holidays. Now that the holidays have
passed, Woody is willing to close this in a much shorter time frame if Stafford is able to do so.
Earlier closing will also save the parties additional interest.

A

RDFESSIONAL

CORPORATION

Matthew M. Cannon
James A. Sorenson
Mica Mcl\lnney
Adam D, Wentz
Robert P. Harrington
Greg M. Newman
Adam K, Richards
James M. Swan

Beth J. Ranschau
Aaron K. Olsen:
OF COUNSEL

Robert M. Graham
Clark P. GIies
M. John Ashton

Gerald T. Snow
Katie A. Eccles
Jordan Christianson
Anjali J. Patel

Stanley J. '"''""'''"tr.-n
January 13,
2

3. All funds from the Closing shall go to the account Staf:fvvood, and shall be
disbursed as follows: (a) payoff of Wells Fargo loan (assumed to be about
$875,000 at closing); and (b) refund ofrent overpayment by Smith Chevrolet
and other expenses mentioned in your letter, will be set at $350,000.2
Balance of funds from Closing shall be distributed equally to the partners.

4. The balance of the properties shall be divided into two sets of property/cash
as set forth below. Stafford shall have the choice to choose Property Set A or
Property Set B, and Woody shall receive the Property Set not elected by
Stafford.

Property Set A
*Snake River Landing Property
Less: $400,000 Cash to Property B
Recipient

Property Set B
Bellon Road Property
Blackfoot property
**Pocatello property
$400,000 Cash from
Property A Recipient

*Recipient A assumes and pays, and holds Recipient B harmless from, the
$1. 9 million note and deed of trust pertaining to this property.
**Recipient B shall receive all proceeds from the recent sale ofthis property.
5. Staffwood's approximately 7 acre plot west of the Snake River shall not be
divided, but shall be conveyed by Staffwood to the City ofldaho Falls in
connection with the Closing in order that each of the parties in their capacity
of partners of Staffwood may receive equal benefit of the Mite off.
6. Conveyance of property in Property Sets A and B to the respective party shall
occur contemporaneously with the Closing. No such conveyance or transfer
of funds shall occur prior to Closing. 3
7. The parties agree that upon Closing, all debts, claims or obligations (a) owing
to Staffwood :from themselves or their respective entities, (b) ovving to them
from Staffwood, and (c) owing to each other (except for (i) continuing
obligations of Stafford pursuant to Section 3 .3 of the November 10, 2010
Settlement Agreement, and (ii) continuing obligations of the parties
pertaining to the windup of SV Idaho pursuant to Section 4 of the July 5,

2

An audit of this amount would delay the Closing. Woody proposes to set this at $350,000 and be
done with it.

3

This avoids piecemeal settlement and motivates the parties to close. As mentioned in footnote l
above, Woody is ready to close as soon as Stafford is able.

Stanley l
January

1Jr,,,,1-r1n

3

2012 Settlement Agreement), if any,
Agreement.
8.

be released and settled by

In order to reduce taxes to the maximum extent possible, the parties agree to
discuss and attempt to agree prior to Closing concerning ways by which
Stafford's receipt of the 3 bid properties along with other divisions of cash
and property to the parties hereunder may be treated overall as an equal
distribution of Staffwood assets in liquidation of their ovvnership interests in
Staffwood. If the parties cannot agree prior to Closing, Closing of the bid
properties and the subsequent divisions shall take place exactly as set forth
above.

9. Staffwood shall remain in existence after the Closing until the end of
calendar year 2014 in order that Staffwood may be used to complete a 1031
like-kind exchange if desired, provided that nothing shall require any action
which increases the tax burden of the other party.
10. Staffwood shall then be dissolved prior to the end of calendar year 2014,
unless it is being utilized for a 1031 like-kind exchange as described in
paragraph no. 9 above; in which case, Staffwood will be dissolved upon
completion of the 1031 transaction.
We look forward to hearing how Stafford would like to proceed.
Sincerely,

~UTNNEY&

_,Ji,./
, .

pence

Greggory J. Savage

cc:

1266871

Michael R. Carlston
Woodruff Smith
Hal Bennett
Damian Smith

~BEKER, P .C .

. L----

EXHIBITC

From:

Sent:
To:
Cc:
Subject:

Greggory Savage <gsavage@rqn.com>
Thursday,
2014 1:26 PM
Stanley Preston; "mcarlston@scmlaw.com'
Michael Spence
RE: Financial Analysis of Proposed Closing

We understand that Woody and the folks advising him generally agree with the computations in the Exhibit Ayou
provided and it seems we are very close to agreement, subject to some clarifications or decisions on the following list of
issues that has been provided to us:
1. Woody's return of his $292,500 deposit is irrelevant to this closing, because he is just receiving his own money
back. Given the limited nature of the matters remaining for resolution, there seems to be no reason why he
shouldn't get the deposit back immediately. We note that Stafford received a return of his earnest money the
day after he elected to cease bidding. At this point, Woody's deposit is unnecessary because he is not obligated
to provide funds to complete this deal. Therefore, we would like the deposit refunded immediately and Exhibit
A amended to remove all reference to the deposit, because to an outsider (such as the IRS) looking at these
documents, it appears that Woody is getting the full $688,867 out of this transaction, which he is not.
2. We see that the computation presumes that Stafford will bring $2.8 million to the closing. Woody's tax
professionals have advised both parties, in order to treat this as a sale Stafford will need to bring in the $2.8M
and let it flow through the transaction. We realize that Stafford has the right to treat this as a sale and exchange
of the 3 bid properties under our Settlement Agreements, but we ask Stafford to consider a dissolution wherein
he makes a contribution sufficient to get the 3 bid properties plus the Property B properties, and Woody gets
Property A plus $395,967 (as adjusted for closing costs)'? This would allow Stafford to bring less than the $2.8
million to the closing and would result in less taxes for both parties. Please advise whether Stafford is willing to
consider this.
3. Since the parties will be paying property taxes, utilities, etc., on a prospective basis, we don't see any need to
keep money in Staffwood. Does this distribution provide for any money to remain in Staffwood? How much
remains in the Staffwood account(s)?
4. Woody is fine with Stafford managing the process relative to the gift of property to the City of Idaho Falls, but
the agreement needs to provide that Woody receives the exact same attribution of the gift as Stafford, and that
Woody's agreement is obtained prior to implementation.
5. As we understand it, upon completion of this closing, the only matters remaining between the parties (other
than Stafford's note to Woody as you have documented) are the following:
a. Future dealings relating to SV Idaho and its eventual liquidation. Does Stafford claim Woody owes any
money to SV Idaho or to Stafford relative to SV Idaho? If there is any disagreement on this, we would
like to resolve it now. Also, there is the $500,000 to be written off. How does Stafford propose to deal
with this between the partners?
b. First right of refusal to buy the other's business. This hurts the marketability of both brothers'
businesses, and is another potential matter for conflict in the fwture. Is Stafford willing to terminate this
provision.
c. Woody also requests that the one year non-hiring provision be terminated.· We would like to have
employees at either partner's business free to be employed where they choose.
6. Subject to the foregoing items and receipt of the following documents, Woody is prepared to close:

a. Draft of an acceptable Settlement Agreement;
b. Revised Exhibit A as requested above;
Title
on the Snake River
d.
Settlement Statement from the title

how disbursements are to

Thanks.
Gregg Savage

From: Stanley Preston [mailto:sjp@prestonandscott.com]

Sent: Wednesday, February 05, 2014 9:52 AM
To: Michael Spence; Greggory Savage
Cc: Mike Carlston (mcarlston@scmlaw.com); Bryan M. Scott; Damian Smith
Subject: Financial Analysis of Proposed Closing
Mike and Gregg,
Attached is a spreadsheet showing the financial breakdown for the closing we have proposed. Obviously we don't yet
know the title fees and closing costs that will need to added to this spreadsheet, but this is essentially what we propose
will be Exhibit A to the Addendum to Escrow Instructions I sent you last week, and the reference to Exhibit Bin the
Addendum will also be changed to reference this document as well. When do you anticipate getting back to us on our
proposal. We would like to close this matter this week. Regards, Stan
Stanley J. Preston
PRESTON & SCOlT
Five Gateway Office Center
178 S. Rio Grande St., Suite 250
SLC, UT 84101
Tel.: 801-869-1620
Fax: 801-869-1621
DD: 801-869-1623
sip@prestonandscott.com
www.prestonandscott.com
The Information contained in this e-mail and any attachments is confidential and solely for the use of the intended recipient. If the intended
recipient is our client, then this information is also a privileged attorney-client communication. Unauthorized use or disclosure of this information
is prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, do not read it. Please delete it from your system without copying it, and notify the
sender by e-mail or by calling 801-869-1620, so that our address record can be corrected. Thank you.
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PRESTON
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ATTORNEYS AT LAW
Stanley J. Preston

Direct Dial: 801-869-1623

January 30, 2014

CONFIDENTIAL AND PROTECTED SETTLEMENT COMNJUNICATION
VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL
Michael W. Spence
Greggory J. Savage
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
36 South State Street, Suite 1400
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
·-··

Re:

Stafford Smith and Woodruff Smith

Dear Mike and Gregg:
Stafford is pleased that Woody has accepted Stafford's settlement offer based on the
terms communicated in my letter to you dated December 20, 2013 . Please be advised that
Stafford is willing to divide the remaining Staffwood property consistent with the terms outlined
in your letter dated January 13, 2014, and Stafford has decided to choose Property Set B.
Enclosed is a draft Addendum to the TitleOne Escrow Instructions to effect a Closing
regarding Stafford's purchase of the properties subject to the bid process, as well as the transfer
of Property Set A to Woody and Property Set B to Stafford, as well as drafts of the Special
Warranty Deeds to be attached as Exhibits to the Addendum.. We have noted one change in the
Special Warranty Deed to Woody where it states that it is further subject to a development lien,
we are going to change this deed so that it specifically references the encumbrance in question.
Also, Stafford is in the process of preparing Exhibit A to the Addendum, and we will forward
these two exhibits to you as soon as they are available. In recognition of the parties' desire to
accomplish this as soon as possible, Stafford proposes that this Closing take place tomorrow,
Friday, January 31, at 2:00 p.m.
The accountants are still in the process of advising our clients regarding whether to
structure the transfer of the Staffwood properties as a sale or liquidation. Stafford anticipates
that he will be provide a description of these two options in the near future and then let Woody
choose which way he wants to proceed.
In the meantime, the parties will still need to prepare and sign a third Setilement
Agreement regarding this matter inasmuch as a number of the terms are not covered by the

Five Gateway Office Center
178 S. Rio Grande Street, Suite 250 • Salt Lake City, UT 84 101 • Telephone: 801-869-1620 • Fax: 801-869-1621
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Michael
Spence
Greggory J. Savage
January 30, 2014
Page2

enclosed Addendum. This settlement agreement will need to address at least the following
issues:
1. A mutual release of all claims between the parties.
2. Woody's agreement to indemnify Stafford and hold Stafford harmless with
respect to the deed of encumbering the Snake River Landing Property for which
Sunn)'View, LLC, is the beneficiary.
3. The parties' agreement that, upon the Closing pursuant to the Addendum, all
debts, claims or obligations: (a) owing to Staffwood from Stafford and Woody
and their respective entities; (b) owing to them from Staffwood; and (c) owing to
each other (except for (i) continuing obligations of Stafford pursuant to Section
3.3 of the November 10, 2010 Settlement Agreement, and (ii) continuing
obligations of the parties pertaining to the vvindup of SV Idaho pursuant to
Section 4 of the July 5, 2012 Settlement Agreement), if any, shall be released and
settled as part of this Settlement.
4. The conveyance to the City ofldaho Falls of the seven acre plot west of the Snake
River, with each partner receiving equal benefit of the tax write off. The gift of
this property, however, must be made contingent upon the City building an
appropriate park by a specified date. Stafford has worked on these arrangements
and should see this through. Without this condition, the park may not be built in
the parties' lifetimes. Stafford has been negotiating and working with the City
and other parties in the planning of the park, and he has been working to bring in
other major donor groups to ensure the park will be worthy of Staffwood's land
donation and will be a true legacy. The parties will need to agree that Stafford
should continue to take the lead in the planning and negotiations with the City.
For these reasons, the timing of the donation should not be stipulated in the
parties' settlement agreement
5. The structure of the transaction as either a sale or a liquidation, with the resulting
impact on the continuing existence of Staff\vood, as set forth in paragraphs 9 ai,d

Michael
Spence
Greggory J. Savage
January 30, 2014
Page3

10 of your January 13, 2014 letter, provided that Woody will make a decision on
this issue within sixty days of Stafford presenting the options to Woody.
6. A provision that the terms and conditions of the November 10, 2010 Settlement
Agreement and the July 5, 2012 Settlement Agreement shall remain in full force
and effect except as amended by the terms of the third settlement agreement.
7. Inasmuch as Staffwood will not be liquidated at the Closing, and it will have
some continuing obligations, the parties will agree to leave a nominal amount in
the Staffwood account.
Please let me know as soon as possible if you have any suggested changes to the enclosed
Addendum, and whether you agree that the parties should prepare and sign a third settlement
agreement along the lines proposed herein. Once we are in agreement on these two points, I vvill
begin preparing the settlement agreement.
Sincerely,

Encls.
cc:

Damian C. Smith (via electronic mail w!encls.)
Michael R. Carlston (via electronic mail w!encls.)
Stafford Smith (via electronic mail w/encls.)

EXHIBIT

From:

Stanley Preston

Sent:
To:
Cc:

20141:05 AM
'Michael
Greggory Savage <gsavage@rqn.com>; Mike Carlston
M. Scott; 'Damian Smith'
Closing on Staffwood Properties
Addendum to Escrow Instructions 02-20-14.docx; Analysis of Staffwood Sale and
Distribution 02-20-14.xls; Release of Escrow Funds 02-20-14.docx

Subject:
Attachments:

Mike,
In my email dated February 13, 2014, ! quoted from our prior written communications wherein our respective clients
reached an agreement as to the terms for Stafford's purchase of the bid properties and the distribution of other real
property owned by Staffwood Partnership, as well as Woody express, written representation that he was willing to go
forward with a Closing to effect the conveyance of the subject real property.
It is, therefore, extremely disappointing that Woody would fail to follow through with his contractual obligation to
complete this Closing in a timely manner and, instead, leave the country for an extended period of time, and thereby
leave this important matter unconcluded. It is particularly troubling that Woody would do this without the courtesy of
notifying us beforehand, and without making any provision that would allow you as his counsel to contact him.
Please be advised that my client's patience has reached its limit, both as to Woody's unjustified delays and failure to
complete the required Closing, as well as his repeated attempts to renegotiate the terms of the parties' prior
agreements. Accordingly, we expect Woody to proceed with the Closing immediately upon his return from his trip,
which we understand from your representation will be this coming Sunday. To accomplish this, we have scheduled the
Closing for Tuesday, February 25, 2014, at 2:00 p.m., as outlined in the attached Addendum to Escrow Instructions, the
Exhibit A to the Addendum, and the Release of Escrow Funds, which have been revised and prepared to accommodate
Woody's request that the Closing make no reference to the return of his escrow funds.
We believe these attached documents reflect the terms of the parties' agreement. If, however, you have any suggested
changes to these documents please advise me immediately, provided that any such suggested changes are consistent
with the terms of the parties1 agreement. Also, to the extent Woody desires to order title insurance on any of the
properties that are being conveyed to him, please notify the Escrow Agent as soon as possible. Finally, please send me
copies of the attached agreements with the required signatures from Woody, Woody1s wife, and the WDS Limited
Partnership, by Monday, February 24, 2014.
Stanley J. Preston
PRESTON & SCOTT
Five Gateway Office Center
178 S. Rio Grande St., Suite 250
SLC, UT 84101
Tel.: 801-869-1620
Fax: 801-869-1621
DD: 801-869-1623
sip@prestonandscott.com
www.prestonandscott.com
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The information contained in this e-mail and any attachments is confidential and solely for the use of the intended
recipient. If the intended recipient is our client, then this information is also a privileged attorney-client
communication. Unauthorized use or disclosure of this information is prohibited. If you have received this
communication in error, do not read it. Please delete it from your system without copying it, and notify the sender
mail or by calling 801-869-1620, so that our address record can be corrected. Thank you.
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from: Michael Spence [mailto:mspence@RQN.COM]
Sent: Tuesday, February 181 2014 4:10 PM
To: Stanley Preston

Subject: "Alias Smith & Jones"
Stan, I have "heard" back from Woody's in house folks. Woody is out of the country and they/we don't expect to "hear
or see" back from him until this coming Sunday, notwithstanding our efforts to contact him beforehand. If he is at the
Olympics (which I seriously doubt), I hope he enjoys the 70 degree weather over there! Sorry. Mike

I

Michael Spence I Ray Quinney & Nebeker P.C. 36 South State Street, Suite 1400 I Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Direct: 801-323-3381 j Facsimile: 801-532-7543 J www.rqn.com
IRS Rules of Practice require us to inform you that advice, if any, in this email (including any attachments) concerning federal tax matters is not
intended to be used, and cannot be used or relied upon for the purpose of avoiding penalties under the Internal Revenue Code, nor for promoting,
marketing or recommending any transaction or matter addressed herein. This e-mail is sent by a law firm and contains information that may be
privileged and confidential. If you are not the intended recipient, please delete the e-mail and notify us immediately.
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individually
his capacity as a general partner of SLS 1
successor to The
SLS Limited Partnership and as a managing partner of Staffwood Partnership, an Idaho general
partnership ("Stafford") and Woodruff D. Smith, individually and as a general partner of The
WDS Limited Partnership and as a managing partner of Staffwood Partnership, an Idaho general
partnership ("Woody"). This Addendum is given by Stafford and Woody to TitleOne Title and
Escrow Company ("Escrow Agent") to augment those certain instructions given to Escrow
Agent dated February 5, 2013 relating to Staffwood Partnership and those certain Settlement
Agreements referred to therein as S.A. 2010 and S.A. 2012 ("Initial Escrow Instruction") and
additional property referred to herein ("Deeded Property").
In consideration of mutual covenants and agreements and the fulfillment of the instructions
contained in this Addendum, the parties agree and instruct the Escrow Agent, as follows:
1. Closing: The Closing shall be on Tuesday, February 25, 2014 at 2:00 o'clock p.m. Mountain
Time at the office of the Escrow Agent located at 400 Memorial Drive, Idaho Falls, Idaho
83402, or such other time and place as Stafford and Woody may agree, in writing delivered to
Escrow Agent. At Closing, the following shall occur:
A. Stafford shall deposit certified funds in the amounts required herein.
B. The Escrow Agent shall eause to be recorded the deeds referenced in
paragraph 3 hereof.
C. The Escrow Agent shall obtain from Wells Fargo Bank, National Association
and file or record terminations, releases, and deeds of re-conveyance sufficient
and necessary to remove the liens and encumbrances listed on "Schedule 1,"
attached hereto, which Schedule shall be prepared by Escrow Agent.
D. Escrow Agent shall disburse to Woody the stuns described in paragraph 2.C.
hereof.
E. Real property taxes and assessments shall not be apportioned between Woody
and Stafford. Rather each parcel is being conveyed subject to accrued and
accruing real property taxes and assessments.
F. The Closing eosts shall be paid by Staffwood Partnership. Each party has the
option of ordering and obtaining standard owner's policies of title insurance on
any of the Deeded Property that is conveyed to such party pursuant to Closing, the
premium for which shall be paid by Staffwood Partnership; provided, however,
that each party shall immediately notify Escrow Agent of its decision to order any
such title insurance so as not to delay Closing. Escrow Agent accepts
responsibility for the condition of title only to the extent as established by
in
accordance with the policies of title insurance purchased as a part of the Closing.

2. Collection of Funds and Disbursements:
parties the following funds:

to

A.
Closing, accept additional funds
Stafford the amount set forth in
Exhibit A, attached hereto, together with a sum equal to one half (1/z) of the fees and
costs charged by the Escrow Agent for Closing services. In addition Escrow Agent
shall disburse to Wells Fargo Bank, National Association all sums necessary to
satisfy the obligations and obtain the release of those liens and encumbrances listed
on "Schedule 1", attached hereto, ·with a payout date of the amounts due to Wells
Fargo Bank, National Association as of January 14, 2014, with Stafford responsible
for paying any interest that has accrued since that date.
B. At Closing, collect from Staffwood Partnership, or at its direction, all sums
necessary to pay the premium cost of title insurance ordered by the parties
relating to the Deeded Property.
C. At Closing, disburse to WDS Limited Partnership the sum set forth in Exhibit
A, attached hereto, less a sum equal to one half (1/z) of the fees and costs of
Escrow Agent incurred in the Closing.
3. Recording of Deeds: At Closing the Escrow Agent shall cause to be recorded
the following Special Warranty Deeds:
A. A Special Warranty Deed in the form of "Exhibit B", attached hereto, conveying to
Woody the property commonly known as the Snake River Landing Property, subject to
accrued and accruing real property taxes and assessments and to liens and encumbrances
of record, including but not limited to that deed of trust recorded as instnunent number
1176756 recorded February 2, 2005 with Staffurood Partnership as Grantor,
AMERTITLE, INC, as Trustee and SUNNYVIEW LLC as beneficiary, which obligation
Woody agrees to ass1une and pay and to indemnify Stafford and hold Stafford harmless
therefrom.
B. A Special Warranty Deed in the form of "Exhibit C", attached hereto,
conveying to Stafford the properties located in Bonneville County, State ofidaho
and commonly known as the RV Property, the Smith Chevrolet Property, the Bellin
Road Property and the Pioneer Road Property, subject to accrued and accruing
taxes and assessments and easements of use or record but free of the lien of Wells
Fargo Bank, National Association as described in paragraph 2. A. hereof.
C. A Special Warranty Deed in the form of "Exhibit D", attached hereto,
conveying to Stafford the property located in Bingham County, State ofidaho and
commonly known as the "Blackfoot Property," subject to accrued and accruing
taxes and assessments and easements of use or record.
4. The Parties' Prior Settlement Agreements: The terms and conditions of the November
10, 2010 Settlement Agreement and the July 5, 2012 Settlement Agreement shall remain in full
force arid effect except as amended by the terms of this Addendum.
2
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WoodruffD. Smith, general partner

Dawn Smith, general partner

WoodruffD. Smith, individually

3

of February, 20

Stafford L. Smith, general partner

Shelly Smith, general partner

Stafford L. Smith, individually
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Staffwood Property Division
Sale of Property to Stafford

Property Sale Analysis
Cash paid to Staffwood
Wells Note Balance Jan 14
Adjustments to payoff+ Payment to Smith Chevrolet
Title Insurance and Closing Costs

amount to distribute

RV
Smith Chevrolet Building
Woody's Automotive Building
RV Building Land
Vet Clinic Land
Woody's Automotive Land
Smith Chevrolet land

2,800,000.00
(858,066.00)
Note plus adjustments to equal $858,066 at date of closing. Stafford's responsibility
(350,000.00)
Amount determined prior to closing
1,591,934.00

less closing costs and insurance

Adjusted Basis
371,040.40
354,230.10
232,596.78
195,500.00
134,421.31
20,000.00
20,000.00

Total Basis

1,327,788.59

Sales Price

2,800,000.00

Gain on sale of assets in Staffwood

1,472,211.41

Cash Analysis
Sale Proceeds
Cash distribution (will be reduced by TitleOne costs)
Cash to Stafford from Woody to equalize A/B
Proceeds from Pocatello
Payment to Smith Chevrolet

Stafford
(2,800,000)
795,967
400,000
239,843

Net Cash

(1,364,190)

at Closing

Tax Basis of Property to Distribute at closing
Team Automotive Pocatello Building
Team Automotive Pocatello Land

Woody

Staffwood Smith Chev

795,967
(400,000)
-239843
350,000

Tax Basis
152,782
20,000

395,967

Team Automotive Blackfoot Building
Team Automotive Blackfoot Land
Bellin Road Land (Milligan)

147,086
10,000
296,751
Tax Basis

Land Snake River Parkway

488,559

and
as a
1
SLS
Partnership and as a managing partner Staffwood Partnership,
successor to
an Idaho general partnership ("Stafford") and Woodruff D. Smith, individually and as a general
partner of The WDS Limited Partnership and as a managing partner of Staffwood Partnership, an
Idaho general partnership ("Woody") hereby instruct TitleOne Title and Escrow Company
("Escrow Agent") as follows:
Immediately upon completion of the Closing pursuant to the Addendum to
Escrow and Closing Instructions ("Addendum") previously signed by Stafford
and Woody, Escrow Agent shall disburse to Woody the sum of $292,500
previously deposited by Woody pursuant to those certain instructions given to
Escrow Agent dated February 5, 2013 relating to Staf:fwood Partnership and those
certain Settlement Agreements referred to therein as S.A. 2010 and S.A. 2012
("Initial Escrow Instruction"), less only the administrative costs of the Escrow
Agent.
The parties further aclmowledge that said disbursement of funds to Woody constitutes a return
to Woody of his own funds that he had previously deposited with Escrow Agent pursuant to
Initial Escrow Instruction, and that these are not new or additional funds that he is receiving
pursuant to the Closing under the Addendum.

DATED this

day of February, 2014

THE WDS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP

WoodruffD. Smith, general partner

Dawn Smith, general partner

WoodrnffD. Smith, individually

DATED

_ day

February, 2014
SLS

Stafford L. Smith, general partner

Shelly Smith, general partner

Stafford L. Smith, individually
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ATTORNEYS AT LAW
Stanley J. Preston

Direct Dial: 801-869-1623

March 3, 2014

CONFIDENTIAL AND PROTECTED SETTLEMENT COMMUNICATION
VIA ELECTRONIC AND REGULAR MAIL
Michael W. Spence
Greggory J. Savage
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
3 6 South State Street, Suite 1400
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Re:

Stafford Smith and Woodruff Smith

Dear Mike and Gregg:
As previously explained in prior correspondence and electronic communications between
us, it is the position of my client, Stafford Smith, that the parties have entered into an enforceable
settlement agreement regarding: (1) Stafford's purchase of the bid properties for the sum of
$2,800,000; and (2) the division of certain remaining Staffwood properties, whereby Woody will
receive what has been designated as the Property Set A, and Stafford will receive Property Set B.
We have reviewed applicable Idaho law on this issue and concluded it supports Stafford's
position.
Stafford has relied to his detriment on the fact that the parties have reached an agreement
on these two primary issues and Stafford is, and has been since January 30, 2014, fully prepared
to close on this settlement and meet all of his obligations related thereto. Stafford is suffering
damage as a result of Woody's refusal to timely close on the agreed terms. At this point, unless
this matter closes in the next few days, Stafford will be forced to use his own funds to pay off the
liens and obligations owed by Staffwood to Wells Fargo Bank.
Accordingly, Stafford hereby demands that the parties perfonu the required Closing on
Thursday, March 6, 2014, at 2:00 p.m. pursuant to the terms set forth in my email to you dated
February 20, 2014, and the documents attached thereto. If the Closing does not take place by
March 6, then Stafford will have no other choice but to sue Woody to enforce the parties'
settlement agreement and recover the damages Stafford has suffered.

Five Gateway Office Center
178 S. Rio Grande Street, Suite 250 • Salt Lake City, UT 84101 • Teleph one: 801-869-1620 • Fax: 801-869-1621
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Michael W. Spence
Greggory J. Savage
March 3, 2014
Page2

Of course, if you have any suggested changes to the proposed Addendum to Escrow
Instructions, the Analysis of Stafnvood Sale and Distribution, or the Release of Escrow Funds,
that I emailed to you on February 20, 2014, we will certainly consider them, so long as they do
not materially change the terms of the parties' agreement.
Finally, this letter once again confirms Stafford's willingness post-Closing to endeavor to
work with Woody to obtain the most mutually beneficial ta'<: treatment reasonably possible.
According to Stafnvood's accountant, completing the transactions in accordance with the agreed
terms provides the most favorable opportunity that will be available to minimize the tax
obligations of the parties. Hopefully, your client will see the wisdom in getting this resolved at
this time based on the terms to which the parties have agreed.
Sincerely,

cc:

Michael R. Carlston (via electronic mail.)
Stafford Smith (via electronic mail)
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Kara L. Pettit (Idaho State Bar No. 5276)
Michael R. Carlston (Utah State Bar No. 0577, Pro Hae Vice Admission To Be Submitted)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
Stanley J. Preston (Utah State Bar No. 4119, Pro Hae Vice Admission To Be Submitted)
PRESTON & SCOTT
Five Gateway Office Center
178 S. Rio Grande Street, Suite 250
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: (801) 869-1620
Attorneys for Plaintiff Stafford L. Smith

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE, STATE OF IDAHO
STAFFORD L. SMITH,
Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING EX PARTE
MOTION TO SEAL COMPLAINT

vs.
WOODRUFF D. SMITH,
Defendant.

Civil No. CV-2014-1434
Judge Jon Shindurling

The Court, having reviewed Plaintiff's Ex Parte Motion to Seal Amended Complaint, as
well as the Amended Complaint and Exhibits thereto that have been filed in this case, being fully
advised in the premises, and good cause appearing therefore:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:
The Amended Complaint filed on March I

2014 in this case is permanently sealed to

preserve the confidential nature of the communications referenced in and

uuu.vu,.,,u/

Amended Complaint, as well as the references to, and descriptions of, prior Settlement
Agreements entered into between the parties, the terms of which are confidential.
DATED this

J1

day of March, 2014.

By
trict Court Judge
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Michael W. Spence (Pro Hae Vice Application Pending)
Greggory J. Savage (Pro Hae Vice Application Pending)
Michael D. Mayfield (Idaho State Bar No. 7857)
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C.
36 South State Street, Suite 1400
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-03 85
Telephone: (801) 532-1500

Attorneys for Defendant, Counterclaim-Plaintiff and
Third-Party Plaintiff Woodruff D. Smith

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE, STATE OF IDAHO

STAFFORD L. SMITH,
Plaintiff and Counterclaim Defendant,
V.

WOODRUFF D. SMITH,
Defendant and Counterclaim Plaintiff.
WOODRUFF D. SMITH,
Third-Party Plaintiff,
vs.
SMITH CHEVROLET CO. INC. and
STAFFWOOD PARTNERSHIP,

MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE
ALTERNATIVE MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
(Oral Argument Requested)
Civil No. CV-2014-1434
Judge Jon J. Shindurling

Pursuant to Rule l 2(b )( 6) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendant Woodruff D.
Smith respectfully moves the Court to dismiss the Amended Complaint filed by Plaintiff Stafford
L. Smith for failure to state a claim. In the alternative, Defendant moves the Court for an entry
of summary judgment in Defendant's favor under Rule 56(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Pursuant to Rule 7 (b )(3) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff intends to file a
memorandum in support of this Motion concurrently with the filing of this Motion.
Defendant requests oral argument on this Motion.
DATED this

//Yl

day of April, 2014.
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C.

ichael W. Spence
Greggory J. Sava
Michael D. Ma 1eld

Attorneys for Defendant, CounterclaimPlaintiff and Third-Party Plaintiff Woodruff
D. Smith
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this ~ d a y of April, 2014, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT was mailed, First Class, postage prepaid, to the following:
Kara L. Pettit
Michael R. Carlston
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
Stanley J. Preston
PRESTON & SCOTT
Five Gateway Office Center
178 S. Rio Grande Street, Suite 250
Salt Lake City, UT 8410 I

1277634
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Michael W. Spence (Pro Hae Vice Application Pending)
Greggory J. Savage (Pro Hae Vice Application Pending)
Michael D. Mayfield (Idaho State Bar No. 7857)
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C.
36 South State Street, Suite 1400
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
Telephone: (801) 532-1500
AttorneysfcJr Defendanl, Counterclaim-Plainliffand
Third-Party Plaintiff WoodnfffD. Smith

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE, ST A TE OF IDAHO

STAFFORD L. SMITH,

ANSWER, COUNTERCLAIM AND THIRDPARTY COMPLAINT

Plaintiff and Counterclaim Defendant,
(With Jury Demand)
V.

Civil No. CV-2014-1434
WOODRUFF D. SMITH,
Judge Jon Shindurling
Defendant and Counterclaim Plaintiff.
WOODRUFF D. SMITH,
Third-Party Plaintiff,
vs.
SMITH CHEVROLET CO. INC. and
STAFFWOOD PARTNERSHIP,
Third-Party Defendants.
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Defendant, Counterclaim-Plaintiff and Third-Party Plaintiff Woodruff D. Smith
("Woody"), by and through counsel, hereby responds to the Complaint of Plaintiff Stafford L.
Smith ("Stafford").

FIRST DEFENSE
The Complaint and each and every claim for relief therein fail to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted against Woody.

SECOND DEFENSE
Answering the numbered paragraphs of the Complaint, Woody answers and alleges as
follows:
1.

Admit.

2.

Admit.

3.

Admit.

4.

Admit.

5.

Admit.

6.

Admit.

7.

Answering the allegations of Paragraph 7, Woody admits the allegations with

respect to residency of Stafford and the location of the real properties involved in this matter.
The allegations with respect to jurisdiction and venue state a legal conclusion to which no
response is required. Woody otherwise denies the allegations of Paragraph 7.
8.

Admit.
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9.

Answering the allegations contained in Paragraph No. 9, Woody states that the

referenced agreement is dated effective November 10, 2010, and speaks for itself To the extent
that the allegations set forth in Paragraph No. 9 are inconsistent with or otherwise misconstrue or
inaccurately characterize the agreement, Woody denies the same.
10.

Answering the allegations contained in Paragraph No. 10, Woody states that the

2010 Settlement Agreement speaks for itself and, to the extent that the allegations set forth in
Paragraph No. 10 arc inconsistent with or otherwise misconstrue or inaccurately characterize the
agreement, Woody denies the same.
11.

Denied.

12.

Answering the allegations contained in Paragraph No. 12, Woody admits that as a

result of Stafford's actions and inactions he was forced to initiate that referenced litigation and
states that documents on file in the litigation speak for themselves. To the extent that the
allegations set forth in Paragraph No. 12 are inconsistent with or otherwise misconstrue or
inaccurately characterize the documents on file in the litigation, Woody denies the same.
13.

Answering the allegations contained in Paragraph No. 13, Woody states that

documents on file in the litigation speak for themselves. To the extent that the allegations set
fo1ih in Paragraph No. 13 are inconsistent with or otherwise misconstrue or inaccurately
characterize the documents on file in the litigation, Woody denies the same. Moreover, as set
forth herein, it is clear that numerous disputes remain between Woody and Stafford.
14.

Answering the allegations contained in Paragraph No. 14, vVoody states that the

2012 Settlement Agreement speaks for itself and to the extent that the allegations set forth in
3
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Paragraph No. 14 are inconsistent with or otherwise misconstrue or inaccurately characterize the
agreement, Woody denies the same.
15.

Answering the allegations contained in Paragraph No. 15, Woody states that the

2012 Settlement Agreement speaks for itself and to the extent that the allegations set forth in
Paragraph No. 15 are inconsistent with or otherwise misconstrue or inaccurately characterize the
agreement, Woody denies the same.
16.

Admit.

17.

Answering the allegations contained in Paragraph No. 17, Woody admits that

RQN has acted as his attorneys and otherwise denies the allegations of Paragraph 17.
18.

Answering the allegations contained in Paragraph No. 18, Woody states that the

2010 Settlement Agreement speaks for itself and, to the extent that the allegations set forth in
Paragraph No. 18 are inconsistent with or otherwise misconstrue or inaccurately characterize the
agreement, denies the same.
19.

Answering the allegations contained in Paragraph No. 19, Woody states that the

2010 and 2012 Settlement Agreements speak for themselves and, to the extent that the
allegations set forth in Paragraph No. 19 are inconsistent with or otherwise misconstrue or
inaccurately characterize the agreements, denies the same.
20.

Answering the allegations contained in Paragraph No. 20, Woody admits that

Stafford initiated the bid process contemplated by the Settlement Agreements with respect to the
Bid Properties. V./ oody further admits that the Bid Properties had previously been leased to
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Smith Chevrolet Co. by Staffwood but denies the legal validity and enforceability of the leases.
Woody otherwise denies the allegations of Paragraph No. 20.
21.

Woody lacks knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny the allegations

of Paragraph No. 21 and therefore denies the same.
22.

Answering the allegations contained in Paragraph No. 22, Woody states that the

2012 Settlement Agreement speaks for itself and, to the extent that the allegations set forth in
Paragraph No. 22 are inconsistent with or otherwise misconstrue or inaccurately characterize the
agreement, denies the same.
23.

Woody lacks knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny the allegations

of Paragraph No. 23 and therefore denies the same. Woody specifically denies that he owes any
obligation to Stafford.
24.

Woody lacks knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny the allegations

of Paragraph No. 24 and therefore denies the same.
25.

Admit.

26.

Woody denies the allegations of Paragraph No. 26 and affirmatively alleges that

after he won the bidding process, he discovered several issues with the Bid Properties resulting
from the actions and inactions of Stafford which resulted in Staffwood being unable to deliver
marketable title to the Bid Properties as required by the Settlement Agreements.
27.

Answering the allegations of Paragraph No. 27, Woody admits that after the

conclusion of the bid process it was discovered that Stafford had caused the Outlet Property to be
titled in Smith Chevrolet Co. rather than Staffwood and in an effort to take advantage of his
5
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years of deception regarding title to the Outlet Property, Stafford refused, and continues to
refuse, to cause title to the Outlet Property to be transferred to Staffwood and instead has leased
the Outlet Property to a third-party to the benefit of Smith Chevrolet Co. Woody otherwise
denies the allegations of Paragraph No. 27.
28.

Answering the allegations of Paragraph No. 28, Woody admits that the third

member of Staffwood's managerial board resigned and that as a result Staffwood could not
legally take any action not approved and agreed to by Stafford and Woody. Nonetheless,
Stafford took, and continues to take, unauthorized, unilateral actions on behalf of Staffwood.
Woody otherwise denies the allegations of Paragraph No. 28.
29.

Admit.

30.

Answering the allegations contained in Paragraph No. 30, Woody states that the

referenced document speaks for itself and, to the extent that the allegations set forth in Paragraph
No. 30 are inconsistent with or otherwise misconstrue or inaccurately characterize the document,
denies the same.
31.

Answering the allegations contained in Paragraph No. 31, Woody states that the

referenced document speaks for itself and, to the extent that the allegations set forth in Paragraph
No. 31 are inconsistent with or otherwise misconstrue or inaccurately characterize the document,
denies the same.
32.

Answering the allegations contained in Paragraph No. 32, Woody states that the

referenced document speaks for itself and, to the extent that the allegations set forth in Paragraph

6
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No.

are inconsistent with or otherwise misconstrue or inaccurately characterize the document,

denies the same.
33.

Answering the allegatio11s contained in F'aragraph No. 33, Woody states that the

referenced document speaks for itself and, to the extent that the allegations set fo1ih in Paragraph
No. 33 are inconsistent with or otherwise misconstrue or inaccurately characterize the document,
denies the same.
34.

Answering the allegations contained in Paragraph No. 34, Woody states that the

referenced document speaks for itself and, to the extent that the allegations set forth in Paragraph
No. 34 arc inconsistent with or otherwise misconstrue or inaccurately characterize the document,
denies the same.
35.

Answering the allegations contained in Paragraph No. 35, Woody states that the

referenced document speaks for itself and, to the extent that the allegations set forth in Paragraph
No. 35 are inconsistent with or otherwise misconstrue or inaccurately characterize the document,
denies the same.
36.

Denied.

37.

Denied.

38.

Answering the allegations contained in Paragraph No. 38, Woody states that the

referenced document speaks for itself and, to the extent that the allegations set forth in Paragraph
No. 38 are inconsistent with or otherwise misconstrue or inaccurately characterize the document,·
denies the same.
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39.

Answering the allegations contained in Paragraph No. 39, Woody states that the

referenced document speaks for itself and, to the extent that the allegations set forth in Paragraph
No. 39 are inconsistent with or otherwise misconstrue or inaccurately characterize the document,
denies the same.
40.

Answering the allegations contained in Paragraph No. 40, Woody states that the

referenced document speaks for itself and, to the extent that the allegations set forth in Paragraph
No. 40 are inconsistent with or otherwise misconstrue or inaccurately characterize the document,
denies the same.
41.

Denied

42.

Denied.

43.

Answering the allegations contained in Paragraph No. 43, Woody states that the

referenced document speaks for itself and, to the extent that the allegations set forth in Paragraph
No. 43 are inconsistent with or otherwise misconstrue or inaccurately characterize the document,
denies the same and otherwise denies the allegations of Paragraph No. 43.
44.

Answering the allegations contained in Paragraph No. 44, Woody states that the

referenced document speaks for itself and, to the extent that the allegations set forth in Paragraph
No. 44 are inconsistent with or otherwise misconstrue or inaccurately characterize the document,
denies the same and otherwise denies the allegations of Paragraph No. 44.
45.

Denied.

46.

Denied.
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47.

Answering the allegations contained in Paragraph No. 47, Woody states that the

referenced documents speak for themselves and, to the extent that the allegations set forth in
Paragraph No. 47 are inconsistent with or otherwise misconstrue or inaccurately characterize the
documents, denies the same and otherwise denies the allegations of Paragraph No. 47.
48.

Answering the allegations contained in Paragraph No. 48, Woody states that the

referenced documents speaks for themselves and, to the extent that the allegations set forth in
Paragraph No. 48 are inconsistent with or otherwise misconstrue or inaccurately characterize the
documents, denies the same and otherwise denies the allegations of Paragraph No. 48.
49.

Answering the allegations contained in Paragraph No. 49, Woody states that the

referenced documents speaks for themselves and, to the extent that the allegations set forth in
Paragraph No. 49 are inconsistent with or otherwise misconstrue or inaccurately characterize the
documents, denies the same and otherwise denies the allegations of Paragraph No. 49.
50.

Denied.

51.

Denied.

52.

In response to Paragraph No. 52, Woody incorporates his responses to the

foregoing paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.
53.

Denied.

54.

Denied.

55.

Denied.

56.

Denied.
Denied.
9

58.

Denied.

59.

Denied.

60.

Denied.

61.

Denied.

62.

Denied.

63.

Denied.

64.

In response to Paragraph No. 64, Woody ineorporates his responses to the

foregoing paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.
65.

Denied.

66.

Denied.

67.

Denied.

68.

Denied.

69.

Denied.

70.

Denied.

71.

Denied.

72.

Denied.

73.

Denied.

74.

Denied.

75.

Denied.

76.

In response to Paragraph No. 76, Woody incorporates his responses to the

foregoing paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.
10

77.

In response to Paragraph No. 77, Woody states that this paragraph states a legal

conclusion to which no response is required. To the extent Paragraph No. 77 makes any factual
allegations, such allegations are denied.
78.

Denied.

79.

Denied.

80.

Denied.

81.

Denied.

82.

In response to Paragraph No. 82, Woody incorporates his responses to the

foregoing paragraphs as though folly set forth herein.
83.

Denied.

84.

Denied.

85.

Denied.

86.

Denied.

87.

Denied.

88.

Woody denies the Prayer for Relief set f01ih in the Complaint.

89.

Each and every other allegation of the Complaint which has not been expressly

admitted herein is denied.

THIRD DEFENSE
Stafford's claims are barred in whole or in part by the doctrines of estoppel, !aches and/or
unclean hands.
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FOURTH DEFENSE
Stafford's claims are barred by the lack of a meeting of the minds and/or a failure of
consideration.

FIFTH DEFENSE
Stafford's claims are barred because the agreements which he alleges are vague,
ambiguous and lacking in material terms to be enforceable.

SIXTH DEFENSE
Stafford's claims are barred, or the damages, if any, which he may be awarded should be
reduced by his failure to mitigate his damages.

SEVENTH DEFENSE
Stafford's claims are subject to setoff or offset in favor of Woody arising out of, among
other things, the facts set forth in Woody's Counterclaim.

EIGHTH DEFENSE
Stafford's claims are barred because of his own material breaches of contract and/or by
his own actions and inactions.

NINTH DEFENSE
Some or all of Stafford's claims are barred because he lacks standing to assert such
claims.

TENTH DEFENSE
Some or all of Stafford's claims are barred by his failure to join necessary and/or
indispensable parties.
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ELEVENTH DEFENSE
Stafford's claims are barred because of the parties' mutual and/or unilateral mistake(s) as
described in the Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint set forth below.

TWELFTH DEFENSE
Woody reserves the right to amend this Answer if, during the process of discovery or
trial, he learns or discovers a basis for additional affirmative defenses.

COUNTERCLAIM AND THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT
Counterclaim- and Third-Party Plaintiff Woodruff D. Smith complains against
Counterclaim-Defendant Stafford L. Smith and Third-Party Defendant Smith Chevrolet Co. Inc.
and allege as follows:

PARTIES, JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1.

Counterclaim- and Third-Party Plaintiff WoodruffD. Smith ("Woody") is an

individual residing in the State of Idaho.
2.

Counterclaim-Defendant Stafford L. Smith ("Stafford") is an individual residing

in the State of Idaho.
3.

Woody and Stafford are brothers.

4.

Third-Party Defendant Smith Chevrolet Co. Inc. ("Smith Chevrolet") is an Idaho

corporation with its principal place of business in Idaho Falls, Idaho. Smith Chevrolet is
currently wholly-owned by Stafford.
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5.

Third-Party Defendant Staffwood Partnership ("Staffwood") is a general

partnership that is equally owned (50/50) by Woody and Stafford. Woody owns his interest in
Staffwood through WDS Limited Partnership, an Idaho limited partnership with Woody and his
wife as general partners. Stafford owns his interest in Staffwood through SLS Limited
Partnership, an fdaho limited partnership with Stafford and his wife as general partners.
Staffwood is named as nominal third-party defendant so that complete relief may be granted in
this action.
6.

Pursuant to Rules 13(a), 13(b) and 14(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure,

jurisdiction and venue are proper in this Court

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
7.

Woody's and Stafford's father, Albon L. Smith, built a very successful

automobile dealership business, Smith Chevrolet, in Southeastern Idaho. Prior to 1991, Stafford
acquired the business from his father.
8.

In 1991, the dealership business, as a result of financial, ceonomic and

management challenges, faced a potential involuntary liquidation of its assets due to the
determination of its then lender, First Security Bank, not to renew its credit lines and the
dealership's inability to obtain alternative financing.
9.

Woody owned and operated a successful used car dealership called Woody's

Automotive and had demonstrated his ability to sell cars, run a profitable business, and gain the
trust and confidence of customers and employees. Woody enjoyed and continues to enjoy a
good reputation

the community for honesty and integrity.
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10.

At the request of Stafford and his father, Woody agreed to join Stafford as an

equal partner and assist Stafford in turning around the dealership business. Stafford and Woody
made a presentation to First Security Bank in Boise, Idaho, explaining to the bank that Woody
had joined Smith Chevrolet as half-owner, and asking for additional time before the financing
was terminated. The bank eventually agreed to allow additional time as a result of Woody's
entry into the business. At approximately the same time, Woody and Stafford entered into an
agreement whereby Woody was to receive fifty percent ownership in the stock of Smith
Chevrolet. Woody was the primary contact with the bank, reported daily to the bank concerning
the progress of the business, and re-established the trust and confidence of the bank. Woody also
caused Woody's Automotive to purchase overvalued inventory of Smith Chevrolet to bring cash
into the business. As a result of Woody's efforts, the credit line was eventually restored.
11.

As part of the agreement for Woody to join Stafford as an equal partner in the

dealership business, on or about January 22, 1998, Woody's Automotive was merged with Smith
Chevrolet.
12.

Together Woody and Stafford turned around the dealership business and by 2010,

Woody and Stafford jointly owned multiple dealership entities including Smith Chevrolet, Smith
Ford, Smith Hyundai and Smith RV (collectively the "Dealerships") along with several other
business entities. Woody and Stafford, mostly through Staffwood, also jointly owned multiple
parcels of real property.
i3.

For several years prior to and including 2010, Stafford had sole and exclusive

control of the Dealerships and the other business entities including Staffwood.
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14.

Over the years, disputes arose between Woody and Stafford regarding Stafford's

failure to transfer one-half of the stock of Smith Chevrolet to Woody immediately as called for
by their agreement, failure to sell the stock at the agreed price per share, failure to involve
Woody in management as required by the Stock Purchase Agreement, and failure to account to
Woody for use of funds in the Dealerships, Staffwood and the other jointly owned companies.
This resulted in Woody and Stafford each alleging various legal claims against the other.
15.

On November 10, 2010, Woody and Stafford, together with their respective

counsel and other representatives, met for the purpose of trying to resolve the disputes between
them.
16.

The November 101h meeting resulted in an agreement that was ultimately reduced

to writing in the form of a Settlement Agreement (the "2010 Settlement Agreement"). The 2010
Settlement Agreement is dated effective November 10, 2010, and was executed by Woody and
Stafford individually and on behalf of their various business entities including without limitation
Smith Chevrolet and Staffwood. Woody was to receive sole o-wnership of Smith Ford and Smith
Hyundai, and Stafford was to receive sole ownership of Smith Chevrolet and Smith Honda.
However, Stafford continued to manage Smith Ford and Smith Hyundai for approximately three
months until the closing on the 2010 Settlement Agreement, which closed as of February 11,
2011, at which time Woody assumed the management of these two dealerships.
17.

Among other things, Section 3 .12 of the 2010 Settlement Agreement identified

four parcels ofreal property owned by Staffwood which either Woody or Stafford could
purchase from Staffwood through a competitive bid process described in the agreement. The
16
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four parcels of real property identified in 2010 Settlement Agreement are "(i) the Smith
Chevrolet building and associated real property; (ii) the Smith Outlet Center building and
associated real property; (iii) the Smith RV building and associated real prope1iy; and (iv) the
Motor City property in Pocatello, Idaho." The successful bidder was to receive "marketable fee
simple title" to the property.
18.

On numerous occasions, both prior and subsequent to execution of the 2010

Settlement Agreement, Stafford, and those working at his direction, represented that the Smith
Outlet Center property was owned by Staffwood. On infonnation and belief, Stafford, or those
working at his direction, caused expenses associated with the Smith Outlet Center prope1iy,
including property taxes, to be paid by Staffwood.
19.

Within months of the closing of the 2010 Settlement Agreement, disputes arose

between Woody and Stafford, and their respective related entities, regarding the terms,
conditions and obligations of the 2010 Settlement Agreement and the parties' compliance with
the 2010 Settlement Agreement as well as newly discovered matters outside the scope of the
2010 Settlement Agreement. Among other things, Woody learned that during Stafford's
management of Smith Ford and Smith Hyundai and virtually on the date of closing, and without
notification to or consent from Woody, Stafford had unilaterally written approximately $450,000
in various checks payable to the benefit of Stafford's entities. Stafford retained the ability to
monitor Smith Ford's bank accounts after closing and had carefully timed the deposit of the
several checks so that Woody would not be aware of the checks and so that he could not stop
payment. Weeks after the closing, Woody first learned of these checks when Smith Ford's
17
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checks would not clear because virtually all of the cash in Smith Ford's bank accounts had been
paid to Stafford's benefit. These new disputes resulted in a lawsuit entitled Woodniff D. Smith,
et al. v. Stafford L. Smith, et al. Case No. CV-11-1772 being filed in this court, alleging breach

of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and other claims against Stafford. Stafford defended by
claiming that he was entitled under the 20 l O Settlement Agreement to take the cash out of Smith
Ford.
20.

Ultimately Woody and Stafford, both of whom have been represented by the same

counsel since at least 2010, together with their business entities including Smith Chevrolet and
Staffwood entered into a second Settlement Agreement dated effective July 5, 2012 (the "2012
Settlement Agreement").
21.

Among other things, the 2012 Settlement Agreement amended the 2010

Settlement Agreement to require that Stafford initiate the bid process by February 2013.
22.

On February 7, 2013, Stafford initiated the bid process by making a bid to

purchase "marketable title without financial liens and subject only easements and restrictions that
are approved following receipt of a title commitment" to the "Smith Chevrolet Prope1iy," the
"Smith RV Center Prope1iy," and the "Smith Chevrolet Outlet Center Property."
23.

The bidding process thereafter proceeded generally as set forth in the Settlement

Agreements.
24.

On August 14, 2013, Douglas Nelson, who served as both Stafford's attorney and

at Stafford's direction, Staffwood's attorney, sent an email 1o Woody's representatives regarding
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the leases between Smith Chevrolet and Staffwood. On August 2i\ Woody's counsel
responded by e-mail to Mr. Nelson's e-mail as follows:
I have been asked to respond on Woody's behalf to your e-mail of August 14111 to
Damian Smith and the Staffwood Board regarding leases on the three properties
that are subject to an ongoing bidding process between Woody and Stafford.
We agree that a discussion of a lease on the Smith Chevrolet prope1iy is
unnecessary as Stafford has given notice that he is vacating that property. A
discussion with respect to leases on the other two properties is similarly
unnecessary. If Stafford wins the bidding process, he will have the certainty he is
seemingly looking for and obviously will not need leases. If Woody wins the
bidding process, he has no interest in a long tenn lease of either property to
Stafford (and has no obligation to do so since the rental, lease tenn and lease
renewal provisions of the Settlement Agreements apply only during the time that
Staffwood own the properties) so discussion of leases on the Outlet or RV
properties is also unnecessary. However, if Woody wins the bidding process, he
would be willing to lease the RV property to Stafford for a short period sufficient
for Stafford to relocate the RV business, subject to agreement on a new written
lease which will include rent that is substantially higher than the Staffwood rent
set by Mark Peterson.
One aspect that the parties probably should discuss, however, is whether the
separation of the properties can be done in a more tax advantageous way once the
bidding process is complete. I understand that as it is currently, both parties will
have to pay considerable tax on the sale of the properties from Staffwood to the
eventual owner. If you wish to discuss any of this further, please feel free to
contact me.
25.

Mr. Nelson did not respond to this e-mail and the bidding process thereafter

continued in accordance with the Settlement Agreements.
26.

On October 17, 2013, Woody made a bid on the three properties. On October 28,

2013, Stafford advised Woody and others that he would not continue bidding on "the Staffwood
properties which are the subjects of the bidding process commenced February 7, 2013." Woody
was therefore the successful bidder under the Settlement Agreements.
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27.

On November 1

2013, Woody's attorneys sent a letter to Mr. Nelson, as counsel

for Staffwood, indicating to Mr. Nelson that under the Settlement Agreements Staffwood was
required to deliver "marketable fee simple title" to the properties and that under Idaho law
"marketable title is one which is free and clear of all encumbrances." The letter further advised
Mr. Nelson that Woody was concerned that Staffwood could not deliver such title by the
required closing date of December 12, 2013, stating the following:
1.
Each of the Properties is cunently subject to a lease agreement
with Smith Chevrolet Woody understands that Smith Chevrolet has given notice
of its intent to tenninate the lease on the Smith Chevrolet Dealership property.
Woody is unsure of the timing of the intended termination and needs confinnation
the property will be vacated prior to closing. Likewise, confirmation is also
needed that the leases on the Outlet and RV properties will also be tenninated and
those properties vacated by December 12th. If this cannot happen, then new leases
will need to be negotiated on terms acceptable to Woody. As noted in our e-mail
to you on August 27, 2013:

If Woody wins the bidding process, he has no interest in a long tenn lease of
either property to Stafford (and has no obligation to do so since the rental, lease
term and lease renewal provisions of the Settlement Agreements apply only
during the time that Staffwood own the properties) so discussion of leases on the
Outlet or RV prope1iies is also unnecessary. However, if Woody wins the
bidding process, he would be willing to lease the RV property to Stafford for a
short period sufficient for Stafford to relocate the RV business, subject to
agreement on a new written lease which will include rent that is substantially
higher than the Staffwood rent set by Mark Peterson.

Please understand that Woody does not want to harm or inconvenience Stafford in
any way. He will not put Stafford out on the street after closing. He is willing to
lease the Properties to Stafford, so that Stafford has some assurance that he can
maintain his business.
2.
Enclosed is the most recent version of a Preliminary Title
Commitment from Alliance Title. According to the Commitment, the Outlet
property ("Property C" in the Commitment) is titled in the name of Smith
Chevrolet We understand that the Outlet property was conveyed in 2003 at a
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time when the parties were in agreement that all investment property purchased
by Smith Chevrolet would be owned by Staffwood. Stafford would appear not to
dispute this, since he classified the Outlet property as Staffwood property both in
the Settlement Agreements and in his bids. Woody needs confirmation that
Staffwood will be able to deliver marketable title to this prope1iy at closing.
3.
Similarly, the Commitment indicates that a couple of small parcels
associated with the Smith Chevrolet building (Property A, tracts 3 and 4 in the
Commitment), are titled in Smith Chevrolet. These parcels were conveyed to
Smith Chevrolet in 1979 and 1980. These parcels are located at the extreme west
end of the Smith Chevrolet property. These parcels have always been used
exclusively in connection with the Smith Chevrolet Dealership property and
should have been included in the property owned by Staffwood. Woody needs
confomation that Staffwood will be able to deliver marketable title to these
parcels at closing.
4.
Exception 11 in this Commitment is a Development Agreement
between Staffwood and Bonneville County. Woody will need appropriate
assurances from Staffwood that all obligations of the property owner arising
under the Development Agreement prior to closing have been perforn1ed and
satisfied.
5.
The title company indicates that as of November 5, 2013, the total
balance owing to Wells Fargo, secured at least in part by the Properties, is
$897,624.40. Please confirn1 that Staffwood agrees with this balance and provide
an explanation as to how Staffwood intends to satisfy the debt and eliminate
exceptions 13-1 7 and 19-21 on the Commitment.
6.
Finally, Woody has learned that instead ofremoving the hydraulic
lifts and the accompanying hydraulic fluid from the service area in the Smith
Chevrolet building and obtaining the necessary governmental approvals
associated with environmental clean-up sites, the area was covered over with
concrete. Woody needs to know how Smith Chevrolet, the occupant and creator
of any environmental issues, intends to remedy this and any other environmental
issues on the Properties. Staffwood cannot convey marketable title to, and
Woody cannot accept, any property that is or potentially may be, environmentally
contaminated.
28.

The November I i

11

letter further stated the following:

fast approaching closing date and other issues, we have been
asked to suggest that Stafford and Woody, together with their attorneys and
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accountants, meet as soon as possible, perhaps even by the end of this week. In
addition to addressing the foregoing issues impacting marketable title, the
following issues could also be included in the discussions:
1.
Pocatello property. Competing offers for the purchase of the property
have been received and an agreement needs to be reached as to how to proceed.
2.
Avoidance of Unnecessary Taxes; Possible Dissolution of Staffwood. As
11
suggested in our August 2i email, it seems to make no sense to structure the
transaction as a sale of Staffwood property. This creates income tax for both
partners. The parties should discuss other structures by which the tax is not
generated, such as, for instance, a distribution in liquidation of the partners'
interests in Staffwood. This would require an appraisal of the Staffwood
properties other than the Properties, and adjustments made depending on the
differential in values. A limited closing could then occur as to the non-Staffwood
properties.
3.
New Lease of Smith Chevrolet and Smith RV. The parties can discuss
and document lease terms mutually acceptable to Stafford and Woody to continue
the lease of the Smith Chevrolet building (short tenn) and the RV property (can
be longer term for Stafford's protection).
4.
Settlement of All Accounts. At the same time, we suggest that the
accountants for both parties meet and discuss all other loans, credits, etc., to settle
all outstanding claims.
5.
Agreement to Extend Closing if Necessary. If the parties can agree on
these issues quickly, closing can occur on or before December 12 111 • If we wish to
use this closing as a way to accomplish a further separation of their interests, we
may decide that it is mutually beneficial to extend the closing in order to
accomplish this.
29.

Subsequent correspondence was exchanged by the attorneys for Woody and

Stafford on at least November 20 and 26, 2013. The attorneys also met on November 25, 2013,
to discuss the issues between Woody and Stafford.
30.

On December 4, 2013, Woody's attorneys sent a letter to the Management Board
the following:
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As you know, we represent Woodruff Smith ("Woody") and this letter is
written on his behalf As you also know, pursuant to the Settlement Agreements
by and between Stafford Smith and Woody Smith and their associated entities
(collectively, the "Settlement Agreements") Woody has won the bidding process
to purchase three properties, two of which (the Smith Chevrolet and associated
properties-"Property l," and the Smith RV property-"Property 2") are
presently titled in Staffwood, and one of which (the Smith Outlet Center
property-"Property 3") is shown by accounting records and tax returns as being
owned by Staffwood, and was represented by Stafford to be owned by Staffwood
in his bid documents, but is not yet titled in Staffwood (sometimes collectively,
the "Properties"). Woody will purchase the Properties in the name of WDS
Family Holdings, LLC (the "Purchaser"). Closing of the purchase is set for
December 12, 2013, the deadline identified in the Settlement Agreements (the
"Closing").
Under the Settlement Agreements and the applicable Idaho law, the
Purchaser of the Properties is to receive "marketable fee simple title" to the
Properties. As set forth in our letter dated November 12, 2013, addressed to
Douglas Nelson, a copy of which is attached hereto, there are significant issues
with Staffwood's ability to deliver "marketable fee simple title" to the Properties.
We met with Stafford's counsel on November 25th to discuss potential resolution
of these and other issues related to Staffwood, but Stafford's counsel have not
responded in any meaningful way to our subsequent communications and
requests.
While we and Woody remain hopeful that a mutually acceptable
resolution to all of the outstanding issues between Woody and Stafford can still be
reached timely, we and Staffwood must at the same time proceed to comply with
the Settlement Agreements. Accordingly, Woody requests formal, written and
prompt board action by Staffwood as follows:
1.
That Woody and/or Stafford be empowered to execute, on behalf of
Staffwood, statutory warranty deeds conveying to the Purchaser marketable fee
simple title to Property 1 and Property 2 at Closing, free of any lease between
Staffwood and previous tenants of such Properties;
2.
That from the proceeds of sale, the remaining balance of the Wells Fargo
loan in the approximate amount of $897,000 be paid off upon, and in conjunction
with, release of all deeds of trust, financing statements or other liens or
encumbrances in favor of Wells Fargo on any Staffwood Properties including,
without limitation, the Properties;
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3.
That Staffwood defend, indemnify and hold han11less the Purchaser
against any environmental liabilities relating to the Properties, and that Staffwood
further seek indemnification from Smith Chevrolet with respect to environmental
liability created by Smith Chevrolet during its tenancy of Property 1;
4.
That each respective partner's share of the net proceeds at Closing be
simultaneously paid to each such partner;
5.
That Staffwood make demand on Smith Chevrolet to convey marketable
fee simple title of Property 3 to Staffwood, and to pursue a cause of action against
Smith Chevrolet if such does not occur prior to or contemporaneously with
Closing. Note that if Smith Chevrolet fails to timely deed Property 3 to
Staffwood as demanded by Staffwood, Woody will proceed to close purchase of
Property 1 and Prope1iy 2, and reserve the sum of $338,000 (which is the amount
shown in Staffwood accounting records as having been paid by Staffwood for the
purchase of Property 3) for later closing when Staffwood has secured the
requested conveyance of Property 3; and
6.
That no Staffwood funds shall be authorized to pay any attorneys' fees
incurred by the partners or Board members relating to any disputes between the
partners relative to the Settlement Agreements or the matters referred to in these
requested actions and resolutions.
Each of the foregoing actions and resolutions is consistent with Staffwood's
obligations to the Purchaser of the Properties. Woody supports each of the
foregoing actions and requests that Stafford and/or Mark Peterson join him to
approve the same. A failure to promptly take such actions will result in
Staffwood (and certain members of its Board) incmTing unnecessary liabilities.
Allowing such a result would be at least a breach of the fiduciary duties owed to
Staffwood and will result in personal liability on the part of the other members of
the Management Board.
Finally, be advised that "Notice" is hereby given that if the Board action
requested in this letter is not taken on or before December 11, 2013, Woody
intends to file litigation seeking a declaratory judgment that Woody is entitled to
the relief requested herein as well as pursuing other claims against Staffwood and
the other members of the Management Board based on their present and past
failures to act in the best interest of Staffwood.
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31.

Counsel

Stafford sent e-mails or letters on December 6, 11, and 17, 2013,

addressing the issues between the parties. In at least the December 6th and 11th correspondence,
Stafford's counsel continued to assert that Staffwood did not own the Outlet Center Property.
32.

On December 9, 2013, Mark Peterson resigned from the Management Board. Mr

Peterson stated that the reason he was resigning was "the allegations and demands of [the
December 4th] letter."
33.

Stafford's counsel thereafter wrote a letter to Woody's counsel on December 20,

2013. The first line of that letter suggested that it was part of an on-going correspondence aimed
at settlement. It thanked Woody's counsel for their "letter yesterday and settlement proposal."
The letter discussed Stafford's potential purchase of certain properties from Staffwood, but
stated that Woody had "requested that the proceeds from the sale not be distributed until the
parties reach a settlement agreement." The letter also clarified that it did not outline all of the
terms for settlement between the parties: "we will expect to promptly receive your proposal for
dividing Staffwood's remaining properties between the partners." (Emphasis added.)
34.

Woody's counsel responded to Stafford's counsel in a letter dated January 13,

2014. The second line of that letter suggested that the December 20 letter was not sufficiently
specific to constitute a valid offer to contract: "For purposes of certainty and clarification, we

set forth below further detail about our understanding of the terms of settlement." (Emphasis
added.) The January 13 letter also included proposals that were not part of the December 20
letter. It stated, "we propose that the parties attempt to agree on a way this transaction may be
done on a tax free basis," and "[a]lso, as requested, we propose a division of the balance of the
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Staffwood property, which we have set forth below." Moreover, the letter suggested that any
agreement would need further finalizing before it was valid: "Funds escrowed by Woody in the
bid process shall be returned upon finalizing this Agreement." (Emphasis added.) The letter
then outlined ten "points of understanding," most of which were terms that had not appeared at
all in the December 20 letter, including the following:
•

"The balance of the properties shall be divided into two sets of
property/cash as set forth below. Stafford shall have the choice to choose
Property Set A or Property Set B, and Woody shall receive the Property
Set not elected by Stafford .... "

•

"Staffwood's approximately 7 acre plot west of the Snake River shall not
be divided, but shall be conveyed by Staffwood to the City of Idaho Falls
in connection with the Closing in order that each of the parties in their
capacity of partners of Staffwood may receive equal benefit of the write
off."

•

"Conveyance of property in Property Sets A and B to the respective party
shall occur contemporaneously with the Closing. No such conveyance or
transfer of funds shall occur prior to Closing."

•

"The parties agree that upon Closing, all debts, claims or obligations (a)
owing to Staffwood from themselves or their respective entities, (b) owing
to them from Staffwood, and (c) owing to each other (except for (i)
continuing obligations of Stafford pursuant to Section 3 .3 of the
November 10, 2010 Settlement Agreement, and (ii) continuing obligations
of the parties pertaining to the windup of SV Idaho pursuant to Section 4
of the July 5, 2012 Settlement Agreement), if any, shall be released and
settled by this Agreement."

•

"In order to reduce taxes to the maximum extent possible, the parties agree
to discuss and attempt to agree prior to Closing concerning ways by which
Stafford's receipt of the 3 bid properties along with other divisions of cash
and property to the parties hereunder may be treated overall as an equal
distribution of Staffwood assets in liquidation of their ownership interests
in Staffwood. If the parties cannot agree prior to Closing, Closing of the
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bid properties and the subsequent divisions shall take place exactly as set
forth above."
•

Staffwood shall remain in existence after the Closing until the end of
calendar year 2014 in order that Staffwood may be used to complete a
1031 like-kind exchange if desired, provided that nothing shall require any
action which increases the tax burden of the other party."

•

"Staffwood shall then be dissolved prior to the end of calendar year 2014,
unless it is being utilized for a 1031 like-kind exchange as described in
paragraph no. 9 above; in which case, Staffwood will be dissolved upon
completion of the 1031 transaction."

Thus, the January 13 letter contained at least 7 proposed material tenns that had not been spelled
out in the December 20 letter and stated that any agreement would need finalizing.
35.

Stafford's counsel responded to the January 13 letter in a letter dated January 30,

2014. The first line of that letter stated that "Stafford is pleased that Woody has accepted
Stafford's settlement offer based on the terms communicated in my letter to you dated December
20, 2013." (Emphasis added.) The letter enclosed "a draft Addendum to the TitleOne Escrow
Instructions to effect a Closing regarding Stafford's purchase of the properties subject to the bid
process, as well as the transfer of Property Set A to Woody and Property Set B to Stafford."
The letter also stated that Stafford had not yet decided on Woody's proposal of structuring the
transfer of Staffwood properties as a liquidation and that "Stafford anticipates that he will be
provide[d] a description of these two options in the near future and then let Woody choose which
way he wants to proceed."
36.

The January 30th letter also emphasized the need for a drafted and signed third

Settlement Agreement and explained that several material terms were up in the air: "ln the
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meantime, the parties will still need to prepare and sign a third Settlement Agreement
regarding this matter inasmuch as a number oftlte terms are not covered by tlte enclosed
Addendum." (Emphasis added.) The letter outlined seven "issues" that would need to be

addressed by a third Settlement Agreement and then stated, "Please let me know as soon as
possible if you have any suggested changes to the enclosed Addendum, and whether you agree
that the parties should prepare and sign a third settlement agreement along the lines proposed
herein." Thus, the January 30 letter was clear in its call for a fonnalized, signed settlement
agreement and in the need to resolve several outstanding terms.
37.

On February 5, 2014, Stafford's counsel sent an email to Woody's counsel. It

attached "a spreadsheet showing the financial breakdown of the closing [Stafford] ha[s]
proposed." In response to a request from Woody's CFO that the deposit be released, Stafford's
counsel declined the request on Stafford's behalf, stating, "Unfortunately, prior history indicates
that when trying to finalize agreements between these parties, the 'devil is in the details.'
(Emphasis added.) We have yet to receive a response we sent to you last Thursday so we don't
know at this stage how close we are to an agreement. In light of Mike's email to me last
Thursday that 'there will, indeed, be a material issue or two,' (that he is cautiously optimistic
will be worked out), we do not think it is advisable to release the escrow funds at this time." His
e-mail further clarifies that no final agreement had been reached between the parties when he
asks: "[w]hen do you anticipate getting back to us on our proposal[?]"
38.

Woody's counsel responded via email on February 6, 2014. That email stated

that "it seems we are very close to agreement, but clarified that any agreement was "subject to
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some clarifications or decisions on the following list of issues." The email listed several such
"issues" that needed clarifying or resolution before closing, one of which was that Woody would
need to receive a "[d]raft of an acceptable Settlement Agreement."
39.

On February 20, 2014, Stafford's counsel sent an email to Woody's counsel.

Contrary to previous representations made by Stafford's counsel on February 5 that no
agreement had been reached at that point, the email now contended that the parties had "reached
an agreement as to the terms for Stafford's purchase of the bid properties and the distribution of
other real property owned by Staffwood partnerships." The email transmitted certain
attachments and stated, "[w]e believe these attached documents reflect the terms of the parties'
agreement." The email did not, however, provide a draft third Settlement Agreement as
requested by Woody's counsel in the February 6 email and January 30 letter, nor did it address
with specificity the myriad outstanding issues outlined in the February 6 email.
40.

Stafford's counsel wrote Woody's counsel a letter dated March 3, 2014. The

letter refers to the potential purchase of the bid properties and the division of other property as
part of a single settlement agreement: "it is the position of my client, Stafford Smith, that the
parties have entered into an e11forceable settlement agreement regarding: ( 1) Stafford's
purchase of the bid properties for the sum of $2,800,000; and (2) the division of certain
remaining Staffwood properties, ... " (Emphasis added.) The letter also referred to those tenns
of the expected settlement agreement as "two primary issues": "Stafford has relied to his
detriment on the fact that the parties have reached an agreement on these two primary issues . ..
(Emphasis added.) The letter then warned that "[i]f the Closing does not take place by March
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6, then Stafford will have no other choice but to sue Woody to enforce the parties' settlement
agreement." (Emphasis added.) It is notable that the March 3 letter refers to a single "settlement
agreement" between the two parties and that it refers to the subject matter of those alleged
agreements as "two primary issues."
41.
In the March

Correspondence was further exchanged between counsel on March 5 and 7, 2014.

i 11 con-espondence counsel for Stafford advised that this litigation had been

initiated.
42.

After multiple requests from Woody, on March 25, 2014, Woody received a copy

of a lease dated February 10, 2014, pursuant to which Smith Chevrolet leased the Outlet Property
to Teton Volkswagen.
43.

Stafford also claims that he was required to pay-off a loan owed to Wells Fargo

Bank by Staffwood.
44.

To the extent that Stafford took any action on behalf of Staffwood, he did so

without the knowledge or consent of Woody and therefore had no authority to act on behalf of
Staffwood.
45.

On information and belie±: payment of the Wells Fargo loan was done to benefit

Stafford personally and/or resulted from actions taken by Stafford for his personal benefit and
not for the benefit of Staffwood.
46.

In response to repeated requests for infomiation regarding the payoff of the Wells

Fargo loan, Stafford's attorneys have advised "that Stafford did not have any substantive
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communications or negotiations with Wells Fargo Bank regarding the Staffwood Loan and there
are no such agreements or conespondence 1o provide."
47.

Stafford has caused other actions such as the preparation of tax returns to be taken

on behalf of Staffwood without the knowledge, consent or approval of Woody. Many of these
actions have been done in a way which benefit Stafford and are to the detriment of Woody.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Declaratory .Judgment-Lack of Binding Settlement Agreement)
48.

Woody incorporates the allegations of the prior paragraphs as if presented fully

49.

Stafford contends that the communications between counsel for Woody and

herein.

Stafford, described above and in Stafford's Amended Complaint, were sufficient to form two
separate, legally binding and enforceable settlement agreements and that Woody breached such
agreements.
50.

As set forth above in the referenced correspondence and given the long history of

disputes between the parties, including the failure of an initial stock purchase agreement between
the brothers in the 1990' s, as well as the failure of two subsequent settlement agreements to fully
resolve the myriad disputes between the parties, the negotiations between the parties were an
effort to reach a final, global or all-encompassing agreement that would once and for all separate
Woody's and Stafford's business interests and resolve the remaining issues between them.
Indeed, as asserted by Stafford's counsel, the "devil is in the details," and the parties had not yet
agreement on those details. Both parties had learned that any settlement agreements
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needed to be very carefully documented, considered, and then signed by both parties before any
agreement was to be reached between the parties in view of the failure of three previous written
agreements.
51.

Woody and Stafford failed to reach agreement on all material tenns of a

settlement agreement and, for the at least the reasons set forth in support of Woody's Motion to
Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment, no legally binding and enforceable
settlement agreement was fonned.
52.

Woody is therefore entitled to a judicial declaration that Woody and Stafford did

not reach a legally binding and enforceable settlement agreement and that Woody and Stafford,
and their respective business entities including Staffwood and Smith Chevrolet, remain subject to
the 20 l Oand 2012 Settlement Agreements (except to the extent that those agreements may be
rescinded or equitably refom1ed by the Court).
53.

Woody is further entitled to such preliminary and permanent injunctive relief as

may be necessary to prohibit Stafford and Smith Chevrolet from taking any action inconsistent
with the Court's judicial declaration.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(Declaratory Judgment-Outlet Center Property)
54.

Woody incorporates the allegations of the prior paragraphs as if presented fully

55.

In November 2013 the parties learned that the Outlet Center Prope1iy was titled in

herein.

the name of Smith Chevrolet.
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56.

Prior to this time the parties believed and acknowledged that the Outlet Center

Property was owned by Staffwood.
57.

Both the 2010 and 2012 Settlement Agreements acknowledged and represented

that the Outlet Center Property was owned by Staffwood.
58.

On numerous occasions, Stafford, and those working at his direction, represented

that the Smith Outlet Center property was owned by Staffwood. On information and belief:
Stafford, or those working at his direction, caused expenses associated with the Outlet Center
property, including property taxes, to be paid by Staffwood.
59.

Throughout the bidding process under the Settlement Agreement, the parties

included and acknowledged the Outlet Center property as property owned by Staffwood.
60.

I( in fact, the Outlet Center property were owned by Smith Chevrolet, Stafford

would not have needed to include the property in the bidding process which he initiated in
February 2013.
61.

Staiiing in November 2013, Stafford and Smith Chevrolet refused to acknowledge

Staffwood's ownership of the Outlet Center property in order to gain an advantage in their
dealings with Woody.
62.

Pursuant to a lease dated February 10, 2014, pursuant to which Smith Chevrolet

leased the Outlet Center prope1iy to Teton Volkswagen. Smith Chevrolet is not the owner of the
Outlet Center property and had no right to lease the property to a third party.
63.

Woody is therefore entitled to a judicial declaration that the Outlet Center

property is owned by Staffwood. Woody is further entitled to a judicial declaration that any
33

or other agreement entered into by Smith Chevrolet with respect to the Outlet Center
property is invalid and null and void and any amounts paid to Smith Chevrolet under the
aforementioned lease or otherwise must be immediately paid over to Staffwood.
64.

Woody is further entitled to such preliminary and pennanent injunctive relief as

may be necessary to require Stafford and Smith Chevrolet to immediately transfer title to the
Outlet Center property to Staffwood, to pay over any amounts rightfully due to Staffwood and to
prohibit Stafford and Smith Chevrolet from taking any action inconsistent with the Court's
judicial declaration.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
(Unjust Enrichment/Constructive Trust)
65.

Woody incorporates the allegations of the prior paragraphs as if presented fully

66.

As set forth herein, Stafford and Smith Chevrolet have been unjustly enriched by

herein.

their refusal to deliver title to the Outlet Center property to Staffwood and by exercising
improper dominion and control over the property and the proceeds received therefrom.
67.

The Court should impose a constructive trust on the Outlet Center property and

any proceeds derived therefrom.
68.

Woody and/or Staffwood are further entitled to a money judgment in an amount

sufficient to disgorge Stafford and Smith Chevrolet of their unjustly obtained benefit and to
compensate Woody and/or Staffwood in an amount to be proven at trial.
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FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Declaratory Judgment-Marketable Title)
65.

Woody incorporates the allegations of the prior paragraphs as if presented fully

66.

Under the terms of the 2010 and 2012 Settlement Agreements, the winner of the

herein.

bidding process provided for in the agreements is to receive "marketable fee simple title" to the
properties subject to the bid.
67.

"Marketable fee simple title" is one which is free and clear of all encumbrances.

68.

As the winner of the bidding process, Woody is entitled to receive "marketable

fee simple title" to the three properties which were the subject of the bidding process, identified
by Stafford as the following: "Smith Chevrolet Property," the "Smith RV Center Property," and
the "Smith Chevrolet Outlet Center Property."
69.

As described above, particularly in Paragraph No. 27, the properties are subject to

encumbrances. Due to the self-serving actions of Stafford, Staffwood has not been able to
address such encumbrances (many of which benefit Stafford) and deliver "marketable fee simple
title" to the properties as required by the 2010 and 2012 Settlement Agreements.
70.

Woody is therefore entitled to a judicial declaration that he is entitled to receive

title to the properties which were the subject of the bidding process free and clear of all
encumbrances including without limitation those identified in Paragraph No. 27 above.
71.

Woody is further entitled to such preliminary and permanent injunctive relief as

be necessary to require Stafford and Smith Chevrolet to remove encumbrances on the
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properties including termination of the lease agreements in favor of Smith Chevrolet and to
prohibit Stafford and Smith Chevrolet from taking any action inconsistent with the Court's
judicial declaration.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Breach of Contract)
72.

Woody incorporates the allegations of the prior paragraphs as if presented fully

73.

As set forth herein, Stafford and Smith Chevrolet have materially breached the

herein.

express terms of the 2010 and 2012 Settlement Agreements.
74.

Under Idaho law, and inherent in the Settlement Agreements, are implied

covenants of good faith and fair dealing. These covenants of good faith and fair dealing apply to
every aspect of the contractual relationships between Woody and Stafford and their related
business entities. These covenants of good faith and fair dealing prohibit Stafford and Smith
Chevrolet from intentionally or purposefully doing anything which would impair, destroy or
injure Woody's right to receive the fruits of the Settlement Agreements and the ordinary and
reasonably anticipated benefits and consideration of the agreements.
85.

To comply with these covenants, Stafford and Smith Chevrolet had an obligation

to act consistently with the Settlement Agreements' agreed common purposes and Woody's
justified and reasonable expectations.
86.

Stafford and Smith Chevrolet have breached their covenants of good faith and fair

dealing by engaging in at least the conduct set forth above.
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87.

As a direct result of Stafford's and Smith Chevrolet's material breaches of the

2010 and 2012 Settlement Agreements, Woody has been damaged and is entitled to recover his
actual, consequential, incidental and expectancy damages suffered as a result of Stafford's and
Smith Chevrolet's material breaches, all in an amount to be proven at trial.

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Declaratory Judgmcnt-Staffords Unilateral Actions on Behalf of Staffwood)
88.

Woody incorporates the allegations of the prior paragraphs as if presented fully

89.

Woody and Stafford equally own Staffwood. No action may therefore be taken

herein.

on behalf of Staffwood without the knowledge, consent and approval of both Woody and
Stafford.
90.

As described herein, Stafford has taken, and continues to take, actions on behalf

of Staffwood without the knowledge, consent or approval of Woody.
91.

Many of the actions unilaterally taken by Stafford are for his own benefit and to

the detriment of Woody.
92.

Woody is therefore entitled to a judicial declaration that any unilateral actions

taken by Stafford on behalf of Staffwood are invalid and null and void. Woody is further entitled
to a declaration that to the extent that such unilateral actions have damaged Staffwood or Woody,
Stafford is personally liable for such damages.
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93.

Woody is further entitled to such preliminary and pennanent injunctive relief as

may be necessary to prohibit Stafford from taking any action on behalf of Staffwood without
Woody's knowledge, consent and approval.
SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Breach of Fiduciary Duty)

94.

Woody incorporates the allegations of the prior paragraphs as if presented fully

95.

By reason of the duties created by the 2010 and 2012 Settlement Agreements and

herein.

otherwise, Stafford owed Woody and Staffwood a fiduciary duty to avoid self-dealing for
Stafford's own benefit or the benefit of Smith Chevrolet, and to protect the interests of Woody
and Staffwood.
96.

As set forth herein, Stafford materially breached his fiduciary duties.

97.

Smith Chevrolet aided and abetted, and benefitted from, Stafford's breaches of his

fiduciary duty.
98.

As a direct result of Stafford's material breaches of his fiduciary duties and Smith

Chevrolet's aiding and abetting such breaches, Woody and/or Staffwood have been damaged and
are entitled to recover their actual, consequential, incidental and expectancy damages suffered as
a result of Stafford's and Smith Chevrolet's actions and inactions, all in an amount to be proven
at trial.
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EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Mutual Mistake)

99.

Woody incorporates the allegations of the prior paragraphs as if presented fully

I 00.

Staffwood's ownership of the Outlet Center property was a material assumption

herein.

and understanding underlying the 2010 and 2012 Settlement Agreements.
101.

In November 2013 the parties learned that the Outlet Center property was titled in

the name of Smith Chevrolet.
102.

As described herein, since November 2013, Stafford and Smith Chevrolet have

taken the position that Staffwood does not own the Outlet Center property and Smith Chevrolet
has refused to transfer title to the property to Staffwood.
103.

As further described herein, Woody disputes Stafford's and Smith Chevrolet's

claim to ownership of the Outlet Center property.

u: however, the Court determines the Outlet

Center property is owned by Smith Chevrolet, such a detern1ination will establish that parties
relied on a mutual mistake of a material fact fundamental to the 2010 and 2012 Settlement
Agreements.

I 04.

As a result of such mutual mistake, the 2010 and 2012 Settlement Agreements

must be rescinded or otherwise equitably reformed.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Woody prays for judgment against Stafford and/or Smith Chevrolet on at
grounds stated

for

as follow:
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1.

On the First, Second, Fourth and Sixth Causes of Action, for entry ofjudicial

declarations and preliminary and permanent injunctions as set forth therein.
2.

On the Third Cause of Action, for imposition of constructive trust and entry of a

money judgment in an amount to disgorge Stafford and Smith Chevrolet of their unjustly
obtained benefit and to compensate Woody and/or Staffwood in an amount to be proven at trial.
3.

On the Fifth and Seventh Causes of Action, for entry of a money judgment

against Stafford and Smith Chevrolet sufficient to compensate Woody and/or Staftwood for their
actual, consequential, incidental and expectancy damages suffered as a result of Stafford's and
Smith Chevrolet's actions and inactions, all in an amount to be proven at trial.
4.

On the Seventh Cause of Action, if a mutual mistake is found, for an order

rescinding or otherwise equitably reforming the 2010 and 2012 Settlement Agreements.
5.

For interest, attorneys' fees and costs, including, without limitation expert fees,

forensic accounting fees, consulting fees, and other costs and expenses, to the fullest extent
allowed by law, including, without limitation, as allowed by Idaho Code 12-120(3 ), 12-121, 48608, and Rule 54( e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
6.

For other relief: in equity or at law, which the Court finds appropriate under the

circumstances presented herein.
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JURY DEMAND

Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 38(b), Woody demands a trial by jury of any
issue triable of right by a jury.
DA TED this

///t

day of April, 2014.
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C.

Michael W. Spene
Greggory J. Savage /
Michael D. Mayfield
Attorneysfr>r Defendant, Counterclaim-Plaint[ff
and Third-Party Plaint!ff Woodruff D. Smith
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this

_j//f day of April, 2014, a true and correct copy of

ANSWER, COUNTERCLAIM AND THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT was mailed, First Class
postage prepaid, to the following:
Kara L. Pettit
Michael R. Carlston
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office box 45000
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
Stanley J. Preston
PRESTON & SCOTT
Five Gateway Office Center
178 S. Rio Grande Street, Suite 250
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
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Michael W. Spence (Pro Hae Vice Application Pending)
Greggory J. Savage (Pro Hae Vice Application Pending)
Michael D. Mayfield (Idaho State Bar No. 7857)
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C.
36 South State Street, Suite 1400
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
Telephone: (801) 532-1500

Attorneys for Defendant, Counterclaim-Plaintiff and
Third-Party Plaintf[f Woodruff D. Smith

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE, STATE OF IDAHO

STAFFORD L. SMITH,
Plaintiff and Counterclaim Defendant,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE
ALTERNATIVE MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

V.

Civil No. CV-2014-1434
WOODRUFF D. SMITH,
Judge Jon Shindurling
Defendant and Counterclaim Plaintiff.
WOODRUFF D. SMITH,
Third-Party Plaintiff,
vs.
SMITH CHEVROLET CO. INC. and
STAFFWOOD PARTNERSHIP,
Third-Party Defendants.

Pursuant to Rule l 2(b)( 6) and Rule 56(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure,
Defendant, Counterclaim-Plaintiff and Third-Party PlaintiffWoodruffD. Smith ("Woody"), by
and through counsel, respectfully submits this Memorandum in Supp011 of Defendant's Motion
to Dismiss or in the Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment.

INTRODUCTION
The key question in this motion is whether the parties fom1ed valid contracts based on
letter and e-mails exchanged between counsel for the parties. As set forth below, the
communications were nothing more than a series of back-and-forth negotiations with an eye
toward a settlement agreement that was never reached. Plaintiff Stafford Smith ("Stafford")
seeks to enforce two alleged "contracts" based on those back-and-forth negotiations, but for at
least three reasons Stafford's own Amended Complaint is fatal to his claims. First, the Amended
Complaint establishes that the parties have a long history of disputes and that the goal of the
negotiations between the parties was an all-encompassing settlement agreement, not a series of
piecemeal contracts. Second, the Amended Complaint establishes that there was never an
agreement as to all of the material tem1s of any contract and that, instead, the communications
between the parties were simply a series of back-and-forth negotiations with no valid offer or
acceptance. And third, there was a mutual mistake about the ownership of one of the properties
at issue that would render any contract unenforceable. Stafford is simply seeking to enforce
agreements to agree and the "contracts" he alleges are merely some tem1s of a settlement
agreement that was never reached. Stafford's contract claims fail and his Amended Complaint
should be dismissed.
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BACKGROUND
This action is about a failed attempt by Stafford and Woody to settle a prolonged dispute
for the third and what was hoped to be, final time. The parties are brothers who have had various
business relationships over the years. (Am. Comp!. ,i,i 6 & 8.) Over the years, disputes arose
between the parties about the management and ownership interests in certain businesses. These
disputes came to a head in approximately 2010. (Id. ,i 8.) The parties asserted legal claims
against one another and later entered a Settlement Agreement dated effective as of November l 0,
2010 (the "2010 Settlement Agreement".). (Id. ,i,i 8-9.) The 2010 Settlement Agreement
divided various car dealerships and other businesses between the parties and included a mutual
release of all claims. (Id ,i 9.) But after the closing of the 2010 Settlement Agreement in
February 2011, another lawsuit was filed and it became apparent that the parties still had disputes
over several issues both related to the 2010 Settlement Agreement and otherwise. (Id. ,i,i 11-13.)
Effective as of July 5, 2012, the parties entered a second settlement agreement (the "2012
Settlement Agreement."). (Id. ,i 14.) This second settlement agreement purported to settle all
claims and disputes between the parties and their various business entities and also included a
mutual release of claims. (Id.

ili! 14-15.)

of the 2012 Settlement Agreement. (Id.

The lawsuit was also dismissed with prejudice in light

,r 15.)

But like the 2010 Settlement Agreement, the

2012 Settlement Agreement was not the end of the story.
Disputes arose between the parties again in 2013. (Id

i! 26.)

These disputes related to

the business interests that the parties shared, and included issues about the bidding process to
purchase three properties owned by Staffwood, the general partnership that is co-owned between
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the parties, and division of other properties owned by Staffwood. (Id

,ri! 4 , 20-1

One of the

three properties that Woody won the right to purchase was known as the Outlet Property, but an
issue arose as to whether that property was even owned by Staffwood. 1 (Id

,r 27.)

Other issues

came to light such as environmental concerns on real property leased from Staffwood and
operated by Stafford's dealership, third-party defendant Smith Chevrolet Co, Inc.
Several communications between the parties and their counsel are relevant to the current
lawsuit and this motion to dismiss. Stafford included those communications, or references
thereto, in his Amended Complaint and attached some of them thereto. The Court may therefore
consider them without converting this motion to a motion for summary judgment. Idaho Wool
Growers Ass 'n, Inc. v. State, 154 ldaho 716, 721, 302 P.3d 341, 346 (Idaho 2012) (considering
on a 12(b)(6) motion a letter that plaintiff had incorporated into the complaint); Stewart v.
Arrington Const. Co., 92 Idaho 526, 530, 446 P.2d 895, 899 (1968) ("Where other matters are
incorporated by reference in the pleadings, the comi may properly consider such matters in
passing on the [12(b)(6)] motion ... "). Those communications include: (1) a December 20,
2013 letter from Stafford's counsel to Woody's counsel (the "December 20 letter"); (2) a January
13, 2014 letter from Woody's counsel to Stafford's counsel (the "January 13 letter"); (3) a
January 30, 2014 letter from Stafford's counsel to Woody's counsel (the "January 30 letter"); (4)
emails between Stafford's counsel and Woody's counsel on February 5 and 6, 2014 (the
"February 5 email" and "February 6 email"); (5) a February 20, 2014 email from Stafford's

1

Stafford contends that the Outlet Property is owned by Smith Chevrolet and in February 2014 he caused the Outlet
Property to be leased to a third-party.
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counsel to Woody's counsel (the "February 20 email"); and (6) a March

2014 letter from

Stafford's counsel to Woody's counsel (the "March 3 letter"). These communications make
clear that, instead of forming two discrete contracts about the purchase and division of
properties, the parties were working to resolve their disputes through an all-encompassing
settlement agreement that was never reached. This memorandum describes each communication
in turn.
A.

The December 20, 2013 Letter

Stafford's counsel Stanley Preston wrote a letter to Defendant's counsel on December 20,
2013, which was incorporated into the Amended Complaint and attached thereto as Exhibit A
The first line of that letter suggested that it was part of an on-going correspondence aimed at
settlement. It thanked Woody's counsel for their "letter yesterday and settlement proposal."
(Id.) The letter discussed Stafford's potential purchase of certain properties from Staflwood, but

stated that Woody had "requested that the proceeds from the sale not be distributed until the
parties reach a settlement agreement." (Id.) The letter also clarified that it did not outline all of
the terms for settlement between the parties: "we will expect to promptly receive your proposal
for dividing Staffwood's remaining properties between the partners." (Id. (emphasis added).)
B.

The January 13, 2014 Letter

Woody's counsel responded to Stafford's counsel in a letter dated January 13, 2014,
which was incorporated into the Amended Complaint and attached thereto as Exhibit B. The
second line of that letter suggested that the December 20 letter was not sufficiently specific to
constitute a valid offer to contract: "For purposes of certainty and clarification, we set forth
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below further detail about our understanding of the terms of settlement." (Am. Com pl. Ex. B
(emphasis added).) The January 13 letter also included proposals that were not part of the
December 20 Jetter. It stated, "we propose that the parties attempt to agree on a way this
transaction may be done on a tax free basis," and "[a]lso, as requested, we propose a division of
the balance of the Staffwood property, which we have set forth below." (Id.) Moreover, the
letter suggested that any agreement would need further finalizing before it was valid: "Funds
escrowed by Woody in the bid process shall be returned upon finalizing this Agreement." (Id.
(emphasis added).) The letter then outlmed ten "points of understanding," most of which were
terms that had not appeared at all in the December 20 letter, including the following:
•

"The balance of the properties shall be divided into two sets of prope1iy/cash as
set forth below. Stafford shall have the choice to choose Property Set A or
Property Set B, and Woody shall receive the Property Set not elected by Stafford.
"

•

"Staffwood's approximately 7 acre plot west of the Snake River shall not be
divided, but shall be conveyed by Staffwood to the City of Idaho Falls in
connection with the Closing in order that each of the parties in their capacity of
partners of Staffwood may receive equal benefit of the write off"

•

"Conveyance of property in Property Sets A and B to the respective party shall
occur contemporaneously with the Closing. No such conveyance or transfer of
funds shall occur prior to Closing."

•

"The parties agree that upon Closing, all debts, claims or obligations (a) owing to
Staffwood from themselves or their respective entities, (b) owing to them from
Staffwood, and (c) owing to each other (except for (i) continuing obligations of
Stafford pursuant to Section 3.3 of the November 10, 2010 Settlement Agreement,
and (ii) continuing obligations of the parties pertaining to the windup of SV Idaho
pursuant to Section 4 of the July 5, 2012 Settlement Agreement), if any, shall be
released and settled by this Agreement."
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•

"In order to reduce taxes to the maximum extent possible, the parties agree to
discuss and attempt to agree prior to Closing concerning ways by which
Stafford's receipt of the 3 bid properties along with other divisions of cash and
property to the parties hereunder may be treated overall as an equal distribution of
Staffwood assets in liquidation of their ownership interests in Staffwood. If the
parties cannot agree prior to Closing, Closing of the bid prope1iies and the
subsequent divisions shall take place exactly as set forth above."

•

Staffwood shall remain in existence after the Closing until the end of calendar
year 2014 in order that Staffwood may be used to complete a 1031 like-kind
exchange if desired, provided that nothing shall require any action which
increases the tax burden of the other party."

•

"Staffwood shall then be dissolved prior to the end of calendar year 2014, unless
it is being utilized for a 1031 like-kind exchange as described in paragraph no. 9
above; in which case, Staffwood will be dissolved upon completion of the 1031
transaction."

Thus, the January 13 letter contained at least 7 proposed material terms that had not been spelled
out in the December 20 letter and stated that any agreement would need finalizing.
C.

The January 30, 2014 Letter

Stafford's counsel responded to the January 13 letter in a letter dated January 30, 2014,
which is attached to the Amended Complaint as Exhibit D. The first line of that letter stated that
"Stafford is pleased that Woody has accepted Stafford's settlement offer based on the terms
communicated in my letter to you dated December 20, 2013." (Am. Compl. Ex. D (emphasis
added).) The letter enclosed "a draft Addendum to the TitleOne Escrow Instructions to effect a
Closing regarding Stafford's purchase of the properties subject to the bid process, as well as the
transfer of Property Set A to Woody and Property Set B to Stafford." (Id) The letter also stated
that Stafford had not yet decided on Woody's proposal of structuring the transfer of Staffwood
properties as a liquidation and that "Stafford anticipates that he will be provide[ d] a description
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of these two options in the near future and then let Woody choose which way he wants to
proceed." (Id.)
The letter also emphasized the need for a drafted and signed third Settlement Agreement
and explained that several material terms were up in the air: "In the meantime, the parties will
still need to prepare and sign a third Settlement Agreement regarding this matter inasmuch as
a number of the terms are not covered by the enclosed Addendum." (Id (emphasis added).)
The letter outlined seven "issues" that would need to be addressed by a third Settlement
Agreement and then stated, "Please let me know as soon as possible if you have any suggested
changes to the enclosed Addendum, and whether you agree that the parties should prepare and
sign a third settlement agreement along the lines proposed herein." (Id.) Thus, the January 30
letter was clear in its call for a fonnalized, signed settlement agreement and in the need to
resolve several outstanding terms.
D.

The February 5 and 6, 2014 Emails

Stafford also made emails from early February a part of the Amended Complaint and
attached them thereto as Exhibit C. The first email was from Stafford's counsel to Woody's
counsel on February 5, 2014. It attached "a spreadsheet showing the financial breakdown of the
closing [Stafford] ha[s] proposed." (Am. Compl. Ex. C.) On February 5, 2014, Stafford's
counsel sent an email to Woody's counsel. It attached "a spreadsheet showing the financial
breakdown of the closing [Stafford] ha[s] proposed." In response to a request from Woody's
CFO that the deposit be released, Stafford's counsel declined the request on Stafford's behalf,
stating, "Unfortunately, prior history indicates that when trying to finalize agreements between
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these parties, the 'devil is in the details.' We have yet to receive a response we sent to you last
Thursday so we don't know at this stage how close we are to an agreement. In light of Mike's
email to me last Thursday that 'there will, indeed, be a material issue or two,' (that he is
cautiously optimistic will be worked out), we do not think it is advisable to release the escrow
funds at this time." His e-mail further clarifies that no final agreement had been reached
between the parties when he asks: "[ w]hen do you anticipate getting back to us on our
proposal[?]" (Id. (emphasis added).)
Woody's counsel responded via email on February 6, 2014. That email stated that "it
seems we are very close to agreement," but clarified that any agreement was "subject to some
clarifications or decisions on the following list of issues." (Id.) The email listed several such
"issues" that needed clarifying or resolution before closing, one of which was that Woody would
need to receive a "[ d]raft of an acceptable Settlement Agreement." (Id.)
E.

February 20, 2014 Email

On February 20, 2014, Stafford's counsel sent an email to Woody's counsel that is
incorporated into the Amended Complaint and attached thereto as Exhibit E. The email
contended that the parties had "reached an agreement as to the tem1s for Stafford's purchase of
the bid prope1iies and the distribution of other real property owned by Staffwood partnerships."
(Am. Compl. Ex. E.) The email transmitted certain attachments and stated, "[w]e believe these
attached documents reflect the terms of the parties' agreement." (/d.) The email did not,
however, provide a draft third Settlement Agreement as requested in the February 6 email and
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January 30 letter, nor did it address with specificity the myriad outstanding issues outlined in the
February 6 email.
F.

The March 3, 2014 Letter

Stafford's counsel wrote Woody's counsel a letter dated March 3, 2014, which was
incorporated into the Amended Complaint and attached thereto as Exhibit F. Importantly, the
letter refers to the potential purchase of the bid properties and the division of other property as
part of a single settlement agreement: "it is the position of my client, Stafford Smith, that the
parties have entered into an enforceable settlement agreement regarding: (I) Stafford's
purchase of the bid properties for the sum of $2,800,000; and (2) the division of certain
remaining Staffwood properties, ... " (Am. Compl. Ex. F (emphasis added).) The letter also
referred to those terms of the expected settlement agreement as "two primary issues": "Stafford
has relied to his detriment on the fact that the parties have reached an agreement on these two
primary issues . ... " (Id (emphasis added).) The letter then warned that "[i]f the Closing does

not take place by March 6, then Stafford will have no other choice but to sue Woody to enforce
the parties' settlement agreement." (Id (emphasis added).) It is notable that the March 3 letter
refers to a single "settlement agreement" between the two parties instead of the two distinct
agreements that are alleged in the Amended Complaint and that it refers to the subject matter of
those alleged agreements as "two primary issues."
ARGUMENT

This key issue in this motion is whether the parties reached an enforceable contract or
whether their communications were simply continued settlement negotiations and counter
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proposals. The "general rules for the formation of a binding contract" are straightforward. C.H.
Leavell and Co. v. Grafe and Assocs., 90 Idaho 502,511,414 P.2d 873, 877 (Idaho 1966). To
form a valid contract, "[t]he minds of the parties must meet as to all of its tenns, and, if any
portion of the proposed terms is unsettled and unprovided for, there is no contract." Id
(emphasis added). To be enforceable, "[a] contract must be complete, definite, and certain in all
its material terms." Lawrence v. Hutchinson, 146 Idaho 892,898,204 P.3d 532, 538 (Idaho Ct.

App. 2009) (emphasis added). A valid acceptance is also required to form an enforceable
contract. But"[ a ]n acceptance of an offer, to be effectual, must be identical with the offer and
unconditional, and must not modify or introduce any new terms into the offer." Leavell, 90
Idaho at 511 (emphasis added). "An acceptance which varies from the terms of the offer is a
rejection of the offer and is a counter proposition, which must in turn be accepted by the offeror
in order to constitute a binding contract." Id at 511-12; see also Gyurkey v. Babier, 65 I P .2d
928,931 (Idaho 1982) (acceptance must be unconditional of the terms of the offer or it is a
rejection and counteroffer). Put simply, a contract is not valid if (1) it is not certain as to all
material tenns or if (2) it is the subject of continued negotiations and proposals.
On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under
I.R.C.P. I2(b)(6), "the question is whether the non-movant has alleged sufficient facts in support
of his claim which, if true, would entitle him to relief." Rincover v. State, Dep't of Fin., Sec.
Bureau, 128 Idaho 653,656,917 P.2d 1293, 1296 (Idaho 1996). If not, the motion to dismiss
should be granted. Summary judgment, on the other hand, is warranted where "there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter

" I.R.C.P. 56(c). In making a summary judgment determination, "[a]ll disputed facts are
to be construed liberally in favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that can
be drawn from the record are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party." Kiebert v. Goss,
144 Idaho 225,227, 159 P.3d 862, 864 (Idaho 2007).
Stafford's Amended Complaint should be dismissed in light of these standards for several
reasons. Stafford suggests that the parties' back-and-forth negotiations resulted in two distinct
contracts, calling one the "Bid Properties Purchase Agreement" and the other the "Division of
Staffwood Properties Agreement." But the reality is that those two "agreements" were simply
parts of a broad settlement agreement that the parties were hoping to reach. Settlement was at
the very core of the parties' negotiations and the purchase of the bid properties and division of
other properties were just pieces of a larger puzzle, a puzzle which in two prior attempts the
parties had not been able to solve. The parties had not reached an agreement on other material
terms related to those portions of the settlement agreement and various other material terms
related to settlement generally. Instead, as Stafford's Amended Complaint establishes, the
communications between the parties were "nothing more than a series offers and counter offers
which never ripened into a binding contract." Id at 513.
This memorandum divides the arguments as to why a binding agreement was not reached
by the parties into four parts. First, it explains why the parties' negotiations about a purchase of
the Bid Properties did not fonn a contract. Second, it explains why the parties' negotiations
about division of other Staffwood properties did not fonn a contract. Third, it explains why
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Stafford fails to state a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Finally, it explains why Stafford fails to state a claim of promissory estoppel.

I.

The Parties Never Formed a "Bid Properties Purchase" Contract.

Stafford contends that the parties entered into an enforceable "Bid Properties Purchase
Agreement," but that contention suffers at least three fatal flaws: (1) purchase of the Bid
Properties was simply part of a potential settlement agreement; (2) the communications were
nothing more than ongoing negotiations and counter proposals; and (3) there was a mutual
mistake about ownership of the Outlet Property.
A.

Terms About the Purchase of the Bid Properties Were Simply Part of a
Broad Contemplated Settlement Agreement.

Stafford overlooks the fact that the main goal of the parties in negotiating was to resolve
their ongoing dispute. As such, their purported "agreement" about the bid properties was just
one piece of the puzzle. There is no document called the "Bid Properties Purchase Agreement,"
Stafford created that title out of whole cloth. Instead, there was simply a series of back and forth
communications that discuss the bid properties among other issues-all with an eye toward an
all-encompassing settlement.
That the terms about bid properties and dissolution were simply parts of a broad putative
settlement agreement is established by the Amended Complaint. The Amended Complaint, for
example, makes clear that the negotiations between the two pai1ies came on the heels of two
previous settlement attempts, that there was "a new dispute between Plaintiff and Defendant,"
Compl. , 27), and that the communications
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the parties was

effort to negotiate

a resolution of this dispute." (Am. Comp I.

i! 29.)

The January 30 letter that Stafford made a part

of the Amended Complaint also made elear that "the parties will still need to prepare and sign a
third Settlement Agreement regarding this matter inasmuch as a number of the terms are not
eovered." (Arn. Comp 1. Ex. D.) That the parties still "need[ed] to prepare and sign a third
Settlement Agreement, after the time in whieh Stafford contends a "Bid Properties Purchase
Agreement" was fom1ed, establishes that the principle aim of the negotiations was to reach a
settlement agreement and that no such contract had been formed.
The March 3 letter further establishes that settlement was at the heart of the negotiations.
That letter stated that "it is the position of my client, Stafford Smith, that the parties have entered
into an enforceable settlement agreement regarding: (I) Stafford's purchase of the bid properties
for the sum of $2,800,000; and (2) the division of ce1iain remaining Staffwood properties."
(Am. Cornpl. Ex. F.) Notably, the letter refers to a single "settlement agreement," not two
discrete contracts as suggested in the Amended Complaint. That letter also cautions, "[i]f the
Closing does not take place by March 6, then Stafford will have no other choice but to sue
Woody to enforce the parties' settlement agreement." (Id. (emphasis added).) The parties were
trying to reach a global settlement agreement, and proposed terms about bid properties and
division of properties were simply parts of that potential agreement.
B.

There Was No Offer or Acceptance Because Each Communication
Contained Clarifications and Counterproposals and there Was No Meeting
of the Minds as to Several Material Terms.

Stafford's claims about a "Bid Properties Purchase Agreement" fail for another reason:
was never an

or "acceptance" of sueh an agreement. It is axiomatic that "[ajn offer
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... must be so complete that upon acceptance an agreement is formed which contains all of the
terms necessary to determine whether the contract has been performed or not" and that "[a]n

acceptance of an offer, to be effectual, must be identical with tlte offer and unconditional, and
must not modify or introduce any new terms into the offer." Leavell, 90 Idaho at 511 (emphasis

added). Stafford suggests that Woody accepted the terms of his December 20 ofter, but the
reality is that Stafford's December 20, 2013 letter was not a valid offer and was followed by a
series of counter proposals and clarifications that refute any notion of acceptance.
1.

January 13 Letter

Woody's January 13, 2014 letter, which is Stafford's primary basis for arguing there was
an acceptance, made clear from the outset that the December 20, 2013 letter was not sufficiently
detailed to constitute a valid "offer." It stated that "[f]or purposes of certainty and clarification,
we set forth below further detail about our understanding of the terms of settlement." (Am.
Cornpl. Ex. B.) That statement alone establishes that the January 13 letter was not an acceptance
because the December 20 "offer" was not sufficiently clear. Instead of an acceptance, the
January 13 letter was just another step in the negotiating process.
In addition to providing "further detail" for purposes of "certainty and clarification," the
January 13, 2014 letter also could not constitute an acceptance because it proposed new terms.
First, it stated "[i]n paragraph no. 8 below, we propose that the parties attempt to agree on a way
that this transaction may be done on a tax free basis." (Id (emphasis added).) Even though the
letter states that Stafford's assent to that term was not required, that proposal "introduce[d] a[]
new tem1[]"to the agreement and, therefore, negated any notion of acceptance. Leavell, 90 Idaho
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at 511. The January 13 letter included additional proposals as well. It stated, "[a]lso, ... we
propose a division of the balance of the Staffwood property," (Id), and then the letter outlined
ten "points of understanding" in which Woody clarified and proposed various terms that were
not included in Stafford's alleged "offer." The second point of understanding, for example,
proposed that "[t]unds escrowed by Woody in the bid process shall be returned upon finalizing
this Agreement." (Id) That provision alone makes clear that the January 13 letter was not an

outright acceptance and that the agreement was not yet final. The other myriad clarifications and
proposals also made clear that the January 13 letter was a far cry from an acceptance. Instead, it
was simply another communication in a series of negotiations and proposals aimed at reaching
an all-encompassing settlement agreement.
2.

January 30 Letter

The January 30 letter also failed to constitute an acceptance of an enforceable contract.
That letter enclosed "a draft Addendum" related to the purchase of the bid properties and asked
Woody's counsel if they had "any suggested changes" to it. (Am. Comp I. Ex. D.) More
importantly, that letter made clear the "the parties will still need to prepare and sign a third
Settlement Agreement regarding this matter inasmuch as a number of terms are not covered by
the enclosed Addendum." (Id) The letter then outlined several proposals for the settlement
agreement and asked whether Woody "would agree that the parties should prepare and sign a
third settlement agreement along the lines proposed herein." (Id) Importantly, one of the
factors that is "helpful in detennining the intention of the parties" to contract is "whether the
negotiations themseives indicate that a written draft is contemplated at the final conclusion of the
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negotiations.

Lawrence, 146 Idaho at 898. The January 30 letter is conclusive that the parties

contemplated such a formalized agreement and it also put forward a series of counter proposals
that showed that the parties had not yet had a meeting of the minds as to all material terms.

3.

February 5 and 6 Emails

The February 5 email further established that no enforceable contract had been formed
about a purchase of the Bid Properties. Referring to the closing for the purchase of the bid
prope1iies, Stafford's counsel asked "[w]hen do you anticipate getting back to us on our
proposal?" (Am. Compl. Ex. E.) That question established that there was no final agreement at
that time. Woody's counsel underscored that point when he responded that "it seems we are
very close to agreement, subject to some clarifications or decisions on the following list of
issues." (Id. (emphasis added).) That statement was accompanied by a list of unresolved issues,
which, taken together, further show that the parties had not had a meeting of the minds as to
several material terms and therefore had not formed a valid contract about the purchase of the bid
properties.
C.

According to the Amended Complaint, There Was a Mutual Mistake About
the Ownership of the Outlet Property.

Even if the parties had formed a valid contract about the "Bid Properties Purchase,"
which they did not, such a contract would not be enforceable because the Amended Complaint
establishes that there was a mutual mistake between the parties about the ownership of the Outlet
Property. Importantly, "[r]escission is the proper remedy where there is a mutual mistake of fact
is material or fundamental to the contract" 0 'Connor v. Harger Const.,

,1

Idaho
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904, 909, 188 P.3d 846, 851 (Idaho 2008). That remedy "abrogates the contract and restores
parties to their original position, as if the contract had never occurred." Id According to the
Amended Complaint, the parties mistakenly assumed that one of the properties that Stafford
sought to purchase-the Outlet Property-was owned by Staffwood. The Amended Complaint
asserts that "the title company that reviewed the ownership of the Bid Properties discovered that
Smith Chevrolet is the record title owner of the Outlet Property, which created an issue as to
whether Staffwood or Smith Chevrolet was the owner of the Outlet Property." (Am. Compl.

~

27.) It is manifest that the ownership of a property is a fact that "is material or fundamental to
the contract" to purchase such property. 0 'Connor, 145 Idaho at 909. Thus, an agreement about
the purchase of the Bid Properties would not be enforceable in any event because it would have
been entered based on a mutual mistake of the parties.
II.

The Parties Never Formed a "Division of Staffwood Properties" Contract.

Stafford's claim about a "Division of Staffwood Properties" contract fails for similar
reasons. Stafford suggests that he accepted a valid offer about the division of the Staffwood
properties in the January 30 letter, but that suggestion falters. An acceptance, is simply not valid
if it is not "identical with the offer and unconditional" or ifit "modif1ies] or introduce[s] any new
tem1s into the offer," Leavell, 90 Idaho at 511 (emphasis added), and the January 30 letter ran
afoul of those requirements. To start, it proposed various new terms for Woody's consideration.
Some of those tenns were in an enclosed draft Addendum related to the purchase and division of
properties. Others were outlined in the letter itself, including seven "issues," or material terms,
that needed to be addressed for settlement. The letter also proposed that the parties sign a "third
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Settlement Agreement regarding this matter inasmuch as a number of the terms are not covered
by the enclosed Addendum." (Id.) That proposal in and of itself was a material tenn to the
parties' agreement. And the letter also reaffirmed that it was a proposal and not an acceptance of
any contract, stating "[p ]lease let me know as soon as possible if you have any suggested
changes to the enclosed Addendum, and whether you agree that the parties should prepare and
sign a third settlement agreement along the lines proposed herein." (Id (emphasis added).) The
January 30 letter was not an "acceptance" of a valid contract because it contained myriad
proposals and because the division of properties was simply a part of an effort towards an allencompassing settlement agreement.
Nor was a valid contract fanned afier the January 30 letter. Communications between
the parties after that date establish that the pariies were "very close to agreement, but that
"clarifications or decisions" were needed on a whole range of issues. (Arn. Cornpl. Ex. C.)
Those communications establish that a "[d]raft of an acceptable Settlement Agreement" was
required, (Id.), and clarify that a binding contract had not been formed.

III.

Stafford Fails to State a Claim for Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and
Fair Dealing Because there is No Enforceable Contract.

Stafford contends that Woody breached an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, but he fails to state a claim as a matter of law. "The implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing is a covenant implied by law in the parties' contract." Lettunich v. Key Bank Nat 'l
Ass 'n, 141 Idaho 362, 368, I 09 P.3d 1104, 1110 (Idaho 2005) (internal quotation marks and

omitted). But where an agreement between parties
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not enforceable,

are no

1

obligations imposed by

agreement that the parties are required to perform in good faith." Id

Where, as here, no binding contract is formed, claim for breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing cannot stand. Id (affirn1ing grant of summary judgment against claim for
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing where agreement between parties
was not enforceable).
IV.

Stafford Fails to State a Claim for Promissory Estoppel Because that Doctrine is a
Substitute for Consideration, Not a Substitute for a Definite Agreement.
Stafford also raises a claim based on the doctrine of promissory estoppel, but that claim is

also deficient. It is well-settled that "[p ]romissory estoppel is simply a substitute for
consideration, not a substitute for an agreement between parties." lettunich, 141 Idaho at 36768. Because of that, the "doctrine of promissory estoppel is of no consequence," where, as here,
"[w]hat is lacking is a suniciently definite agreement." Id In other words, "[b]ecause there is
'no complete promise ... to be enforced' here, [Stafford] is unable to avail [him]self of
promissory estoppel." Bank <~(Commerce v. .Jejjerson Enterprises, 154 Idaho 824,835,303 P.3d
183, 194 (Idaho 2013). Put simply, "[i]t is not for Jack of consideration that [Stafford's] claim
fails, but rather for lack of an agreement itself" Chapin v. Linden, 114 Idaho 393, 397, 162 P.3d
772, 776 (2007). The doctrine of promissory estoppel is of no moment here and fails to cure the
fiaws in Stafford's contract claims.
CONCLUSION
Stafford fails to state valid contract claims because the Amended Complaint establishes
the parties did not form valid, enforceable contracts about the
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Properties

or division of other properties owned by Stai1wood. The parties instead were simply engaged in
ongoing negotiations toward a final settlement agreement that was never reached. The Amended
Complaint should accordingly be dismissed.
DATED this

//f-- day of April, 2014.
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